We granted certiorari to review the Court of Criminal Appeals' reversal in this case in light of United States v.Leon, ___ U.S. ___,
The salient facts are as follows:
The defendant, Robert Lee Crittenden, had cohabitated with Sara Jackson, who had a nine-year-old daughter. The two quarreled and separated, and, according to the testimony of the defendant, Sara Jackson threatened him, saying that she would get back at him somehow.
Some time after the defendant moved out, Sara Jackson learned that her daughter had gonorrhea. The following day, October 8, 1982, Sara went to the sheriff's office seeking an arrest warrant, and she executed an affidavit in support thereof, which accused the defendant of first degree sexual abuse of her daughter. The defendant was arrested pursuant to the warrant, was convicted by the Circuit Court of Covington County of attempted rape in the first degree, and was sentenced to ten years and a day in prison.
On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals,
In its petition for certiorari, the State argues that, according to Illinois v. Gates,
Our earlier cases illustrate the limits beyond which a magistrate may not venture in issuing a warrant. A sworn statement of an affiant that "he has cause to suspect and does believe" that liquor illegally brought into the United States is located on certain premises will not do. Nathanson v. United States,
[ 290 U.S. 41 , 54 S.Ct. 11 ] (1933). An affidavit must provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause, and the wholly conclusory statement at issue in Nathanson failed to meet this requirement. An officer's statement that "[a]ffiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe" that heroin is stored in a home, is likewise inadequate. Aguilar v. Texas, 78 L.Ed. 159 [ 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 ] (1964). As in Nathanson, this is a mere conclusory statement that gives the magistrate virtually no basis at all for making a judgment regarding probable cause. Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others. In order to ensure that such an abdication of the magistrate's duty does not occur, *634 courts must continue to conscientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are issued. [Emphasis added.] 12 L.Ed.2d 723
"Before me, Clerk or Magistrate of District Court, this day personally appeared Sara Jackson and made oath that he [sic] has probable cause for believing and does believe that within twelve (12) months before the making of this affidavit that Robert Lee Crittenden, a/k/a "Bean," whose name is otherwise unknown to the affiant, he being sixteen years of age or older, did subject to sexual contact [the victim], who was less than twelve years of age, in violation of §
13A-6-66 of the Code of Alabama, against the peace and dignity of the State of Alabama. SEXUAL ABUSE — First Degree §13A-6-66 which said offense has been committed against the peace and dignity of the State of Alabama."
It is clear that this is the "bare-bones" type affidavit that the United States Supreme Court said in Gates would be inadequate. Alabama courts also recognize that affidavits, like the one in the present action, which consist solely of the affiant's conclusion that the named individual committed an offense, without setting forth the facts upon which the conclusion is based, are fatally defective. Malone v. State,
A "bare-bones" affidavit can be validated if it is supplemented with additional facts which the magistrate considered before determining that probable cause was present. The Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on this issue, but there was no showing that the magistrate had anything upon which to base the probable cause determination except the affidavit. Without such additional information, the affidavit and arrest warrant cannot be given any effect in this case.
In the case sub judice, soon after his arrest, the defendant gave a confession to the police. According to Taylor v.Alabama,
In Leon, the Supreme Court, addressing the argument concerning the policy of deference to a magistrate's probable-cause determination, stated:
[R]eviewing courts will not defer to a warrant based on an affidavit that does not "provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause." Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at [239],
. . . . 103 S.Ct., at 2332
___ U.S. at ___,
Although the Court was willing to assume [in Beck v. Ohio,
, [ 379 U.S. 89 , 85 S.Ct. 223 ] (1964)] that the arresting officers acted in good faith, it concluded that 13 L.Ed.2d 142 "`good faith on the part of the arresting officers is not enough.' Henry v. United States,
, 361 U.S. 98 102 ,, 80 S.Ct. 168 171 ,. If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be `secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' only in the discretion of the police." [Beck v. Ohio, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 , at 97, 379 U.S. 89 at 229 (1964).] We adhere to this view and emphasize that nothing in this opinion is intended *635 to suggest a lowering of the probable-cause standard. On the contrary, we deal here only with the remedy to be applied to a concededly unconstitutional search. 85 S.Ct. 223
___ U.S. at ___,
The exception we recognize today will also not apply in cases where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role in the manner condemned in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York,
, 442 U.S. 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2319 (1979); in such circumstances, no reasonably well-trained officer should rely on the warrant. Nor would an officer manifest objective good faith in relying on a warrant based on an affidavit "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. [590] at 610-611, 95 S.Ct. [2254] at 2265-2266 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 920 (1975)] (POWELL, J., concurring in part); see Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. [213] at [___], 103 S.Ct. [2317] at [___, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1983)] (WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment). Finally, depending on the circumstances of the particular case, a warrant may be so facially deficient — i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized — that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. Cf. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, [___] U.S. [___] at [___], 104 S.Ct. [3424] at [___, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1984)]. 82 L.Ed.2d 737
___ U.S. at ___,
In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause. Only respondent Leon had contended that no reasonably well-trained police officer could have believed that there existed probable cause to search his house; significantly, the other respondents advance no comparable argument. Officer Rombach's application for a warrant clearly was supported by much more than a "bare bones" affidavit. The affidavit related the results of an extensive investigation and, as the opinions of the divided panel of the Court of Appeals make clear, provided evidence sufficient to create disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to the existence of probable cause. Under these circumstances, the officers' reliance on the magistrate's determination of probable cause was objectively reasonable, and application of the extreme sanction of exclusion is inappropriate.
___ U.S. ___,
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, FAULKNER, JONES, ALMON, SHORES, EMBRY and BEATTY, JJ., concur.