Ex parte Selma & Gulf Railroad

45 Ala. 696 | Ala. | 1871

Lead Opinion

PETERS, <T.

A primary question in this case is, the constitutional validity of the law under which the people of the county of Dallas acted in the matter set forth in the *725complainant’s petition, in the court below. This depends, in the first instance, upon the power of the legislature of the State to create corporations ; and in the second place, the power to bestow upon such corporations as it may create, the authority to contract debts, or obligations in the nature of debts. If these questions are affirmatively answered, as it seems to me they must be, then one of the chief difficulties in this case is removed.

It would be but a waste of time to attempt to show that the general assembly of this State may establish corporations. It would be equally vain to argue that such corporations, when so created, may not be clothed with a power to contract debts, or to enter into such obligations as individuals may enter into. A corporation is an artificial person, and is solely the creature of the law-making power, in this country. And it may exercise such authority, in all matters with which it may deal, as the legislature may think fit to bestow upon it, where the legislative power itself is not limited by some constitutional restriction.— 2 Kent, 273, 276, 277, 278, 275 ; 1 Kydd Corp. 13, 69, 70 ; 1 Bla. Com. 475; Ang. & Ames Corp. 1, 2, et seq.; Dartmouth College v. Wooaward, 4 Whea. 636, Marshall, C. J., arguendo.

The county is a corporation created by law. Like most corporations, its powers are necessarily specific and limited, but such powers as it may exercise, it owes to legislative grant. And the legislature may make such grant as broad as it thinks fit, unless there is a constitutional restriction which confines such grant to a specific limit. The legislature is simply the agency by which the people exercise the sovereign law-making powers remaining to them as citizens of the State, and not abandoned to the government of the whole Union. For, in the two governments, the national and the State governments, the absolute sovereign power of the people to make laws is vested. There is no power for this purpose exist ng anywhere else. Between these the whole sovereignty to make laws is absorbed. And it is beyond question that the people, as the absolute sovereigns, may do what they think best. They are the supreme and irresistible power to make and to *726unmake,” in the States and in the nation.— Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 389, 390 ; Tiffany on Gov. 46, § 74, et seq., and notes. In their action, without constitutional organization, the majority necessarily represents the sovereign will, which is the law. — 1 Bla. Com. 44; 1 Steph. Com. 25. This is the case with all bodies of men who act without the limitations which an Organization may prescribe.— 1 Tucker’s Bla. Com. app. 168,172; 1 Story Const. § 330; 9 Dane Abr. 37, 43; Ruthf. Inst. p. 249,’ §§ 1, 2. Then, with us, where there is no limit imposed by the national organization, which we call the government of the United States, in such matters as those involved in this case, the States are free to act as they please. And they act without restraint, except such as they may impose upon themselves. — Dorman v. The State, 34 Ala. 216, 230; Cooley, 87, 172, 173; Smith Com. p. 312, 313. Most clearly, this is a question with which the constitution of the Union has nothing to do. It is a question of a grant of power to a State corporation, which acts wholly within the State, and wholly for domestic purposes. It is a question, then, as to what powers a State may confer on a county corporation, within its own limits. Undoubtedly, a State may divide its territory into counties, and give to each county a corporate existence. This, so far as I am advised, has never been doubted. — Const. Ala. 1819, Art. YI, § 16; Const. Ala. 1867, Art II, § 2 ; Rev. Code, § 896; Covington County v. Kinney, January T. 1871; Barbour County v. Horn, ib.; 2 Kent, Z75; Ang. & A. Corp. §§ 18, 71. That the State may authorize the counties so created to sue and be sued, to contract and be contracted with, and to levy taxes on the people of the county and on their property, is equally undisputed. — Rev. Code, §§ 897, 898, 900, 902, 904, 905 ; Stein v. Mayor and Aldermen of Mobile, 24 Ala. 591. Then, unless it appears that there is some express limitation imposed on the legislature by the State constitution, which fetters the general assembly in its power to make such a grant to the county as that exercised under the act in question in this case, it is reasonable to conclude that none such exists. The omission to make the limitation, leaves the power as broad as the sovereignty itself; that is, “ ab*727solute and irresistible.” — tí Wheat, supra. The power, then, in the legislature, to authorize the counties of the State to make contracts, to own propertv, and incur obligations, is without limit, save such as policy and discretion may demand.— Smith’s Com. pp. 312, 313 ; Booth v. Town of Woodbury, 5 Amer. Law E. p. 202.

