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Ex Parte McKay
819 S.W.2d 478
Tex. Crim. App.
1990
Check Treatment

*1 rehearing deed, appellant s motion for bankruptcy precise result On petition discretionary appel- re- this after Commissioner Ware review: case decision, rehearing granted: prior original court’s deliv- lant’s motion ceived this 31,1990. gar- opinion judgment of Additionally, ered withdrawn: the Court December “encourages Appeals of of cause remanded to overextension reversed: nishment lenders, marginal high-risk credit cre- that court. relationship adversary

ates undesirable employer employee, is unnec- between CAMPBELL, WHITE and essary creditors can use other de- BERCHELMANN, JJ., dissent. payment, mostly vices to secure and used (citing against poor ignorant.” Id. Wage

Sweeney, “Abolition of Garnish- ment,” Fordham L. Review

(1969)). today, only modification of

Before provision important since century ago more adoption than approved the voters Wayne McKAY. David allow the enforcement of court-ordered 70850. No. payments. permit- Instead of support child ting scope to determine the voters Texas, Appeals of Court of Criminal ban, fiat, judicial garnishment today, by En Banc. effectively six of this court de- members repeal, part. in at substantial clare its least Sept. 1990. By eviscerating con- this well-established Rehearing Dec. Denied provision, today’s decision will stitutional exactly force into that “condition debtors abject dependence and want” sought pre-

framers of our constitution Co., 11 v. Indian Live-Stock vent. Bell vigorously at 346. dissent from S.W. judicial of the Texas Constitution. rewrite GAMMAGE,JJ., join in

DOGGETT this dissent.

SHELBY

STATE. No. 0491-87. Texas, Appeals Court of Criminal En Banc. Jan. Court, Appeal from the 338th District Coker, Judge. County; Ernest Harris *2 III, Dallas, Monning, appel-

B. Prater lant. Vance, Tolle, Atty., Dist. Teresa
John Dallas, Huttash, Atty., Asst. Dist. Robert Paul, Atty., Asst. State’s Matthew W. Austin, Atty., for the State. State’s

