Ex Parte Reggel
delivered the opinion of the court. He .stated the facts in the foregoing language, and continued:
this case arises under §§ 5278 and 5279 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which provide :•
“ Sec. 5-278.. "Whenever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice of the executive authority of any State or Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found Or affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the-governor or chief- magistrate of the- State or Territory from whence the' person-so charged has fled, it shall be the duty of the executive authority of the State or Territory to which- such person has fled to cause him to be arrested and secured, < and to cause notice of the.arrest to be given to the executive authority making such demand, or to the agent of such authority appointed to receive the. fugitive, and to cause the fugitive to be delivered- to such agent -when he shall appear. If no such agent appears within six months from the time of the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged. All costs or expenses incurred in the apprehending, securing, and transmitting such fugitive to the State or Territory making such demand shall be paid by such State or Territory. -
“ Seo. 5279/ Any agent, so appointed, who receives the fugi
It is not necessary to consider the question suggested by. counsel as to the' right of the governor of the Territory to have withheld the papers upon which he based his warrant for the arrest of the accused; for, the record shows that the requisition and the accompanying papers from the governor of Pennsylvania constituted the evidence upon which he acted,''and were submitted to the court to which the writ of habeas corpus was returned.
Under the act of Cong'ress, it became the duty of the governor of Utah to cause the arrest of Reggel, and his delivery to the agent appointed to receive him, when it appeared: 1. That the demand by the executive authority of Pennsylvania was accompanied by a copy of an indictment, or affidavit made before a magistrate, charging Reggel with having committed treason, felony, or other crime within that State, and - certified as. authentic by her Governor. 2. That the person demanded was a fugitive from justice.
The first of these conditions was met by the production to the governor of Utah of the indictment.(duly certified as authentic) of the grand jury of the Court of Quarter Sessions of. the Peace for the City and County of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, wherein the accused was charged with having committed the crime of obtaining by false pretences certain goods with the intent to cheat and defraud the persons therein named; which offence, as 'was made to appear from the .statutes of that Commonwealth (a copy of which, duly certified as authentic, accompanied the indictment), is a misdemeanor under the laws of Pennsylvania, punishable by a fine not exceeding $500, and imprisonment not exceeding, three years. ’
It was objected in the court of original jurisdiction, that there could be no valid requisition based upon an indictment for an offence less than a felony. This view is erroneous. It
Although the Constitutional provision in question does not, in terms, refer to fugitives from the justice of any State, who may be found in one of the Territories of the United States, the act of Congress has equal application to that class of cases, and the words “ treason, felony, or other crime,” must receive the same interpretation, when the demand for the fugitive is made, -under that act, upon the governor of a Territory, as when made upon the executive authority of one of the States of the Union.
■ Another proposition advanced in behalf of appellant is, that the indictment which accompanied the requisition does not sufficiently charge the commission of any crime; of which fact it was the duty of the governor of Utah to take notice, and which the court may not ignore in determining --whether
The only question remaining to he considered, relates to the alleged want of- competent evidence before the governor of Utah, at the time he issued the warrant of arrest, to prove that the appellant was a fugitive from the justice of' Pennsylvania. Undoubtedly, the act of Congress did not impose upon the executive authority of the Territory the duty of surrendering the appellant, unless it was made to appear, in some proper way, that he was a fugitive from justice. In other words, the” appellant was entitled, under the act of Congress, to insist upon proof that he was within the demanding State at the time he is alleged to have committed the crime charged, and subsequently withdrew from her -jurisdiction, so that he could not be reached by her criminal process. The statute, it is to be observed, does not prescribe the character of such proof; but that the executive authority of the Territory wras not required, by the act of Congress, to cause the arrest of ap
Did, it sufficiently appear that the appellant was, as represented' by the executive authority of Pennsylvania, a fugitive from the justice of. that Commonwealth ? "We are not justified 'by the' record before uss in saying that the governor of Utah should have held the evidence inadequate to establish that fact.' The warrant-of arrest refers-to an affidavit taken before a notary public of Pennsylvania showing Reggel’s flight from that Commonwealth. There was no such affidavit; but the reference, manifestly, was to the affidavit made by Frederick Gentner, which recited the .finding by the grand jury of the City and County of Philadelphia, of a true bill of indictment charging Eeggel with “ the-crime of false pretences,” and stating that he “ is a fugitive from justice,”’ and was then in Salt Lake City, Utah Territory. This is sworn to, and is attested -"by the seal of the Court of Quarter Sessions — the court in which the prosecution is pending. It is not entirely clear from the record, as presented to us, what is the official character of the person before whom the affidavit was made. The reason
It is contended that Gentner’s affidavit that Reggel is a fugitive from justice is the statement of a legal conclusion, and is materially defective in not setting out the facts upon which that conclusion rested. Although that statement presents, in some aspects of it, a question of law, we cannot say that the governor of Utah erred in regarding it as the statement of a fact, and as sufficient evidence that appellant had fled from the ’ State in which he stood charged with the commission of .a particular crime, on a named day, at the City and County of Philadelphia; especially, ás no opposing evidence was brought to his attention. If the determination of that fact by the governor of Utah upon evidence introduced before him, is subject to judicial review, upon hcibeas corpus, the accused, in custody, under his warrant — which recites the demand of the governor of Pennsylvania, accompanied by an authentic indictment charging him, substantially in the language of her statutes, with a specific crime committed within her limits— should not be discharged merely because, in the judgment of the court, the evidence as to his being a fugitive from justice was not as full as might properly have been required, or because it was so meagre. as, perhaps, to admit of a conclusion .different from that reached by him. In the present case, the proof before the governor of Utah may be deemed sufficient to make a prima facie cas,e against the appellant as a fugitive from justice within the meaning of the act of Congress.
Judgment affirmed.