The people of the county are the corporators of the county. — 2 Kent, 274. Like other corporations, they may have their powers restricted or enlarged by statutory enactment. This may be done by general or by special law. And whether done in the one way or the other, the corporators of the county can only be held to be bound in the event they act under authority of the law thus made. The legislature clothes them with the power to act. This the legislature has the power to do. — 24 Ala. 591, supra. And when tne county acts, as all corporations must, when no other mode is prescribed, it must perform its functions through the action of a majority of its citizens entitled to speak in its elections. — Aug. & A. Corp. §§ 84, 499 ; 1 Kydd Corp. 422; 2 Kent, 23tí.

And what the legislature does, is done by the people. The law is, theoretically at least, the united will of all the people of the State, both of those who favor the specific enactment, and of those who oppose it, and also of those who were silent and said nothing. — Dwarris Stats. 657. Then, when tne legislature declares that a county, or the people of a county, may do any particular thing, this is the declaration of all the people of the State and of all the people of the county. They all consent to the declaration, or law, thus made, and agree and bind themselves to carry it into' effect, and they accept all its consequences. This declaration, as long as it remains in force, is the law, unless the people, in some way, have bound themselves not to make such law; that is, have forbidden it in their constitution, which is their organic law. If they have, then the enactment is contrary to the legislative will of the State. It is unconstitutional and void. In such case, the legislative department of the government of the State is presumed to have fallen into an error. This, any and all the departments of the government may do. And the *728courts are bound to declare that such error has been committed, when the question is submitted to their judgment 5 and the law is held invalid for this reason. — 1 Kent, 448, 449, et seq.; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 49; Haley v, Clark, 26 Ala. 439. But this is never done, unless such, error is clear and palpable. It can not be done on mere inference and presumption. — Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cr. 87-The fact of error must be patent and beyond reasonable doubt, in order to justify the court in a judgment of nullity against an enactment of the general assembly. The wisdom and learning of the law-making power is not to be presumed to be inferior to that of the courts. Each is presumed to know the scope of its powers, and high duties which these powers originate. Each acts under like sanction of an oath, and fealty to the best interests of the people, whose agents they are. They discharge the functions of co-ordinate and separate departments of the sovereign power. They are each responsible to the people, but not to each other. They are distinct and independent. Const. 1867, Art. II, § 2. No power is expressly given to the one to review the acts of the other. Among agencies so constituted, it is an exceedingly delicate office for the one to say of the other, that it is incapable or inco npetent to the performance of a plain duty equally patent to both; that is, the duty of adhering in its action to the limits prescribed by the constitution. It is contended that the courts are bound by oath to support the constitution, and therefore they must declare an enactment void, which, in their opinion, is repugnant to the limitations of that instrument. No power of this grave nature is expressly given. Considering its importance, it is a little strange that it has been wholly omitted. But, grant that it exists. It can not be permitted to rest upon mere inference and argument; because, if the inference is a mistake, or the argument is false, its exercise is an usurpation by one branch of the government against the authority of another. Did the people mean to grant such a power, unless some express clause of the constitution was clearly disregarded ? I think not. — McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, passim; People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481.

*729The act under which the petitioner proceeded, and to the validity of which the appellees object, was approved December 81st, 1888. It is entitled, “An act to authorize the several counties, and towns and cities of the State of Alabama to subscribe to the capital stock of such railroads, throughout the State, as they may consider most conducive to their respective interests.” — Pamph. Acts 1888, p. 514, No. 172. The first section of this statute, wdiich is the operative portion, I quote below, omitting the enacting clause:

“ Section 1% That any and every county of the State of Alabama, situate upon, or adjacent to, main or branch lines of the railroads of this State, as such lines are, or may be hereafter located by the companies owning and controlling said roads respectively, is authorized and cm* poiuered to subscribe for, take and pay for the capital stock of such railroad companies of the State as they may deem most conducive to their interests, as hereinafter provided. The said railroad companies, by their president and the majority of their directors, may, in writing, propose to any such county that it shall subscribe for and take an amount of their capital stock, to be named in said proposal, at a certain price per share, and pay for the same in such bonds of the county as shall be set forth in said proposal.”— Pamph. Acts 1868, p. 514, No. 172.