OPINION

MILLER, Judge. post-conviction application This pursuant corpus 11.07, Applicant was Article V.A.C.C.P. plea guilty by jury on a of not convicted V.T.C.A., Penal capital murder. See 19.03(a)(2). August Section On Code imposed pen- court the death trial jury’s alty affirmative answers pursuant submitted the three issues ap- Art. V.A.C.C.P. On direct affirmed peal, convictionwas 2, 1985,in a publish- this Court on October opinion. McKay v. ed reh’g (Tex.Crim.App.1985), denied. attorneys “not to Following applicant’s petition his instructed the appeal, juror’s interpre- inquire prospective of certiorari denied for writ on October tation, understanding States United definition or terms Texas, McKay v. 479 U.S. deliberately, probability, reason- (1986). Applicant 93 L.Ed.2d 164 doubt, S.Ct. of violence.” The criminal acts able *3 corpus relief then denied state habeas was say that the judge trial went on to terms 27, 1987, February again on March on and defined, they and are statutorily “are Finally, petition for applicant’s taken as in common lan- to be understood corpus presented federal writ of habeas supposed to guage, jurors and the are agreement by district court dismissed meanings.... And know such common 3, 1988, permit to in order on November I to you will ask therefore application for applicant to file an amended After along those lines.” them corpus of habeas in this Court. We peremptory chal- had exercised his fifth solely applicant’s on application Berg, the lenge prospective juror to Robert erred in of whether the trial court the issue (6) peremptory chal- had exercised six State restricting ruling scope of voir dire the selected, four had been lenges, jurors and Applicant contends that his examination.1 following the the record further reflects question prospective jurors was ability to colloquy: to in such a fashion as violate his limited record. Counsel THE COURT: On the Sixth, Four- Eighth, the and rights under inquired of the Court to for the State has Amendments the United States teenth to ruling in its specific more here be a bit 10 of the Constitution Article Section prohib- is or not defense counsel Texas Constitution. question, you ‘If asking ited from evidentiary hearing held No guilty of intentional- have found someone The entered an this matter. trial being killing without ly another human find expressly adopting proposed order answer no to you could ever justification, sub of law ings of fact conclusions itwas done de- which asks appli by response the State in its mitted liberately?’ findings con application. Those cant’s writ asking is specifically While for habe- applicant’s application that clude common term deliberate- definition merit and that corpus relief was without doing indirectly this is what the ly, feel or feder any not denied state applicant was directly, to do asking you is rights. are not bound We al constitutional that ques- not to ask you I will ask conclusions, however, judge’s by tion. by the unsupported record. Parte MR. HARRISON Counsel]: [Defense (Tex.Cr.App. Adams, may Honor, we Your which we— 1989). present case parties in the cite ruling. running objection Court’s to the regard portions of record with identical Yes, may, and I you over- THE COURT: by ap presented for grounds relief rule it. any find are plicant, and we unable thirty-five (35) ruling, Following the above record so Based discrepancies. interrogated. jurors prospective were presented, find the trial court’s we further unsupported. are We conclusions the above rul- Applicant maintains stated, appli find, the reasons for unconstitutionally limited unduly and ing cor under habeas cant’s claim prospective properly question ability his relief. pus. grant applicant willWe Although attorney applicant’s pre- jurors. making running ob- error served July shows that on The record ruling, applicant trial, to the trial court’s jection during the course (Tex.Cr.App.1989), (10) grounds Applicant ten raises running long objec- we held "as as the wherein application. his writ stating spe- timely objection, tion constituted ruling, de- grounds the movement propriety for the recently of run- cific addressed the 2. We (if grounds specific the court make preserve in Sattiewhite sired ning objections parole ruling appeal. instruction on law in a did not contest the on direct stitutional fatally in- Thus, reaching appli- charge ... so the merits of before claim, punishment proceeding must decide whether this fected entire cant’s we the resultant sentence inval- penalty in death case as to render issue be raised void, ... hold that judgment a writ id and we application for the first time cogniza- claim” of error his “Rose habeas corpus pro- postconviction habeas ble It is this state that well-settled “[tra- entertained, ceeding, not be and thus will corpus only ditionally, habeas is available 11.07. under Article jurisdictional ... or deni- review defects Truong, Implicit in at 813. als of fundamental corpus holdings these Banks, rights.” Parte *4 errors, to at limited those constitutional omitted). (citations (Tex.Crim.App.1989) those pursuant least state constitu- Banks, applicant we held that where tion, exceptional are or that so fundamental complains improperly a venireman was that they susceptible a that are not harm following challenge for excused cause analysis, fatally or so infected the that 35.16, V.A.C.C.P., pursuant to Art. [punishment] proceeding entire as ren- claim could not be asserted via habeas cor- judg- der the resultant sentence invalid and pus procedural since involves a statute ment void. jurisdictional defect constitu- or Banks, tional consideration. 769 S.W.2d at discussed Numerous other cases have 540. corpus the merits habeas claims that of fatally pro infected the certain errors have However, not er all constitutional Maldonado, parte Ex ceedings. necessary rors of cause the level harm (Tex.Cr.App.1985)(charge cognizability warrant under a ofwrit habe- procedure error that infected the trial so although corpus. We have held that impar denied a fair and corpus application may predicat habeas be corpus); cognizable is on tial trial habeas ed on violations state constitutional Coleman, (Tex. parte Ex 599 S.W.2d rights, may cognizable the claim not be via (charge Cr.App.1978) error that infected error, corpus alleged habeas when the if resulting the entire trial such that the con committed, subject is nevertheless process cognizable viction violates due Appel harm under Texas Rule of Aaron, Ex Parte corpus); habeas 81(b)(2). parte Truong, Ex late Procedure (failure of (Tex.Cr.App.1985) S.W.2d 680 Ex (Tex.Cr.App.1989); 770 S.W.2d 810 sign or waiver of the State trial Dutchover, (Tex.Cr. parte 779 S.W.2d 76 or jury contemplated Articles 1.13 Truong: App.1989). As stated in Y.A.C.C.P., cognizable if per se not evi Therefore, contrary to the contention parties’ ap shows those consent dence by applicant, this advanced Court has Ashcraft, Ex proval); 565 S.W.2d giving determined that the unconstitu- (sufficiency (Tex.Cr.App.1978) of evidence parole instruction on did not tional law parte Moffett, cognizable); jury assessing render verdict (allegation S.W.2d 184 judgment invalid nor on writ of habeas evidence is part To based that verdict void. corpus it results a violation because give may be in- the instruction harmful parte Brandley, See also process); due deed, is no er- but more than reversible (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (Camp say, judgment is at ror. That is to bell, J., dissenting) (newly evi discovered voidable, and as such best subject matter for the exer dence not fit collateral attack writ of habeas corpus); federal habeas etc. cise of state or exhaustive, anything but applicant will unable This list is but Inasmuch as be is no including say it to that while there an uncon- suffice demonstrate preserved appellate apparent court.” 786 S.W.2d from the context of the run- an were not objection) ning be deemed n. then error should only to determine reviewed showing just which errors bright line rule restraint amounts to an such a not “a violation of are or are Smith, corpus”, are abuse of discretion. cognizable on writ exceptional or fundamental or are not “so susceptible to a they are reviewing reaffirmed the test We fatally analysis”, or or have not “so dire in court’s restriction of voir proceeding infected [punishment] the entire Smith 643: invalid the resultant sentence as to render discretion, a ... show abuse [T]o void”, many certainly errors judgment must demonstrate defendant “categories” and thus are do fall into these proper. sought to ask was question he corpus despite of habeas on writ proper the defen- question If great should not principle that the it, asking then prevented from dant was Banks, appeal. be used as a substitute presumed the defendant harm is an- 589. The to be per- his intelligently exercise could not Does the voir dire error swered then is: challenges without the informa- emptory more of into one or the case at bar fall gained from an answer. tion “categories”? these proper purpose A *5 constitutionally guaranteed The on an issue juror’s views is to discover right encompasses the right to counsel Smith, 513 S.W.2d applicable to the case. in order to in prospective jurors Mathis, 322 at 632. We 826 and S.W.2d effectually peremp exercise telligently and juror specifically held that whether have challenges challenges for cause tory and grounds challengeable cause on the process. Mathis during jury selection against any of the that he or she is biased 627, State, 322 S.W.2d v. 167 Tex.Crim. rely upon the defendant law which v. Gardner 629, (Tex.Cr.App.1959); 631 queries applicable issue to the case and State, 675, (Tex.Cr.App. 689 730 S.W.2d Smith, 513 proper. relating thereto are State, 641, v. 1987); 703 643 Smith S.W.2d (defendant sought to ask the 826 S.W.2d at cited therein. (Tex.Cr.App.1985); and cases pro consider they could panel whether jury end, de should allow judges To that trial prosecu punishment proper as a bation leeway questioning in much fendants murder). tion At the same during voir dire.

