*1 parte Stephen Ex A. McWILLIAMS.
No. 64508. Texas,
Court of Appeals Criminal
En Banc.
Oct. 1980. Rehearing
On May Rehearing
Second Denied
July *2 Ketchand, Houston, appel-
Robert L. lant. Huttash, Austin, Atty.,
Robert State’s the State.
OPINION
wаs violated when was
he
convict-
upon
ed
the same evidence for two offenses
DAVIS,
TOM G.
Judge.
arising
out of
same continuous assault-
This is an
application for writ
habeas
ive
involving
victim.
11.07,
corpus filed
pursuant
Art.
V.A.C.
reflects
March
record
that on
July
C.P. On
petitioner entered
*3
1975, petitioner
gunpoint
robbed
pleas
guilty
aggrava-
to the
at
offenses
ted robbery, aggravated rape
aggrava-
and
clerk of
store in
grocery
Areola. Immedi-
ted kidnapping. Punishment in each cause
thereafter,
ately
petitioner
forced
clerk
was assessed
thirty
Petitioner
years.
to leave
with him an automo-
the store
now raises numerous contentions concern- bile.
ing the
validity
each of these convictions.
cases,
In two
held
recent
we have
that
Initially, he maintains that his indictment
carving
precluded
convictions
aggravated
for
rape is fundamentally de-
for
aggravated robbery
aggrava-
both
fective
culpable
to allege
failure
men-
ted rape, where it was shown that both
tal state.
alleges
perti-
The indictment
offenses resulted from one continuous as-
part
petitioner
nent
that
did then and
against
saultive
same
transaction
vic-
there:
tim.
v.
Tex.Cr.App.,
Orosco
“unlawfully, by
threats,
force and
121;
Tex.Cr.App.,
S.W.2d
Ex Parte Curry,
without
J_L_,
the consent of Mrs.
Orosco,
In
it
S.W.2d 712.
was found
ravish and have sexual intercourse with
that
use
where the
and exhibition
a knife
J-L-,
Mrs.
a female not then and
provided
aggravating
circumstances in
there the wife of the said Stephen McWil-
offenses,
both
appellant
not be сon-
could
liams, and the said Stephen McWilliams
Likewise,
Phillips
victed in both.
J_
did compel
submission
Mrs.
State, Tex.Cr.App., 597
929 it was
S.W.2d
L-to
said ravishment and sexual in-
aggravated
held that convictions for both
tercourse by threatening to inflict death
kidnapping
aggravated
sexual abuse
and serious bodily injury to the said Mrs.
J_L_”
resulting
from
continuous assaultive
victim
against
transaction
the same
violat-
Smith,
In Ex
Parte
571 S.W.2d
ed
Lastly,
doctrine.
in Tatum
this Court held that in
order
establish
Tex.Cr.App., 534
criminal responsibility for the offense of
was held that convictions for three offenses
rape, the
allege
prove
State must
that
arising
single
against
out of a
intentionally,
defendant acted
knowing
victim violated the double
or
ly,
recklessly. V.T.C.A.Penal
Sec.
clauses of
both
State and Federal Con-
culpable
6.02. When a
state is
mental
an
stitutions,
required
reversal of two of
element of an offense and the indictment
the three
allege
element,
fails to
convictions.
that
the indictment
will
fundamentally
sup
defective and
supports
We
find that
evidence
port a
See,
Zachery
conviction.
finding
trial
petitioner’s
court’s
that one of
Tex.Cr.App.,
Petitioner next contends he was Petitioner’s conviction sub- ject to double jeopardy and the vated is set kidnapping aside. petitioner’s remainder of contentions, contentions five related peti
will be addressed
they relate to his
challenges
tioner
the sufficiency of the evi
aggravated robbery
support
aggravated
conviction.
dence to
his
robbery
conviction. This
repeatedly
Court has
held
Petitioner next raises three contentions
corpus proceeding
that a habeas
may not be
concerning
aggravated
his
robbery indict-
used
collaterally
sufficiency
attack the
ment. He maintains that the indictment is
See,
support
evidence to
a conviction.
allege
defective because it fails to
culpa-
Dunn,
Ex Parte
Tex.Cr.App., 571 S.W.2d
ble mental state and ownership. He fur-
928;
Dantzler,
Ex Parte
Tex.Cr.App., 571
argues
ther
that the indictment is insuffi-
S.W.2d 536. These contentions are without
cient because it does not allege that
merit.1
person robbed was the
person
assault-
Petitioner next
contends
his
ed.
plea of guilty
aggravated robbery
Petitioner’s
aggravated
indictment for
*4
involuntary because he was told that if he
robbery alleges in pertinent part that he did
plead
did not
guilty, he would receive a life
then and there:
during
sentence. The record reflects that
“unlawfully
steal,
and intentionally take
pleа
the guilty
proceeding, the trial court
over,
exercise control
and carry away
petitioner
admonished
pursuant to Art. 26.-
J-L_,
from Mrs.
hereinafter called 13,
petitioner
V.A.C.C.P. The fact that
en
owner, corporeal personal property,
plea
guilty
tered a
in order
avoid
wit, money, with intent to deprive said greater punishment does not entitle him to
owner of said property and without the
See,
corpus
habeas
relief.
