2 W. Va. 569 | W. Va. | 1866
This is an application of William A. Quar-rier, of Kanawha, to be admitted to practice as an at
The applicant was in complicity with the rebellion from the beginning, surrendered and took the amnesty oath prescribed by President Johnson, and thereby received the executive pardon.
The right of a licensed attorney to be permitted to qualify with a view to practice his profession, upon taking the oaths required by law at the time of his application, is as unquestionable as his right to practice after he has qualified. Fisher’s case, 6 Leigh, 619.
According to the ruling of this court in Faulkner’s case, a Virginia license to an attorney resident in this State at the time of the separation, avails as fully as if granted here. It follows, therefore, that to prevent the applicant from qualifying and practising his profession here it ought to be shown, that he had forfeited the right conferred by his license. And to this end it has been urged by the attorney general that the, applicant has been guilty of treason. Now, that the citizen who, unmindful of his duty, and forgetful of the obligation of his oath as an attorney, instigates'rebellion, joins the public enemy, and voluntarily wages a war of insurrection to subvert the government of his country, commits treason and forfeits his right to life, property, and privileges derived under that government, few will deny. But these consequences, after the restoration of peace, as distinguished from a state of war, only follow on conviction of the crime according to the course of common law, unless the law-making power has provided some other mode of procedure.
It is very true, that by the common law the subject or citizen of one belligerent cannot sue in the courts of the other, and the principle is the same whether the party suing be alien or citizen, if an enemy. But the disability, at least
But it has been urged that the faets confessed were treason, and that treason confessed was felony within the statute, sec. 5, chap. 164, Code of 1860, which provides that “any court before which any attorney has been qualified, on proof being made to it that he has been convicted of felony, may supersede his license.” But not every treason is within that statute. Treason to any other government than our own would not answer its requirements. An Irish or Hungarian rebel would hardly be excluded from practising as an attorney here, if otherwise qualified, because of his treason to the British queen or Austrian emperor. Treason is very truly and justly regarded as the highest crime known to the law, but that is only true of treason against the State which enacted the law; for of treason against any other State the law takes no notice, and Sir Walter Scott but expressed the common judgment of mankind when the said that, “treason upon political accounts, though one of the highest crimes that can be committed against a State, does not necessarily infer anything like the detestation which attends offences of much less guilt and danger.”
Indeed it must not be forgotten that in this ease no treason against the State of West Virginia, whose courts are invoked to consider the subject, has been either proved or confessed, and the only acts stated that could amount to the crime of treason were perpetrated against the United States, and for which the party has been pardoned by that govern-;' ment.. Now it would be straining the point too far to hold.
An appeal has beep made to the. court to exclude attor
Since, therefore, no act of the legislature has been found disbarring the applicant, or making it the duty of the court to do so, it is not perceived on what authority the court might interpose and refuse the applicant permission to qualify and practice as an attorney in this court, upon iris taking the oaths required by law of all other attorneys. And this view of the case is sustained by the decision of the court of appeals of Kentucky in Tenny’s ease.
Motion sustained.