jury panel State, 413 In Martinez v. 763 S.W.2d time, however, afforded trial we have juror held that (Tex.Cr.App.1988), we the voir dire ability to control courts the in who, guilty verdict returning a upon compel a would process if sound discretion case, automatically capital murder restrict judge nevertheless trial one, inquiring special issue “yes” to answer conducting an questioning in the interest delib- conduct was the defendant’s See, e.g., orderly expeditious trial. for har- erate, challengeable for cause was State, (Tex.Cr. 823 v. 513 S.W.2d Smith since “such a against the law boring a bias State, 591 v. App.1974) and McManus inability, once manifests an position (not 505, (Tex.Cr.App.1980) 520 S.W.2d against an guilt has been resolved issue of duplicitous disallow of discretion to abuse accused, guilt evidence for reconsider State, 608 S.W.2d v. questions); Clark in value it will probative whatever (trial court can set (Tex.Cr.App.1980) 669 first context of the particular State, v. limits); Abron reasonable time Martinez, 763 S.W.2d issue.” (tri (Tex.Cr.App.1975) 408 523 S.W.2d Gardner3, held that: we limits, time set reasonable al court can constrained to Ordinarily we would questions, vexatious repetitious or restrict of discre- not an abuse form, ... it is hold that improper in questions asked restrict of veniremen questioning prohibit hab tion personal questions directed restrict which, having no statu- regarding terms court’s Accordingly, a trial jurors). its of juror’s definition, left are during tory voir questioning to limit decision was rendered. in Gardner years before our decision tried in five case was The instant