Ex Parte Thom
owner,
effective consent of said
and said as, 474
238. This contention is with
S.W.2d
defendant,
committing
the course of
out merit.
said theft
take, steal,
and with intent to
complains
Petitioner next
of a
obtain, and maintain
prop-
control of said
one-on-one showup which was conducted
erty, did then and there intentionally and
shortly
State,
after his arrest.
In Fierro v.
knowingly
place
threaten and
the said
Tex.Cr.App., 437 S.W.2d
it was held
owner in fear of
bodily
imminent
injury
plea
guilty,
voluntarily
that a
if
and death by then and there using and
made,
understandingly
is conclusive as to
exhibiting
wit,
a deadly weapon, to
guilt
defendant’s
and waives all non-
firearm.”
jurisdictional
pre
defects. An
in a
error
trial
procedure
identification
does not con
The allegation
petitioner
that
act
jurisdictional
stitute a
defect. We find that
ed “intentionally” is sufficient to allege a
error,
petitioner’s plea
guilty
waived
if
culpable
6.02,
mental state under
su
Sec.
any,
showup
in the
conducted after his ar
pra. There is
requirement
no
that a rob
rest.
bery
allege
indictment
Ex
ownership.
Lucas,
162;
Parte
Tex.Cr.App., 574 S.W.2d
Petitiоner next
plea
contends
his
Servance v.
Tex.Cr.App., 537 S.W.2d guilty was the result of ineffective assist-
753. Lastly, the victim of
robbery
Among
things,
and ance of
other
counsel.
he
the victim of
underlying
attorney
theft
maintains that his
coerced him
need not
See,
pleading guilty,
be the
into
refused to contact cer-
person.
Watson v.
witnesses,
tain
Tex.Cr.App.,
and “offered no advice or
legal representation.”
We find that the indictment is sufficient
to allege an offense under V.T.C.A. Penal
post-conviction
In a
habeas cor
action,
Sec. 29.03.
pus
petitioner
has
burden of
judicial
1. The record
contains a
confession en-
the indictments. The confession is sufficient
petitioner
See,
pleas
support
guilty pleas.
By-
tered at the time
entered his
evidence to
his
guilty.
confession,
petitioner
Tex.Cr.App.,
In the
admits to
ron v.
Harrison v. Petitioner was then transferred to Utica, Hospital Utica State New York. describing departure his treatment evidentiary The trial court held an institution, from this petitioner stated ap hearing petitioner’s in connection with follows: plication. hearing, At there was no “THE did they And what do COURT: claim of evidence offered relative to the way of treatment or consultation? ineffective In the assistance counsel. Gave me “THE DEFENDANT: medi- evidence, of such petitioner absence has cation and saw a doctor time. discharge having failed to his burden of doctor one time “THE COURT: Saw a affirmatively record demonstrate al gave you medication? leged represen ineffectiveness counsel’s Yes. “THE DEFENDANT: tation. This merit. contention without they you “THE Then released COURT: petitioner Finally, aggravated attacks his in about a week? robbery conviction on the basis “THE DEFENDANT: I left. hearing trial court failed to conduct his escaped? You “THE COURT: *5 competency to stand trial. He maintains Yes. “THE DEFENDANT: that there was sufficient evidence before “THE COURT: Ran off? the trial court in to raise a bona fide Yes.” “THE DEFENDANT: doubt as to his competence to stand trial a competency jury that should have report The trial court then examined a impaneled. been Benjamin dated May from Dr. Sher Following a from the district request 1975. case, In the court instant the trial petitioner attorney, Dr. Sher examined was relieved of to any responsibility hold a to competency effort determine an to his pretrial hearing by petitioner’s virtue of examination, trial. a result of this stand As ready entry announcement of of a com- petitioner Dr. concluded that was Sher guilty plea any suggestion without of in portion trial. A petent to stand See, competency. Morales Tex.Cr. stated, that report “Mr. McWilliams stated 418; App., Thomas v. Hospi- spent timе in the Mattewan he some .App., Tex.Cr S.W.2d Beacon, He that tal in New York. stated hospital by was the court.” he sent to prior accept- that record reflects to ing his pleas petitioner of guilty, informed attorney trial then stated Petitioner’s the court that he been had confined two compe- was opinion, petitioner his mental institutions State New accepted then tent to stand trial. The court September York. From until January guilty pleas. his Hospi- he was at the Mattewan State 46.02, 2(b), provides Art. Sec. V.A.C.C.P. Beacon, tal in regard New York. to With follows: as confinement, guilty record from the de- during “If the trial evidence plea as reflects follows: brought incompetency fendant’s “THE COURT: ... source, attention of the court from right, during “All you the time that hearing conduct a out the court must there, you you were in did know jury to determine presence of the place? were in that sup- not there is evidence whether or incompetency to stand begin- finding