The other sections of this act are merely directions as to the manner in which the “authority ” thus given is to be exercised. If the authority can be given, then undoubtedly the mode of exercising it may be given, and to a corporation like a county it should be given also. The authority is the chief thing. The modes of its exercise are the incidents. And here, as in other cases, the greater necessarily contains the less. Omne majus continet, in se, minus. — Wing. Max. 206. The thing given implies the power to enjoy its use.

If we keep the real point in controversy in this discussion properly in view, it seems to me that there can be no room for doubt. It is this: Can the legislature of this State authorize the corporations mentioned in the caption of the above cited act to contract the obligations therein *730mentioned? Where is the limitation that forbids it? I have looked in vain to find it. This is the whole question. This power has never been denied in this State. Only the mode to discharge the obligations has been questioned, but not the power to confer it. It has been repeatedly exercised and sustained in this State, and almost without exception in every State of the Union, where it has not been expressly forbidden. — Stein v. The Mayor of Mobile, 24 Ala. 591; Stein v. The Mayor of Mobile, 17 Ala. 234; see, also, Pamph. Acts 1859-60, pp. 193, 197, 246, 271, 284, 210; Pamph. Acts 1855-56, p. 291, No. 299; Pamph. Acts 1865-66, pp. 460, 461, Nos. 276, 277 ; ib. p. 534, No. 382; Pamph. Acts 1866-67, p. 4, No. 2; Pamph. Acts 1849-50, p.343, No. 201; Bev. Code* §§ 900-902. I have referred to the foregoiug enactments in order to show that the general assembly of this State has repeatedly authorized corporations in this State to contract debts for various purposes, and this power has never until recently been questioned. If the corporators act under the authority thus bestowed, they consent to incur the obligation thus created, and to accept the consequences. That is, they bind themselves to discharge it. What a corporation does, as the law provides, binds all the members, just as if all had assented to it. The minority must go with the majority, unless there is some rule to excuse them. And in this case there is none. In this respect, counties are not different from other corporations. If an obligation is contracted by the majority, in the manner authorized by law, it mus i be discharged in the manner authorized by law. It can not be repudiated because the minority complain, nor because the majority may subsequently change its views. If the obligation creates a debt, it must be paid.— Von Hoffman v. City of Quincey, 4 Wall. 535; Mitchell v. Burlington, 4 Wall. 270, 274; Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 330; Meyer v. City of Muscatine, 1 Wall. 385; Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 202. The principle upon which these cases rest is, that when a party consents to contract a debt, he also consents to the use of the necessary appliances to enforce its payment. Here, the consent to the “subscription” is a consent to the issuance of the '‘county *731bonds,” and the obligation to pay them. It is a consent to the tax, if that is the mode of/raising the funds necessary for the payment. And in a corporation, the majority of the corporators can give this consent, unless some other method is provided. — Ang. & A. Corp. p. 76, § 84; ib. p. 517, § 499 ; 2 Kent, 236. And a majority of the corpora-tors is a majority of the voters of the county, because the citizens are the corporators, and the legislature has declared that they shall act by submitting the question to be decided to the popular vote. Such legislation may be wise or unwise, but it can not now be said that in such a case the corporator is taxed without his consent, or that his property is taken and applied to public or private uses without his consent.— Gibbons v. Mobile & Great Northern Railroad Company, 36 Ala. 410; Gilman v. City of Sheboygan, 2 Bla. 510; State of Alabama, ex rel. Board for Imp. River, Harb. and Bay of Mobile, v. Comm’rs of Revenue for Mobile County, Jan. T. 1871.

There are two sections of the present constitution which, it is urged upon the court by,the learned counsel for the appellees, affect the questions involved in this case. The one is the 25th section of the first article. So much of this as is presumed to be applicable to this discussion is in these words:

“ That private property shall not be taken or applied for public use, unless just compensation be made therefor; nor shall private property be taken for private use, or for the use of corporations other than municipal, without the consent of the owner.” — Const. Ala. 1867, Art. I, § 25, Pamph. Acts 1870-71, p. v.

The other section is as follows:

“The State shall not engage in ivories of internal improvement, but its credit in aid of such may be pledged by the general assembly on undoubted security, by a vote of two-thirds of each house of the general assembly.”— Const. Ala. 1867, Art. IY, § 33, Pamph. Acts 1870-71, p. xii.