483 understanding State contends that even based common usage, long meaning and at least so error was committed “constitutional” prohibition imposed harmless, in the interest judge, already reasonably limiting Smith, notwithstanding language procedure. On lengthy voir presumes S.W.2d at case, however, the facts the instant that the defendant once is determined we find that interest the trial court asking proper ques from prevented might limiting Gardner, in voir dire was have had The State relies tion. right clearly outweighed appellant’s an abuse of wherein we found S.W.2d interrogate Kirklin venireman disallowing in the defendant [con- discretion cerning automatically whether she would a similar the one pose affirmatively answer issue one case, dis present yet found harm. We having after found that the defendant tinguished the facts of Gardner cases intentionally committed present murder]. like and the case Smith Gard itself, stating:

ner State, v. Pow Smith appellant Footnote 7. Counsel for the (Tex.Cr.App. v. ell State S.W.2d [631 apparently State were 1982)], the two Mathis cases [Mathis prevented they legally view that were State, inquiring from ever as to a venireman’s 167 Tex.Cr.R. and Mathis understanding meaning “de- of the (1959)], Campbell S.W.2d authority We know of no liberate.” (Tex.Cr.App. statute or caselaw substantiate this 1985), prevented from the defendant was notion. question to the entire' posing proper *6 Therefore, attempt Id. at 684 and 688. panel, simply single a venire jury juror to a ascertain whether maintains such man. that event it is clear In position proper is mat- unquestionably a a to upon right repre the encroachment inquiry during capital a ter murder voir I,Art. sentation counsel under Sec of dire. Constitution, 10 the see tion Texas present case, applicant’s In the de Mathis, 322 S. W.2d at has infected questioning proper. sired line of In was process jury selection. entire asking prospective juror whether a could The Smith manifest. “no” ever answer issue one the defendant verdict, returning guilty a effec pos from complained prevented he was tively sought juror to determine question during the ing proper a individ thereby automatically “yes”, answer separate venire ual voir dire twelve demonstrating against a bias law Again, the harm man in that event [sic]. challenge grounds for a We cause. evident. would be consistently right held contrast, error in- By in this case the representation as afforded under Article single dire of but venire- fected the voir a in 10 of the Texas Section Constitution appellant man. Because was awarded right question pro properly cludes the peremptories, the infection additional spective during voir dire order to jurors cured. was peremptory challenges effectively exercise (emphasis Gardner, S.W.2d at n. 9 challenge predicate for a establish added). Gardner, for cause. case, applicant pre- was Smith, Mathis, present In the asking proper question Thus, applicant’s from right vented S.W.2d 629. veniremen, approximately half jurors thirty-five limited in question prospective court abused the entire venire. way as to his constitutional violate limiting by improperly hold, therefore, that the trial its discretion rights. We appli- disallowing questioning. Since scope of its discretion in voir court abused thirty-five allowed to question. cant was not difference, there is a per- qualitative of that thirty-five additional veniremen and in the need for emptories granted, corresponding were not Gardner difference distinguishable, and the harm clearly reliability in the determination that death manifest. appropriate punishment specif- is the ic case.