“THE Not port DEFENDANT: at the ning. trial.” Robinson, impanel
In Pate v. a competency jury although 86 S.Ct. it was 836, 15 (1966), L.Ed.2d 815 discovered mid-trial that was the defendant interpreted process the due escapee Hospital. clause to an from Rusk State require that a criminal defendant be diagnosis afford- was found that an earlier that the ed an adequate hearing competency mentally defendant was ill meant little stand trial judge whenever the trial be- present when contrasted with a evaluation comes aware of counsel, a bona fide doubt concеrn- by his own the trial court and a ing competence. present that defendant’s In order com- psychiatrist question on the violation, to find a Pate it must be shown petency. supra Ainsworth v. at 522. trial, during that before or evidence of such case, In the instant matters incompetence brought was to the court’s question which could have raised the See, Hagans, attention. Ex Parte Tex.Cr. at of trial infor- competency the time was App., 558 S.W.2d concerning petitioner’s prior mation two Halford, In Ex Parte Tex.Cr.App., 536 commitments at mental institutions. When questioned the Court found that the trial to the for his commit- reason court ment, should have competency petitioner conducted a “I don’t responded, remem- case, hearing. In that petitioner’s anything.” ber He es- was shown have mother testified that he long history caped approximately had a from an institution of mental illness and irrational behavior two and one-half before the instant years following a injury head as a child. He was compared offenses. This evidence must be shown to have previously been committed to Dr. examination conducted some Sher’s to two mental Three institutions. doctors two months before trial in which he con- although petitioner testified that was a “so- petitioner competent. cluded that was Pe- ciopathic personality” testimony he was nevertheless the time of the titioner’s legally sane. The petitioner’s attorney guilty pleas trial was coherent and evidenced an stated petitionеr’s ability understanding proceedings. Lastly, to communi- cate “adequate.” We found this evi- the conduct and demeanor observing after dence sufficient trial, to raise a bona fide doubt petitioner at the time of the court Halford, competence. as to Ex supra Parte competent. him to be found *6 at 232. upon evi- extensively Petitioner relies
Likewise,
Long, Tex.Cr.App.,
in Ex Parte
hearing
evidentiary
dence introduced at the
petitioner
S.W.2d
maintained
application to
held in connection with this
that the court should have conducted a com-
support
competency
his contention that a
petency hearing.
Long,
In
several of the hearing
have been held at the time
should
petitioner’s relatives stated that his conduct
hearing
pled guilty.
evidentiary
he
The
was “strange and abnormal.” Two friends
approximately
was held
four and one-half
However,
described him as “insane.”
three
years after trial.
petitioner
doctors testified that the
was of
evidentiary hearing
from the
record
“sound mind” at the time of trial. We
attempts by
four previous
reveals
suicide
found the evidence sufficient to create a
It was further shown that at
petitioner.
bona fide
competence
doubt as to
and that
was committed to Mat-
petitioner
the time
the trial court should
a sep-
have conducted
charged
he had
with
Hospital,
tewan
been
hearing
arate
to determine the issue.
criminal offenses in New York and
multiple
Schenectady
County
Previous admission to a mental hos
pital
a result of mental
coupled
explanation
County
with an
does not
found that “as
require
hearing
(petitioner) lacks ca-
separate
a
to determine
disease or defect [he]
competency.
Tex.Cr.App.,
proceedings
to understand the
pacity
Cruz
817;
in his own defense.”
against
Bledsoe v.
Tex.Cr.
him or to assist
App.,
showing
threats to
“(2) compels
rape by
take
a woman to
submission to the
compel
submit
to
death,
bodily injury,
intercourse
or
serious
by recklessness
threat
negligence.
imminently
It
that one can
be
inflict-
kidnapping
conceivable
or
threaten to inflict
or
bodily injury
anyone.”
serious
ed on
Zapata
provide
competency hearing.
2. Petitioner
Cf.
does
contend that he was
Rather,
Estelle,
(5th
1979);
incompetent
fact
Na-
at the time
trial.
v.