I also quote below another section of the fundamental law, which in some measure is connected with the very important question under consideration. It is this:

*732“ The general assembly shall not have power to authorize any municipal corporation to pass any laws contrary to the general laws of the State, nor to levy a tax on real or personal property to a greater extent than two per centum of the assessed value of such property.” — Const, Ala. 18u7, Art. IY, § 36, Pamph. Acts 1870-71, p. xii.

It can hardly be denied that a county is a “ municipal corporation.” — 2 Kent, 275, marg.; People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325, 335; Horton, Judge, &c., v. Mobile School Com., 43 Ala. 598; 1 Bla. Com. 116; 4 Bla. Com. 411. Then, counties are excepted out of the prohibition expressed in section twenty-five of the constitution, above cited. This is the effect of the words “ other thau,” before the word “municipal,” in said section. Then, so far as county corporations are involved, the constitution stands in this case as it did before the adoption of the present instrument. And such corporations could be authorized by the legislature of the State not only to subscribe for stock of a railroad company, but also to levy a tax for the payment of the obligation incurred for this purpose.— Gibbons v. Mobile & Great Northern Railroad Company, 36 Ala. 110.

The State undoubtedly may permit works of internal improvement to be constructed within its limits, without engaging as a party therein. It is this that the constitution prohibits. The State is different from a county. And the limitation being applied to the State alone, legal reasoning will not permit it to be extended beyond the State. Expressum facit cessare taciturn. — Broom’s Max. p. 278. The constitution, then, does not intend to fetter the action of the general assembly in its power to grant authority to any other corporations it may create to do what the State, as such, may not do. This also appears from the further fact, that a municipal corporation may be authorized to levy taxes to the extent of Uoo per centum on the value of the property assessed. — Const. Ala. 1867, Art. IY, § 36, supra. This appears from the section of the constitution above cited. And it is the exercise of this power to tax that is most persistently complained of. This power is nob within the control of this tribunal, unless it is carried beyond the limit of “two per centum” of the assessed value *733of the property, real and personal, on which the tax is levied.

Another objection to the act under discussion is, that its title conflicts with the second section of the fourth article of the State constitution, which is in these words: “ Each law shall contain but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.” — Const. 1867, Art. IY, § 2. The title to the law in controversy has already been recited. This act was approved December 31st, 1866. — Pamph. Acts 1868, p. 514, No. 172. The above cited section of the constitution of the State has already been discussed, to some extent, in this court. It is settled, that it is a command upon the general assembly which they can not disregard, and is not merely directory. But no rule is yet laid down which defines the stringency with which this command shall be construed and enforced.— Weaver v. Lapsley, 43 Ala. 224; Martin v. Hewitt, 44 Ala. 418 ; Gunter v. Dale County, ib. 639. These latter cases, without impeaching or impairing the able opinion in Weaver v. Lapsley, supra, evidently show that this command is to be liberally and broadly construed. They also acknowledge the right of the general assembly to construe the section of the constitution above referred to, and to fix their own interpretation upon it, to the same extent that may be done by the courts. If this construction may be liberal and large, they have the right so to fix it. This they have done. And it seems to me that this tribunal would pass beyond the wise limit of its powers, when it goes into minute criticisms in order to controvert the accuracy of the legislative interpretation. Yery true, the right to do this may exist; but it is never exercised save in a case wholly free from all reasonable doubt. — Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87. This is a safe rule, and can not lead to a conflict of judgment between two of the chief departments of the government. And for this reason it ought to be inflexibly adhered to.

The true “subject ” of the law in controversy is “ works of internal improvement in this State,” whether by railroads or by navigable streams. From the very birth of the State, these branches of this important subject have been united. They are mentioned together in the act of *734Congress granting to the State the two and three per cent, funds. — Code of Ala. 25, 27. This subject is everywhere treated as a unit. It is so mentioned in the State constitution itself. — Sec. 33, art. 1Y, supra. It is the basis of a great system of internal commercial intercourse. It may have an almost infinite variety of details, but it is one in purpose and in subject. Here it is the only theme of discourse in the law. — 7 Enc. Am. 16, Inland Navigation; 10 ib. 478, Railways; 11 ib. 44, Rivers Navigable; Webst. Die. Unab., word subject. “Works of internal improvement” being the theme and purpose of the legislature, all the details of the subject may justly be connected in one system by one law. This the general assembly have done. Besides, the mere use of language by that body is a high indication of its legislative fitness; particularly, as in this case, when it has the concurrent sanction of the executive. If the enactment is unsatisfactory and impolitic in the estimation of the people, let it be repealed by the proper authority, not by the courts. The objection to the title of the law I think insufficient, and it must therefore fail.