Still, error rise does this “constitutional” of error level Id. considering corpus?4 In further Alabama, 447 U.S. In Beck v. dealing that in question, we remember (1980), the Su- 65 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. imposing the death procedures for with to deter- preme certiorari Court Supreme penalty, the United States Court could mine whether a sentence of death invariably recognized heightened has jury constitutionally imposed after a ver- requirements need for assurances that jury capital guilt in a case when dict in a of due are followed in- permitted consider a lesser Carolina, v. North case. Woodson noncapital offense and when cluded 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 U.S. 96 S.Ct. supported such a ver- evidence would have (1976), majority again recognized that dict. The Court mandatory the North Carolina held that significant constitutional differ- “there is a penalty statute was unconstitutional death and lesser penalty the death ence between “failjed] particular- because it allow “if the held that unavail- punishments” and aspects of ized consideration of relevant instruc- ability lesser included offense of a record of each convicted the character and con- the risk of unwarranted tion enhances imposition upon him defendant before viction, constitutionally prohib- Alabama death,” observing that of a sentence withdrawing option from the ited from all is a different “death case.” Beck at jury in kind rather than de- other sanctions however, significantly, the Court not- More fur- gree.” at 2991. The Court Woodson not decide need not and do ed that “we stated: ther would re- the Due Process Clause prevailing practice of individu- While the giving of such instructions quire the gener- alizing sentencing determinations 2390, fn. 14 Beck at noncapital case.” simply enlightened policy ally reflects added), again implicitly empha- (emphasis imperative, rather than a constitutional *7 severity pun- in the of sizing a difference fun- capital that in cases the we believe lesser of- capital offenses and ishment for humanity underly- respect for damental fenses. requires ing Eighth Amendment ... the Florida, 430 U.S. In Gardner and record of the character consideration (1977), the Su- L.Ed.2d 393 circum- offender and the S.Ct. of the individual constitutionality reviewed the particular preme offense as a Court stances of the presentence part judge’s the use of a constitutionally indispensable of of a trial deciding to overrule inflicting penalty investigative report of death. in the process of defendant jury that a a recommendation squarely on the This conclusion rests murder, first-degree get life sentence for a penalty of death is predicate that the report The imposing death. instead sentence of qualitatively different from a The Su- to the defendant. Death, undisclosed long. in imprisonment, however light in of the consti- held that preme Court impris- from life finality, differs more its recognizing developments tutional 100-year prison term dif- than a onment punishment different kind of death is a year or two. Because only fers from a concept attempts past to elucidate the suggests Court’s concurring opinion that at this 4. easy attempt cognizability the any is as as by habeas "whether juncture we should determine discussion, (see su- difficult define it has been as to void the the error other measure conviction,” 481-82). page We would pra, opinion at concurring opinion, page We concurring opinion had the crit- appreciated undertaking the this admit- for not are then faulted suggested just and given been more constructive daunting "enterprise." icism tedly We are cognizability concept should of habeas the "other what or character of these hint as to the nature future. mean in the criticism of this We note that measures.” sentencing as that of intentional other and that the the same standard knowing. or itself, process, the must as well as process, satisfy due the use of the undis- Id., at 552-553. information was not constitutional.