823 In cases this statutory provisions, tutional or and since decisions. some Court cites tradition, carving, this has Herera “same evidence test” and doctrine of both the unsound, now “continuous assaultive transac proved it should aban- Paschal State, supra, and doned. tion” test. Duckett v. See State, (Tex.Cr. 359 Hawkins v. There is no definitive statement of these two tests App.1976). Neither doctrine; ap carving it is a nebulous rule Steele, A scholarly criticism. without See plied jurisdiction. Initially, in only Texas, Defense Jeopardy Review of the carving was offenses applied when the two Review, (1981); 16 Texas Tech.Law 393 charged contained ele common material Kirchheimer, Act, Offense, required ments or when the two offenses (1949); Jeopardy, Double 58 Yale L.J. 503 the same evidence to convict. Herera v. (1965). Jeopardy, Twice in 75 Yale L.J. 262 State, (1896). 35 943 Tex.Cr.R. 34 S.W. This Court added the “continuous act or Neither the Federal nor State Constitu- multiple transaction” test in Paschal v. 49 prohibit tions nor Texas statutes (1905). Tex.Cr.R. offenses com- prosecution statutory S.W. Since for two time the “same evidence” and mitted in the same transaction. The consti- speak jeopardy “continuous assaultive transaction” tests of double provisions tutional randomly have been In Duckett v. applied. in terms of the “same offense” rather than State, 454 (Tex.Cr.App.1970) Supreme S.W.2d 755 de “same transaction.” The Court fendant’s robbery conviction was held to be United States Sanabria United carving States, violation of the because doctrine the same evidence support (1978) power was used to both stаted that the L.Ed.2d that conviction and legislature: defendant’s conviction define lies in the offenses Then, assault with intent to murder. “[Ojnce Congress statutory has defined a (Tex.Cr. Douthit v. S.W.2d ‘allowa- prescription its App.1972) the court used the continuous prosecution’ prescription ble unit of assaultive transaction test to determine scope protection determines the af- whether defendant’s two prosecutions by prior acquittal.” forded conviction or (of rape victim) the same were in violation which the This deference doctrine. The court held Congress has to the shown United States intercourse, the various acts of al to the should also be shown this Court though part all of a continuous assaultive legis- Legislature. only Texas Not has the transaction, were sufficiently separated by separated crimi- clearly lature defined and time and place so that they part were not offenses; known, di- nal it has also made a single purposes. transaction for carving intent insofar as rectly indirectly, its The court returned to the “same evidence” multiple prosecutions are concerned. test in Robinson v. (1974) Chapter 3 of the Texas Penal Code (Tex.Cr.App.1975) uphold defendant’s offenses multiple property prosecutions trespass convictions of criminal and misde legislature appears considered. meanor theft. Significantly, under a “same from this intended to exclude other offenses transaction” analysis, prosecutions to allow provision, and would havе disallowed the second conviction within one criminal occurring each offense since upon the theft was committed defend offense, Prosecutions for each transaction.1 trespass ant’s University onto the of Hous occurring in property other than offenses ton campus. to be prohibit- one criminal transaction are supported
That different decisions can be when in violation of the double ed by these two Federal and theories indicates the lack of clauses of the State precedential value doctrine Constitutions. Code, Compare Chapter (Octo- Multiple Revision of the Penal Final Draft Prosecutions Jeopardy, 1970) Multiple Chapter and Double A with Prosecu- Texas Penal ber Revision, Proposed tions, State Bar Penal Committee V.T.C.A. Code
824 one, is applica provision whether each requires
The difficulties involved in the
tion
the carving
proof
doctrine are numerous.
of a fact which the
does
other
not.”
Any sequence
conduct can be labelled
Blockburger
States,
299,
v. United
284 U.S.
and
Court
construed
“transaction"
has
180,
(1932);
52 S.Ct.
same act a vio- this case is constitutes review, may lation two or on as ... statutory provisions peal distinct be “heard the test to be the court seems applied appeal,”1 to determine an to have it, whether there two or has deliv- offenses chosen so to for the court hear V.A.C.C.P., 11.07, Art. Sec. 3.
825
robbery,
forth six
thetical defendant
is indicted for
opinion setting
ered a written
might
reasons for its decision.
It
as well
rape, may
sep-
he
insist on
kidnapping,
so,
doing
have refrained from
for none
obtaining
arate trials. After
a conviction
justify
the reasons can
its decision to dis-
long
and a
sentence for one offense in an
carving
card the
doctrine.
prosecutor will not often choose
episode, a
(and
wit-
expend
to
his
the court’s and the
reason” is
“compelling
The court’s first
nesses’)
money
sequence
time and
in a
that,
carving
says
deterrence.
It
under the
prosecutions
in the
for the other offenses
doctrine,
robs, kidnaps,
“a defendant [who]
first, “compelling”
episode. The court’s
...
suffers
rapes, and murders his victim
scrutiny.
than he would had he
reason cannot withstand
punishment
no more
one of the crimes.
Justice
only
committed
is that “the
The court’s second reason
prosecution
and reason demand
for each of
doctrine of
is not mandated
offenses,”
epi-
separate
to deter such
only
This is
Jeopardy
Double
Clauses.”
sodes. This seems to be more a rhetorical
holding
half true. The court is correct in
compelling
flourish than a
per-
reason. A
does
that
the United States Constitution
robbed, kidnapped, raped,
son who
and mur-
doctrine,
require
not
but it is
death,
dered his
punished by
victim could be
wrong
the Texas
about
Constitution.
doctrine;2
regardless
is
it
explicit-
has not held
clear,
lights
justice
even in the
re-
reason,
ly that
the Fifth Amendment does not
the prospect of an additional
transaction,”
carving,
imprisonment
marginal-
quire
term of
would
or “same
be
ly greater
test,
prospect
rejected opportunities
deterrent
than the
it has
death.
adopt
point
the test so often that
Ohio,
See,
sufficiently
e.g.,
clear.
Brown v.
Even if murder
is removed frоm the
2227,
161, 170,
2221,
432
97
53
U.S.