The petition alleges that, under authority of the act of December 31, 1868, above mentioned, the Selma & Gulf Railroad company, a corporation regularly and legally organized, made a proposition to Dallas county, in this State, in the manner prescribed by said statute, to take and pay for the sum of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars of the capital stock of said company. An election was ordered and held, to vote on the acceptance of this proposition by the people of the county, as required by the law, when a majority of almost two to one of the people of the county voted to accept the proposition of the company: When this is done, the court of county commissioners is authorized and required to make the subscription voted for in behalf of said county to the capital stock of said company, in the manner, and for the amount set forth in said application, and to deliver to said railroad company, in payment of said subscription, bonds of the county, having not less than ten nor more than twenty years to run, with interest coupons attached for semi-annual interest, payable at such times and places as may be agreed upon between *735the said railroad company and the said judge of probate of said county.” —Pamph. Acts 1868, pp. 514,515, 516, § 6, No. 172. By virtue of this authority and requisition of the law above said, the said railroad company applied to the court of county commissioners of said county of Dallas for the subscription to the stock of said company, and for the bonds of the county in payment therefor, to the amount so voted and accepted, as aforesaid, by the people of county; but said court of county commissioners refused to make the subscription and is-sue the bonds, as required by said act. The said railroad company then applied to the judge of the criminal court of Dallas county for an order nisi against said commissioners court, to show cause why said subscription should not be made and said bonds issued, as authorized and required by said court, or a mandamus awarded to compel the same. This the said judge refused, and the application and motion is now renewed in this court. And the application is now resisted here, on the grounds, that the statute above quoted is repugnant to the constitution of the State, and therefore void. This objection is also insufficient.

Let a rule nisi be granted, in accordance with the prayer of appellants’ petition and motion in this court, returnable into this court during the present term, on Thursday after the first Monday in July, in the year 1871, the same being the sixth day of said month of July, 1871, to show •cause, &c.

The Chief Justice concurs in the result of this opinion, but he holds that the provisos to the seventeenth section of the act above referred to are unconstitutional, and that if the title of this law had expressed the subjects of these provisos, then the whole act would have been obnoxious to the constitution, and void.






Dissenting Opinion

B. E. SAFFOLD, J.,

dissenting. — I propose to treat exclusively of the powers of the State government in the exercise of the rights of eminent domain and taxation, as modifií d and controlled by the State constitution, so far as they are applicable to the present cause. I shall endeavor *736to confine my argument to legitimate deductions from general principles of admitted truth.

A county, or other municipal corporation, has no inherent right of legislation, and can not subscribe for stock in a public improvement unless authorized to do so by the legislature.

But the legislature of a State, unless restrained by the organic law, has the right to authorize such subscription in a railroad or other work of internal improvement, and to empower the corporation to borrow money to pay for it, and to levy a tax to repay the loan. — Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327.

A distinction, now more apparent than real, but of which every one retains a consciousness, between a county and a city, has had no inconsiderable influence in directing the legislation, and in construing the laws, applicable to them. The county has never been more than a civil division of a country for judicial and political purposes, or a circuit or portion of the realm; while the city was once a state or nation itself, as its name signifies. The memory of thi3 independence and greatness is traceable in the charters of cities and acts conferring legislative powers upon them. Their transition to complete subordination to a larger state has not effaced the notion of their sovereignty, or done away with the habit or practice of according to them a local and restricted legislative and judicial power. In Alabama, no such separate existence has ever been claimed for the counties. Their officers have been the executors of the State laws only, and frequently the most important of them have been chosen outside of their boundaries. At no time have they exercised even a semblance of independent authority, or any discretion in their acts. Their duties have been rigidly prescribed by the legislature, and the mode of their performance minutely appointed.

If they are municipal corporations in any sense separable from the State, then section 36, Article IV of the State constitution is without virtue. That section undoubtedly means that the real and personal property of the citizen shall not be taxed to a greater extent than two *737per cent, per annum of the assessed value for any municipal purpose whatever distinguishable from the State. If the legislature may include one such corporation within another, and authorize each to tax to the amount limited, what protection is afforded by that provision of the constitution ?

