46 Ala. 384 | Ala. | 1871
This is an application by Robert S. Thornton for a rule to be directed to the honorable chancellor of the eastern chancery division of this State, sitting for the county of Cherokee, to show cause why a peremptory mandamus shall not be issued against him in order to compel him to reinstate on the docket of the chancery court of said county of Cherokee a certain cross-bill filed by said Robert S. Thornton on the 23d day of November, 1870, to the original bill of complaint of Mary A. Kyle, by her next friend Robert B. Kyle, complainant, against said Robert S. Thornton and Nat. M. Thornton, as the administrators of the estate of Ann C. E. Thornton, deceased, defendants, filed on the 14th day of September, 1870, in said chancery court of said county of Cherokee, which said cross-bill was dismissed out of said court on the third day of February in the year 1871, on demurrer, by order of the learned chancellor of said court.
The allegations of the petition for mandamus show that Mary A. Kyle, by her next friend Robert B. Kyle, filed her bill of complaint in the chancery court of Cherokee county in this State, on the 14th day of September, 1870, against Robert S. Thornton and Nat. Macon Thornton, as the administrators of the estate of Ann C. E. Thornton, deceased, and on the 23d day of November, 1870, said Robert S. Thornton filed his answer to said bill of complaint, and therein, by way of cross-bill, prayed relief against said complainant for certain causes connected with or growing out of the subject matter of said original bill, as in said cross-bill is shown and set forth, as allowed by law. To which said cross-bill, by way of answer thereto, the said complainant in said original bill demurred for want of equity. This demurrer was heard on the 3d day of February, 1871, before the final determination of said cause, and the same was sustained, and said cross-bill was dismissed out of said court, and the said Robert S. Thornton was taxed with the costs of said cross-bill.
The Revised Code declares that, “the defendant may obtain relief against the complainant for any cause connected with or growing out of the subject-matter of the