S.Ct.
hypotheticals
court’s list of horrible
each of
J.,
(1977) (Brennan,
L.Ed.2d 187
concur-
the remaining
punishable by
offenses is
Oklahoma, 429
ring); Thompson v.
U.S.
confinement
unlikely
life.3
1053,
768,
(1977)
97
quired
Fourteenth
examples
actually
inconsistency).9
show
California,
Cooper
however.
386 U.S.
justify only
But
reason
a reform of
this
can
788, 791,
(1967).
Section 14 of Rights the Texas Bill of at 691 punished cumulatively.’ 445 U.S. says, offense, “No person, for the same shall * * omitted). (footnote at S.Ct. put [100 1438] be twice in jeopardy of life or liber- Congress’ inquiry essential is intent. ty....” [T]he Like the clause in corresponding 687, 100 at 1436.” See 445 U.S. S.Ct. Amendment, the Fifth “decep- it contains 279, Hawkins, 658 F.2d United States tively plain language given has rise [which] ” (5th 1981). 287 Cir. problems complex.... both subtle and Bretz, 28, 2156, 32, Crist v. 437 U.S. 98 S.Ct. Legislature’s The intent is much Texas 2159, 57 L.Ed.2d 24 Congress’s, harder to find than doctrine is problems a solution to the non-existent,11 nearly sources have been deciding person may subjected when a be today.12 even are obscure multiple punishments closely trials or too, mentioning, It is worth acts; related Blockburger part test is creating court a collision between a different approach prob- to one of these Blockburger analysis analysis and its own suggestion lems. The that one is based on a offenses. As the court of lesser included stricter construction of the constitutions irrele- Blockburger regards as today, holds false; than the other is there cannot be a may trial there be a vant the fact that “[a]t strict construction of the constitutional each overlap proof substantial in the term, “same offense.” offense; statutory separate ... it is the repeating is worth must be the Blockbur- of each offense which elements ger test, adopted today, is not a substitute this test.” This court’s examined under with, for the begin doctrine. To lesser offenses is the analysis of included time, Blockburger will not resolve the on the question part at least of the opposite; multiple (as case, whether may trials be had dis- an offense was a lesser facts of the tinguished multiple though from even its elements punishments included offense which are imposed trial). encompassed by the of- strictly were not Ohio, See, Brown v. 432 n. 97 alleged. e.g, fense Christiansen 2221, 2226, (1977). State, (Tex.Cr.App.1979) L.Ed.2d 187 575 S.W.2d Byers, Compare opinion, parte the court’s ante: “The Ex 12. See Supreme 1980), (Tex.Cr.App. deference which the Court has shown based on four which was Congress tape recordings. the United States be should also untranscribed Legislature.” shown this Court to the Texas State, 361, 364, 11. Gillette v. S.W.2d J., (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (Roberts, dissenting). circumstances, Supreme
(under some issuance Texas State, may bad check be lesser found in Wilson v. 76 (1876) included Tex. theft); great weight that “the of American Hazel v. author- supported the ities” conclusion was to (unlawful 700-701 (Tex.Cr.App.1976) carry- decision, reach. was an Included Indiana ing weapon is lesser offense of included Jackson 14 Ind.R. from felon, possession unlawful of firearm which the Texas Court extracted though proof even requires former offense following: of “carrying,” which latter offense does split up “The State one crime and not).13 reconciled, Until these cannot holdings are parts. prosecution it in A prosecute that, will though law be even an offense any part crime fur- bars is a lesser included offense of under another prosecution upon ther based the whole or law, person may state be convicted and Wilson, part supra, same crime.” punished for both Blockburger. under This at 83. constitutionally will be interesting. In conclusion: The court an accepted discards is the same transaction “[When] [it] reason, good for no exchange for a doc- against one offense and... trine will involve more than difficulties accused on sepa- cannot convicted it now admits. I am convinced that the charging parts rate indictments different grass greener Blockburger on the side of of one as a distinct offense. *13 the fence. I dissent. conviction one of A on the indictments prosecution a on bars the other.” Ibid. ONION, J., TEAGUE, J., join in P. and in appellate Also 1876 the other court in this opinion. Quitzow State, Texas 1 Tex.App. decided CLINTON, Judge, dissenting. (Ct.App.1876),and can so far as be as- Application certained the first rendition of the doctrine shorthand appeared opinion courts the Texas for more than hundred in one years by Presiding Judge and five of the Court written provided signifi- now has a cant White: protection against being citizen