The act which authorizes the counties, cities and towns to subscribe for stock in railroads, empowers the counties to collect a tax of one per cent, on the value of real and personal property, and cities and towns to collect two per cent, on the same description of property. Where counties include within their boundaries cities and towns, here is authority given for taxation violative of the above section of the constitution. An act of the legislature is unconstitutional when its full operation would subvert any provision of the constitution. But these corporate bodies have already authority to collect a certain amount of tax indispensable for the proper purposes of their creation. Will it be-said that the limit of taxation is the extent to to which these corporations may subscribe? Does the proposition include both principal and interest of the amount agreed to be paid ? Is that portion which can not be paid at maturity void for want of authority to contract it, or will the creditor have to wait his turn? If he must wait, will the current expenses of the corporation have priority of his demand ? The number of roads .in which a county, city or town may take stock, is unlimited. If subscriptions in several are made at the same time, as may possibly be the case, shall the taxes, when scant, be apportioned amongst them ? I fear a construction so fraught with intricacies fatal to the credit, if not the peace, of the State.

The following are among the legitimate rules for construing statutes which are not modified by any others: First, In respect to remedial laws, the old law, the mischief and the remedy, are to be considered. Second, The intention of the law-giver, deducible from the whole and every part of the law, assigning to the words their natural and obvious signification. — 1 Kent’s Com. 462. The term “ State ” has such a variety of meanings, that the one *738intended in any particular use of it must be reasonably ascertained. "We are now speaking of it in the sense of its sovereignty, because only by its governing power can it exercise the authority claimed for it. Section 25, article 1, of the constitution, is conceded to be a regulation and restraint of the right of eminent domain. Under its protection, private property can not be taken for private use, or for the use of corporations other than municipal, without the consent of the owner. It should be observed that this is only an express guaranty of what has heretofore been recognized as an inalienable right. In all other cases just compensation is to be made. Even the right of way, and, for works of internal improvement, the necessary attendant right to establish depots, stations, and turnouts, so indispensable to the proper occupation of the country, and the enjoyment by each citizen of his own property, must be paid for, and are restricted to the particular uses' for which they are taken.

The right of taxation is a prerogative of sovereignty, no more extensive or exalted than that of eminent domain. Let it be admitted that its exercise may extend, in degree, to the confiscation of private property. Its full scope and meaning is tersely expressed in the popular aphorism, “ Millions for defense; not one cent for tribute.” It is the duty of the State tó exhaust the means of its citizens in the proper defense of dearer rights, or even their future accumulation of property. But no one will contend that it has any authority to do this, except in cases of imperative necessity. As well may it claim to dispose of their rights of life and liberty. The plain and obvious meaning of a tax is, a contribution imposed by government on individuals, for the service of the State.

The people of a county, in their collective capacity, pos■sess none of the attributes of sovereignty. No legislative power is committed to them. The whole is vested in the general assembly composed of the duly elected representatives of all the counties. So far as they engage in business distinct from the purposes of government, it is as individuals, or a private corporation. To such the legislature ■is forbidden to delegate power to levy taxes. — Const. Ala. *739art. 9, § 2. How can the State legislate the people of a-comity, individually or collectively, into the constituent membership of a private corporation ? Such a body is founded upon contract, and there can be no contract without the consent of each party to it.

It is only in its municipal character, that a county may contract debts and tax its citizens to pay them. In this sense, the State itself is a municipal corporation, and it is its powers of sovereignty that the county exercises, delegated as an imposition of the duties and burdens of government on particular localities, to be specially benefited thereby. If, in such cases, we say the county is a municipality distinet from the State, then we are nullifying section So, article 4, of the constitution, by embracing one such body in another, with the authority to each to tax the citizens the full extent allowed. If it be only a constituent part of the State, we violate the 33d section of the same article, which forbids the State to engage in works of internal improvement.