closed Thus, juror equate a these who would justifications discussion of the of- defen- by automatically finding the terms the the re- fered upon finding deliberate dant’s conduct ground jected on the several reasons knowing would intentional or that was “nullity.” use such information sat- special while the issue one To render obviously juror process such a who isfy requirements due allow determining in special issues guided case, noncapital its use was constitu- constitu- would undermine the penalty is in a case the death tional where Jurek, sentencing tionality of scheme. our invoked. Id. U.S. 96 S.Ct. 2950. reasoning find the in the We above-cited reveals, As the discussion above compelling Ap- in the cases instant case. sought during question applicant ask plicant capi- for and was tried convicted of very dire to the heart of our voir went murder, only tal offense under our scheme, sentencing nec- capital murder penal subjecting a code defendant essarily impact an had whether receiving possibility penalty. the death automatically, op- particular jury would Indeed, applicant was sentenced to die. special discretionarity, answer the posed to reviewing constitutionality of sen- our affirmatively require the trial issues cases, tencing in death penalty scheme of death. Giv- judge impose sentence Supreme Court of the United held States claim and the en nature special the submission of the process standards heightened need V.A.C.C.P., provided in Art. issues cases, penalty met in we hold that death guided jury determining appli- applicant’s claim via death, impose such scheme was constitu- cation Texas, tional. 428 U.S. Jurek To The trial committed reiterate: (1976). 49 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. With requested denying voir regard special specifi- issue one number con- questioning; the error was of a Texas cally, held this Court dimension; this is a mur- stitutional posed deliberateness issue one penalty was im- der case death where finding did turn defen- heart posed; the error went dant offense “inten- making committed the decision used arriv- thus, knowingly.” penalty; in this in- tionally ing at the death Heckert v. stance, cognizable by type of error is Judge (Tex.Cr.App.1981). *8 sup- Applicant has explained Tom G. Davis in Heckert: prove the merits plied error facts appellant’s adopt If were Maldonado, required by argument deliberately and intention- at 116. S.W.2d knowingly linguistic equiva- ally or were sought Therefore, granted. is the relief 37.071(b)(1), lents, it would render Art. is judgment in Cause No. 80164 set holding, nullity. Under such a supra, released to applicant is ordered aside 37.071(b)(1),supra, a use- Art. would be County to Dallas answer the the Sheriff of thing finding of in that a an inten- less copy A of this in this cause. indictment irrec- knowing or murder would be tional Depart- the Texas opinion will be furnished finding with a that the defen- oncilable Justice, Divi- of Criminal Institutional ment delib- dant’s conduct was not committed sion, by the Clerk of this Court. presume Legis- erately. We will 37.- would not have enacted Art. lature DAVIS, J., participating. not 071(b)(1), for a supra, had it intended BERCHELMANN, J., dissents. finding of to be based deliberateness CLINTON, Judge, concurring. though dimension, of state constitutional is subject analysis nevertheless to a harm applicant conten- present Had raised the Tex.R.App.Pro., 81(b)(2), under Rule at “is appeal, direct I not hes- tion his voidable, subject is not best as such itate to reverse his and remand conviction a collateral attack by writ habeas cor for new the cause trial. See Gardner did pus.” 770 S.W.2d at 813. We State, (Tex.Cr.App.1987); 730 S.W.2d 675 hold, thereby necessarily, that defect State, (Tex.Cr.App. Lane S.W.2d of constitutional dimension that is not sub 1987); State, Morrow 753 S.W.2d 372 cognizable ject analysis to a harm bewill (Tex.Cr.App.1988); Martinez v. 11.07 In Truong in an collateral attack. Concluding (Tex.Cr.App.1988). S.W.2d susceptibility analy we held that to a harm that the error one of state committed was one that error did not sis was indicator dimension, plurality- constitutional render a That is conviction void. essentially today grants the same relief however, say, this is exclusive post-conviction application for writ under determining measure for whether not an corpus brought pursuant to Arti- of habeas error voids the It seems to me conviction. Having to it cle Y.A.C.C.P. alluded that, Truong, plurali consistent if the with passing, plurality explains how never ty purports upon error of rely state disposition today with the is consistent magnitude, proceed it should holding Truong, 770 parte Court’s First, inquiries. two it should ask (Tex.Cr.App.1989). As under- subject the error to a whether opinion, cog- the plurality stand its believes is, If it analysis.* plurality finds then ha- nizability post-conviction of the issue in know the “at best we conviction is voida corpus justified beas ble," id., hence, at conviction, capital murder and the United given on collateral attack. That a error is States Court has held that however, analysis, to a harm “heightened” in considerations are it is of dispositively does not establish context, Eighth Amend- vis-a-vis the nature as to the conviction void. render prohibition against un- ment’s cruel and inapplicable, Finding a harm punishment. my this is an- usual view plurality would ad ap- nevertheless example other ad hoc this Court’s by any dress the other proach issues will of what as to void con- measure the error is such be entertained collateral attack of a suffering jurisdictional defect as conviction. viction Dutchover, it void. See parte to render admittedly Rather than undertake this (Clinton, enterprise, daunting plurality concludes J., concurring). simple for the rea- the issue Truong, supra, prosecuted capi- essential In Ex we son that which, allegation error murder. I do understand how that ly held that an tal * supra, n. we held and 10 of Texas Constitution." 753 §§ In Gardner v. "cured" Under the circumstances error of the sort at issue here to be S.W.2d presented 376-77. there, observed, "harm dire of but a we inasmuch as affected the voir Id,, venireman, presumed.” me that single It strikes with and the defendant had been kinds, kind, challenge. peremptory of this as with other “the an additional ruling concrete data from an accused is record will contain no so we observed that where *9 appellate meaningfully posing proper question can prevented which an gauge court thereof, venire, portion or did significant the likelihood that did not [it] or entire is, punishment respectively, "evident.” to the conviction or "manifest” and contribute State, State, Allridge 784 S.W.2d v. 163 the accused.” Roberts v. See also Thus, 81(b)(2), State, supra, (Tex.Cr.App.1990). (Tex.Cr.App.1988). In Rule su- Morrow hypothetical pra, may application no I would not have here. we held that use an erroneous however, reason, say that for purportedly to illustrate distinction between want to that void, rendering rendered the "intentional” and “deliberate” to a substantial conviction 11.07, supra. parte Ex under of veniremen "so distorted the lawful Article number Finding subject Truong, supra. error is not an course of the whole voir dire that [Morrow] necessarily represen- . end the to a harm does not due course law and effective denied I, cognizability inquiry. guaranteed as Article tation of counsel state, if also feder- cogniz- ability at least of translates into instant circumstance al, 11.