twice in placed jeopardy. Its dis- brutal prosecutor right “The had a carve as patch by a majority my “got largе Brothers an offense out of this as neck,”1 controversy the blood of in my could, and must yet he cut once.” I Id., dissent. must at 53-54.2 State, Day Holmes, 13. These cases from derive a 1. Justice Oliver Wendell in letter (Tex.Cr.App.1976), Laski, explained 315-316 in once judges being that the matter of sala- V.A.C.C.P., which the court construed Art. 37.- ries included in the income tax 09(1): “An a lesser offense is included offense particularly, did interest him he not “at by proof if ... it is established of the same or in I in all love with what had written” dissent required less than all the facts to establish the “got controversy had not in blood of ” charged commission of the .... (Howe my neck.” 1 Holmes-Laski Letters 68 Day in dictum that the statute lesser “defines 1953) at ed. 266. One other occasion Holmes included offense in terms the facts had not write in “when the intended to dissent misinterpreted case” has been to mean the evi- my opinion fighting came and stirred blood.” misinterpreta- dence the case. this Under “Here,” Id., applauds at 560. commenta- tion, unlawfully carrying weap- the offense of tor, “is the of.” Schae- stuff dissents made on could be a lesser included offense murder fer, Policy, Precedent and 34 U.Chi.L.Rev. if alleged the evidence showed that the murder- (1966), Aldisert, reprinted permission carrying weapon. er was The correct con- 1976) (West Publishing Judicial Process Co. Day (and statute) struction of of the is that the 802, 804. By term “facts” refers to “factual elements.” construction, lesser included offenses year 2. A of Texas before the Court in a case can be determined from the four passing, general indictment, had nоted in “It is a rule that a alleges corners of the which required may party proceeding “facts held a criminal be to establish the commission of offense,” offense, small, distinguished great from answer for or which mere mat- transaction,” legally ters of evidence. can be out of the carved fense,” ground and on this Hirshfield had Quitzow’s hiring The “transaction” was and, indictment, from livery excepted contending stable a horse to the he not, therefore, time, prosecuted for swin- a saddle and bridle and not could returning Applying dling. rejected by them when The contention was agreed. doctrine, jury trial court and the was instructed that the Court held that con- swindling. the trial was for precluded viction of theft of the horse trial the offense exceptions The Court held the should have conviction theft of saddle and bri- sustained, judgment been reversed the dle. The Court relied on and discussed Wil- prosecution. dismissed the son v. supra, and several other au- thorities. opinion Judge Hurt In I, (Ct. meaning Simco v. examined the of Article Tex.App. § App.1880) White, clause in Presiding Judge jeopardy for the the Constitution Court, opined defendant, the State of Texas and concluded that “a why once a who person put shall not be twice stole three horses simultaneously, each be act, acts, omission, for the same or which owner, longing to a different was convicted law, by positive are forbidden and to which them, of theft of any one of he could not annexed, conviction, any punishment thereafter be convicted of theft of thе other followed, prescribed in this Code.” horses, therefore, swindling “a conviction “Because the taking transaction—the upon supported which rests and is alone the three horses at the same time—would the act of as true the instrument passing constitute but (Wilson one offense in law set forth in this indictment is a full and v. The 76); 45 Texas plea complete satisfaction of the law which for- former good would be [of conviction] bids, upon prescribes, pun- conviction upon of, the strength and by virtue of though ishment for said act.” But rule, another well settled in criminal forged passing same act of as true a instru- practice, which prosecutor allows the *14 ment “enters into and constitutes the vital large carve as an offense single out of a least, offenses, wit, of, elements two can, transaction as he yet he must cut swindling knowingly uttering forged and a Quitzow State, once. v. The 1 Texas true,” for that instrument as a conviction Ct.App. 47. Here is where the doctrine complete act “would be a satisfaction of the support would come in and proposition it general violated law.” As a plea. [Referring to Wharton Criminal an accused “could was correct that as Law and ‘authorities cited in the note.’]” have been convicted under the indictment Id., at 349. knowingly of the offense of swindling for following year Judge Hurt wrote for instrument, passing forged as true a there- State, the Court in Hirshfield v. 11 Tex. for plead fore he cannot this conviction App. 207 (Ct.App.1881). Upon an indict- swindling prosecution uttering to a for a allеging ment all constituting instrument,” the elements forged still uttering offense of forged instrument borne in mind that there is must be “[I]t followed other allegations swindling principle applicable another to this sub- Hirshfield was swindling. convicted of ject jeopardy, quite which is distinct Then in effect was a provision panel pleas of for- from that which obtains precluded code that the offense of swin- acquittal generally. mer conviction or dling taking from a case of or some theft carving, This is the doctrine and proscribed other opera- offense “out of the explicitly recognized effectively ap- and tion of law which defines such other of- plied in a number of cases our Su-
citing Bishop on Criminal indicated.) Law. Jackson mine unless otherwise 421,423 State, (All (1875). emphasis 43 Tex. or, grounded; and if it
preme
Appeals.
Court
Court
was one continuous
[Cit-
ing
Id.,
them and
at 215.
transaction,
in which appellant perpetrated
others].”3
assault,
robbery
the prosecution
Presiding Judge White reiterated
once,”
State,
could come but
Moore v.
Wright
doctrine in
Tex.App.
Tex.Cr.R.
