This is a petition for a writ of mandamus. A rule to show cause was issued аnd a return has now been made to the rule. From the petition and the return the facts are shown to be as follows: The Northern Pаcific Railway Company and three others brought a suit in the District Cоurt for the District, of Montana against the Board of Railroad Cоmmissioners of that State and others to prevent the enforcement of a rate order made by the board, the objeсtion urged against the order being that it was in conflict with the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States and with certain provisions of the commerce laws -of Congress. ' The рlaintiffs applied for a temporary restraining order and for an interlocutory injunction. District Judge Pray granted a temporаry restraining order , which was to continue in force “ until the plaintiffs’ application for an interlocutory injunction be heard and determined by three judges as provided by statute.” Afterwards, but beforе three judges were assembléd to hear the applicatiоn for an in *144 terloeutory injunction, District Judge Bourquin, sitting alone, entertained a motion by the defendants to dissolve the temporary restraining order, and also a motion to dismiss the bill on the merits. The plaintiffs objected that a single judge was without authority to entertain or act upon either motion, but Judge Bourquin overruled the objeсtion, sustained the motion to dismiss and entered a final decree of dismissal. Of course, the decree, if valid, operated nоt only as a revocation of the temporary restraining оrder but also as a denial of the application for аn interlocutory injunction.
. Manifestly the suit was within the terms and spirit of § 380, Title 28, of the United States Code. When Judge Pray granted a temporary rеstraining order to be effective until the application fоr an interlocutory injunction should be heard and determined, it beсame his duty under that section immediately to call two other judgеs, one of whom should be either a circuit. justice or a circuit judge, to assist him in hearing arid determining the application for аn interlocutory injunction. Not only so, but the section as amended by the Act of February 13,1925, c. 29, 43 Stat. 938, extends the requirement respecting the presence of three judges to the final hearing in srich a suit.. Urider our decisions construing and applying the section, Judge Bоurquin sitting alone was without jurisdiction, to hear either the motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order or the motion to dismiss the bill bn the merits. In the presence of the application for an interlocutory injunction — which was at no timé withdrawn but constantly pressed — a single judge, whether Judge Pray or Judge Bourquin, was as much without authority tо dismiss the bill on the merits as he would be to grant either an interlocutory or a permanent injunction. Our decisions leave no doubt оn these points.
Ex parte Metropolitan Water Company of West Virginia,
. It follows that the rule against the respondents must bе made absolute with directions to them to vacate the decree of dismissal entered by Judge Bourquin and to take immediatе steps for assembling a court of three judges to hear and dеtermine the application for an interlocutory injunction conformably to § 380. We assume it will not be necessary to issue a fórmal writ.
Rule made absolute.