- in attack. claims under Article ability post-conviction collateral constitutional particular ground upon supra. parte Truong, supra. See Surely the Ex Dutchover, (Clinton, J., Eighth supra here has no parte relief Ex component. 37.071, concurring); parte Crispen, Amendment Article Ex V.A.C.C.P., requires finding (Clinton, J., that a of delib- concur- penalty erateness be made the death plurality before It me what the ring). seems to statutory con- may imposed. Rules of what today potentially does undermines giv- demand that “deliberate” be struction have made. progress we apart from meaning significance en my part, I For own would avoid “intentional;” Article 37.- that attributed question altogether applicant of whether 071(b)(1), inquiry supra, must involve Texas to relief under the Constitu- entitled whether the murder discrete from instead, tion, upon the Sixth proceed, intentionally. Heckert v. was committed Constitu- Amendment to the United States State, (Tex.Cr.App.1981); 612 S.W.2d 549 view, my For applicant tion. in was de- Fearance v. right prived of his federal constitutional Thus, juror (Tex.Cr.App.1981). unable to just of counsel as sure- effective assistance punish- differentiate “deliberate” at right ly deprived of he was his identical as phase guilt at ment from “intentional” under Article § phase deprive capital would accused of altogether sanguine I am not about process and due course of law. Gard- I granting under a claim do re- relief State, supra, Disallowing ner at “fun- gard particularly “exceptional” questioning tailored to such an ina- reveal damental,” con- notwithstanding its federal would, by same bility a venireman parte dimension. See Ex Cris- stitutional token, ineffec- render assistance counsel J., (Clinton, concurring). pen, supra, tive, deprives inasmuch as it counsel of the Moreover, being “exception- the error possible chance to establish a basis nature, applicant made al” in should be that, cause, id., or, challenge failing explain he raised the reason could intelligent peremptory use of his chal- in due of his direct this contention course lenges. supra. It Morrow v. Dutchover, appeal. supra, at 79 parte Ex doubtful, however, particular in our however, (Clinton, J., concurring). yet, As capital Eighth murder scheme the Amend- prevailed on the perspective has necessarily requires ment that a “deliber- I current as understand Court. Under law finding ate” be made it, in some requirements phase penalty may before a death be ob- in the properly preserved it be instances Eighth purposes, tained. For Amendment court, supra, and parte Crispen, Ex Code, may already V.T.C.A. Penal 19.03 § pled in the properly it be sufficiently event death-eligi- the class of narrow corpus in this Phelps, application for writ of habeas ble See offenders. Lowenfield Court, Dutchover, supra, any Ex de- parte 98 L.Ed.2d 568 U.S. S.Ct. Thus, magnitude (1988). proceeds upon plurality fect federal me, of a collateral premise, way it seems to more than be remedied Eighth brought “more under Article su- proceeding that under the Amendment Banks, pra. parte supra, is due" murder defendants. cognizabili- Accordingly, grant enough if that is to bestow But cases cited. attack, I ty upon a on collateral do claim cause on the basis of a viola- why right not understand Amendment tion of Sixth Banks, (Tex.Cr.App. of counsel. to effective assistance 1989), equally did not have an opin- Although join plurality I cannot was, all, after mur- claim. Banks ion, I concur that relief should be therefore plurality’s criteria der defendant too. granted. *10 for me. entirely are too whimsical McCORMICK,P.J., and CAMPBELL begun hoped the Court had I had WHITE, JJ., cogniz- join opinion. in this develop a more coherent doctrine of OPINION TO DENIAL OF STATE’S Sixth Amendment. Since that is an error dimension, MOTION FOR REHEARING of constitutional it is federal cognizable existing precedent under wheth CLINTON, dissenting. Judge, subject analysis er to a harm or not. See Banks, (Tex.Cr. original in this On cause a submission App.1989). I On that basis concurred in opinion held judge plurality three that fail- Judge the result. Berchelmann dissented questioning of re- ure to allow veniremen Judge par opinion. without Davis did not distinguish garding ability their “inten- ticipate. tional” “deliberate” error of magnitude. state constitutional Disallow- In rehearing his motion for the State ing question significant portion the of to a alia, inter Attorney contends, Prosecuting venire was held to violate the concurring opinion in erred assum I, right under to effective counsel Article ing is a Sixth claim of there Amendment the 10 of Texas Constitution. Because § compara ineffective assistance of counsel inquiry very “went to the heart of our holdings prevention ble to this Court’s scheme,” capital sentencing murder be- right dire effective voir can violate heightened pro- of “the need for cause representation of counsel under Article cases, plurali- cess standards” in See, v. Mathis supra. e.g., § ty cognizable held this under Article error (1959). Tex.Crim. 11.07, Op. cogniza- 485. It is Y.A.C.C.P. fact, no comparable there is Sixth ble, held, plurality notwithstanding our claim, or at least none that has Amendment parte Truong, in holding in recognized been the federal courts. (Tex.Cr.App.1989),that errors state treating When voir dire issues the federal are subject constitutional dimension that mostly speaks in terms of the caselaw are not analysis post in a harm right impartial Sixth Amendment to an conviction habeas right jury, deprivation of the rather than ques counsel. Failure to allow effective cause, concurring opinion I filed a tioning they of veniremen as to whether judges joined. three There I requirements can of the law follow various opined that of the state constitu context right not to an deemed a violation of the here, tional error that occurred a harm Estelle, Moreno impartial jury. E.g., analysis “may application[.]” Op. 1983); King (CA5 178-79 F.2d so, being *.n. That the limitation (CA5 1988). Lynaugh, 850 F.2d 1055 cognizability expressly on announced I Only case that found addresses at one Truong apply. But I still be not inadequate voir any length question “[fjinding an error is lieve standpoint from the violation necessarily end to a harm does Procunier, effective counsel. Milton v. Id. Neither cognizability inquiry.” my 1984), (CA5 1095-97 F.2d it, plurali nor as I opinion, understand disallowing ques held that Fifth Circuit ty’s, question addressed the what errors under tions to veniremen as to their of state constitutional dimension not sub standings meaning of the word “de analysis may ject to a nevertheless so counsel as liberate” did not disable trial Article under su him Amend render ineffective Sixth plurality pra. The did address very This close to the purposes. ment Eighth believed original sub contention raised principle “more-process- Amendment v. McCot Esquivel mission here. See also is-due” to a defendant rendered ter, 1985); (CA5 at 957 777 F.2d Grif cognizable. rejected approach. I issue Lynaugh, 823 F.2d at 864-65 fin Instead, cogniza- avoided the (CA5 1987). The United States bility of state altogeth cases. Court denied certiorari in all of these by positing that relief could be er I can error, Moreover, reflection guise further the same under for. “prejudice” any reason the guaranteed by imagine counsel as ineffective