Moreover, during the one hundred and *16 five years Legisla- the doctrine has been of what the Putting at work in this record Texas the code of procedure proposed Chapter criminal ture cut out of the 3 in 590, (Tex. only judi- Reynolds 5.“The common law not of 592 consists 6. precedents (opinions cases) cial Cr.App.1977); in decided 427 Townsend v. principles, standards, doctrines, 55, (Tex.Cr.App. 1968). and tradi- 62 * * * tions. Our common law started in the Ages, practically nothing.” Middle lar, from Lef- defined, episode” “criminal does not 7. As thus Law, Judge-Made Sources of 24 Okla.L. implicate carving the doctrine at all. (1971), Aldisert, quoted by op. Rev. 319 cit. supra, at 92-93. 832 Legislature of its light presumed knowledge
the
of the
the
is to
something
call it
is
it
longstanding
doctrine,
carving
we are “enti-
opinion
Supreme
not. The
Court
tled
legislature,
through
to assume that the
margin
went
in the
explain
that since
inaction,
its
its
of the
approval”
indicated
“only single
single
a
is
violation of a
statute
doctrine,
Servicenter,
Allen Sales
Inc. v.
here,”
&
issue
at
there was no need to analyze
863,
(Tex.1975);
Ryan, 525 S.W.2d
866
see
the case
jeopardy
under familiar
tests “used
Poole,
624,
Republic
also
Ins. Co. v.
257 S.W.
to determine whether a
Antonio,
(Tex.Civ.App.1923—San
writ may give
separate prosecutions,
rise to
con-
ref’d.).
punishments
separate
victions and/or
under
Patently
Supreme
statutes.”
Court is
Therefore, though
carving
doctrine
showing
not
point
“deference” to the
judicial creation,
a
legislative approval
still
abdicating
duty
its own constitutional
just eight years
sanction
the doctrine
function to decide
under
jeopardy questions
ago—the
strongly
last
in-
time—may be
developed
years—
doctrines it
over the
has
ferred.
cases cited and discussed in the
In spite of
so
in
what
is
obvious
footnote, Sanabria,
70,
supra, U.S. at
respect,
majority
gleans
somehow
from
2182,
at
are several
reflect
there
in
S.Ct.
rejection of proposed Chapter
enact-
3 and
judicial system
the federal
as well.
nothing
ment of the four
sections
have
disconcerting enough
two
Nor
it
carving
do with the
doctrine that
developed
analyzing
theories have
what
Legislature “appears” to have intended “to
pur-
constitutes
“same
for
transaction”
allow prosecutions for each offense occur-
poses
applying the
doctrine.
ring within one criminal transaction.” But
recognition
This is
human
but a
crimi-
the law is that a
change
quo
the status
uniformly
nal
not
follow the
behavior does
not to be inferred unless the
pattern.
decide
trying to
what is
legislative body has unmistakably indicated
the “same
jeop-
offense”
constitutional
a contrary wish.
Bush Oceans Interna-
ardy purposes
Supreme
Court of the
tional,
211,
207,
1980).
621 F.2d
(CA
n. 5
developed essentially
United States has
two
Legislature
Since
did
not tinker with
different
theories.
all,
no
doctrine at
there is
indi-
it,
cation of
desire to abolish much less
Blockburger test,
set forth in the
an unmistakable one.
majority opinion,
one. There is the
well;
applies,
perception
Neilsen
like
power
That the
to define offensеs lies in
theories,
one
when
number
the Legislature is
un-
rudimentary,
of offenses arise from a continuous transac-
once it
doubtedly
statutory
has defined a
Nielsen,
176, 9
parte
tion. Ex
131 U.S.
prescription
offense that
of the “allowable
(1889)
S.Ct.
834 indictment,
tactic,
proves
practice
as Kirschheimer
from the
to sanction a
which
cases, for
prosecutors
some
to hold in re- might
op-
be rendered as an
instrument
serve facts as well as theories of law to
pression to a citizen.”16
when their
not suc-
advance
first efforts do
the
not make
majority of
Court does
is precisely
ceed
desired.14 That
what
as
any compelling showing
policy
such
that
the
courts have said the
considerations
un-
suddenly
have
become
was
prevent.15
intended to
provided
Nor has it
principled
sound.17
a
repeated
The “fundamental unfairness of
to approve
long
reason
that
been
which has
illegal
appar
trials for the
conduct
is
rejected
oppression.”
“as an instrument of
ent and has
thе courts and the
troubled
That
the Court has
“difficul-
encountered
Golson,
legislature,” People
9,
supra,
note
ties” in applying
impugns
the doctrine
designed
at 75. The
carving doctrine
to
the doc-
members
the Court more than
unfairness,
relieve
that
fundamental
itself,
suggests
trine
efforts at
and
that
though
provisions
the
our con
jeopardy
consistency in
to be made
application ought
People
v. Mullen
may
stitutions
not. See
surrendering
inability
to
professed
before
a
hoff, supra,
9,
450,
note
33 Ill.2d
211
at
judicial
job.18
do
in Herera
Thus,
quot
244.
in
supra,
N.E.2d
abandoning
salutary
doctrine extant
ing
an
Jersey opinion
from
earlier New
years
more than
in
one hundred and five
approved
proposition
Court
that “it is
this
the Court
majority
slender
better
that
go
the residue of the offense
unpunished than,
exposes
deprivation
to a risk
by sustaining the second
citizens
case,
course,
dissenting opinion
14. The classic
v. Illi
17. At least
in
Ciucci
Orosco v.