Decisions of the supreme courts of several of the Northwestern States, construing provisions of their State constitions, more or less like that contained in the 33d section, above referred to, are quoted in behalf of the applicant. It may be aptly remarked of these authorities, that judicial decisions on new questions are little more than the personal opinions of the judges delivering them. It is only when they survive the criticism of time, that they attain the dignity of precedents. Some of these opinions show the lingering influence of past predilections. For instance, the Ohio court sustained a delegation of power to a county to subscribe for stock in a railroad, in the face of a direct constitutional prohibition in terms against it, although no step had been taken in the exercise of the power when the constitution became operative. The Illinois court, in support of a similar construction, said by way of argument, that the State might authorize others to do what it could not do itself; for example, it could not try a suit, yet it might authorize a court to do so. In several of these cases, there were able dissenting opinions; and in Michigan, the court, through Judge Cooley, the distinguished comment*740ator on constitutional law, declared that such legislation infringed the reserved and inalienable rights of the citizens.

What is meant by section 33, article 4, of the constitution — “ the State shall not engage in works of internal improvement; but its credit in aid of such may be pledged by the general assembly, on undoubted security, by a vote of two thirds of each house of the general assembly ” — in view of the old law, the mischief and the remedy, and the intention of the convention ? The capacity of the State to engage in such works depends entirely on its command, as a sovereign, of the property of its citizens. It had engaged with them in the banking business, and, in 1836, had signally failed, engulfing the munificent donation of the Federal government for the education of its children, and accumulating a debt which thirty-five years of taxation has not diminished. These taxes were all collected by counties, through the instrumentality of their organization, executing directly the State laws. Debt, taxation, aud consequent discontent, was the mischief. The remedy was to avoid it in the future. Who cared how much the State engaged in business or trade of any kind, if no debts contracted were to be paid by taxation ? What is the basis of the credit which the general assembly is authorized to pledge on undoubted security ? Whether a debt is due by the county or the Slate, does it not strike directly at the credit of the State? Who would trust a State full of bankrupt counties ? Was it not the object of the convention to preserve unimpaired the credit of the State, that it might be used to the utmost advantage ? In view of the fact, that no act of legislation had ever before recognized the counties as distinct from the State, I am obliged to regard it as a forced construction of this section which would now separate them.

Which is most natural and obvious: that a State can create something which has no capacity in itself, and endow it with power to do that which its creator is unable to do ; or that it can not ? Every illustration given in favor of the first of these propositions fails, lecause of some inherent or acquired capacity in the creature to do what the legislature merely regulates, not confers the power of doing. *741Why construe this provision of the organic law, evidently intended for the protection of each individual citizen, against his right to dispose of and control his own as he pleases, and in favor of the power of irresponsible persons to drag him into reckless speculation, and reduce him to poverty? If a county be not a municipal corporation, in the sense of section 36, supra, as I think it is not, then the entire property of the people of any county in this State is at the mercy of any combination of capitalists who maybe able, by fair or foul means, to control the vote of the county. They may confiscate it to their own use in the construction of railroads which, though they pass through the county, run miles away from it. The present constitution of our State asserts pre-eminently the sacredness of individual rights. It seeks to exalt the person, and to find in the security given to each the best protection for all against the tyranny alike of the government and the community.

It is insisted that, by applying the restraint of section 33, article 4, to the delegation of sovereignty as well as to its direct exercise, we prohibit all those enterprises which are usually regarded as pertaining to the ordinary administration of government. This is an admission of the stern spirit of the restriction, suppressing all such issues as look like an evasion of its meaning. There is a difference easily defined between the undertakings of government and the callings of business, though the actor in both be the State. The building of court houses and prisons, and the construction of highways and bridges, are eminently within the province of government, because they are for the use of all, without property in them for any. Even the clearing away of obstructions in navigable streams, or the moderate improvement of their navigation, must devolve upon the State, for the same reason. It can not be left to private expenditure, because the duty of the State to all its citizens forbids the granting of such exclusive privileges as would afford adequate compensation. The boundaries of the duty of the government in this respect, are of course flexible, depending upon the culture and enlightened progress of the people. A wagon or stage coach on the com*742mon highway will no more answer instead of the railroad with its trains of cars, than the canoe or barge can take the place of the magnificent steamer on the river, when the advance of the people requires the change. The time may come when the railroad shall substitute the highway as the legitimate subject of State construction,- and when trains shall be run' upon them by individuals or companies, as public carriers, under a license sufficient to keep them in repair. But that is not now, and very different will it be from the State engaging in business as a banker, carrier, merchant, and the like, and then, as a government, seizing upon the means of the people to carry it on. Against this the constitution has provided throughout all the departments and divisions of the State, whether county, city, or town, save only that their credit may be pledged on undoubted security.-