nois,
supra,
S.Ct.
argued
philosophical
L.Ed.2d 983
notion
(1957).
separate
Three of four
indictments
permitted
not be
to exhibit a
that
should
“[o]ne
charging Ciucci with murder of his wife and
weapon to
and
several
another
commit
of-
children,
tried;
respectively,
three
were
against
person
fenses
and be liable for
imprisonment,
years
first resulted in 20
id.,
offense,”
punishment for
one
at
and,
years
finally,
pro
second in 45
the third
many
against
per-
nor “commit as
crimes
penalty. Though
Supreme
duced the death
punishment
son
he wishes without fear of
opinion
in a
Court
Per Curiam
found no viola
crime,” id.,
except for one
at 129. But of
process,
tion
due
Illinois
was
course even
traditional
tests
action, People
moved to take remedial
v. Gol
offense,” e.g.,
Nielsen,
Blockburger
“same
son,
(1965),
32 Ill.2d
207 N.E.2d
supra,
protection
designed
provide
are
Legislature
Illinois
enacted corrective
against
punishments
“multiple
the same
measures,
Mullenhoff,
People v.
33 Ill.2d
offense,”
Pearce,
395 U.S.
North Carolina
(1965).
The charging portion the aggravated taking Mae with him and if she her wanted robbery indictment is out set verbatim in or mother alive she better not move she opinion submission, on original and need again. Taking would never see her mother not be reproduced say packages cigarettes here. two two six Suffice aggravation alleged beer, that on or packs about Mae close appellant had her March 1975 appellant did “knowingly eyes, and he led her to a station nearby threaten place in fear wagon. owner bodily injury
imminent and death then roads, done, That he drove around back using and there exhibiting a deadly chattering all the time about sorrowful wit, weapon, to a firearm.” The owner is life,1 until he managed get events in his indicating identified name she a fe- end, at even- stuck an isolated dead where male. tually gunpoint required at he Mae to com- The aggravated kidnapping indictment acts mit round deviate sex and other alleged, her, in terms of indecencies, raped V.T.C.A. Penal he twice. аnd then 20.01(2)(A) 20.04(aX3), § also slept escape. on While he Mae her At § made or 21,1975 about March appellant morning, did inten- five still su- about o’clock in tionally knowingly abduct the same pine wagon, appellant the station original Belatedly majority opinion asserted is the 1. The on submission recounts that “the compelling prior bald statement reason” least insti- two commitments mental abandoning escape and his ultimate from the doctrine is “that it tutions encourages telling slightest first he was crime.” Were there the second one. After Mae suggestion support going proposition, that her to kill her because he knew for that law, daughter appellant majority opinion it, had contacted the re- needs to reveal for crimi- poured nology mightily then out accounts his would lented and be with that advanced Nam, dying in Viet his knowledge brother’s in his arms which somehow has eluded best man, leaving his But, him for own course, wife’s another minds in the field. there is hope expressed he die a would mother’s none. proud on and so could of him—and hero she paranoid vein. on similar following to the custody eyes into without incident statement of
taken two deputy Ohio, sheriffs. law in Brown v. (1977): L.Ed.2d 187
Applying
to such a
Blockburger
“The
test is not the
situation,
original
classic
submission
determining
standard
whether succes-
aggrava
Court set
aside
conviction
prosecutions
sive
impermissibly
ted
We cited
involve
kidnapping.
Orosco
and Ex
the same offense. Even if two offenses
(Tex.Cr.App.1979)
S.W.2d 121
(Tex.Cr.App.
parte Curry,
sufficiently
permit
different
*20
1979)
sentences,
“the
proposition
the
that
imposition
consecutive
suc-
ag
for both
precluded
convictions
prosecutions
cessive
will be barred in
rape,
gravated
aggravated
and
robbery
the
some circumstances where
second
where it
that
offenses re
was shown
both
the
prosecution requires
relitigation sulted from
continuous
trans
assaultive
already
by
factual
issues
resolved
the
* * *
against
action
the same victim.”
It was
first.
it
noted that
in
was found that
Orosco
a less-
today
Because we conclude
that
“where the use and
of a
exhibition
knife
greater
er included and
offense
the
provided
aggravating
the
circumstances in
Blockburger, we need
same under
offenses, appellant
both
could not be con
repetition
proof
decide whether
victed in both.” Also relied on were Phil
required
prosecutions
the successive
lips
(Tex.Cr.App.
v.
929
against Brown would otherwise entitle
1980) and
Tatum
pretending Bloekburger provides
only test to determine “whether successive
prosecutions impermissibly the same involve
offense,” by refusing analyze light
jeopardy issues come before us in Nielsen, as well.
To judicial folly, such I must dissent.
ONION, P.J., TEAGUE, J., join. *21 RICONDO, Appellant,
Felix Texas, Appellee.
The STATE of
No. 58970. Appeals Texas, Criminal
En Banc.
Nov.
On En Rehearing Banc June