489 per se renders a Washington, 468 error v. that constitutional Strickland prong Crispen, 668, parte Ex 2052, “void,” 674 104 S.Ct. 80 L.Ed.2d U.S. conviction see a (1984), on such 103, would come to bear (Tex.Cr.App.1989) at 111 S.W.2d 108 Amendment claim of ineffectiveness Sixth J., concurring), least (Clinton, we should at any of counsel. It would not seem to fit say an is “of able to error sufficient be categories for obliged magnitude character or that we are prejudice analysis unnec has held a say rectifying it to that our interest Cronic, 466 v. See United States essary. compelling finality in- overcomes otherwise 648, 2039, 25, n. at U.S. 659 & 104 S.Ct. terests”, we make it a basis before 657, (1984). On the L.Ed.2d at 668 Goodman, collateral relief. case, as set out in the present facts of the (Clinton, J., S.W.2d State, McKay v. opinion appeal, on direct 3). concurring) op. said (slip at We have (Tex.Cr.App.1985), at 27-28 intelligent peremptory denial use of acted, readily appellant find jury could analy- challenges a harm is not premeditar but with deliberately, just sis, so the likelihood harm is tion, which is more than Article 37.- impartial fair and great a denial V.A.C.C.P., requires. Russell v. 071(b)(1), inevitable, rather, simply but be- State, (Tex.Cr. at 779-780 S.W.2d is such that a cause the nature error circumstance, it App.1983). Given this non, harm, vel meaningful inquiry into can- that, probable reasonably does not seem State, supra, v. See not be made. Nunfio questions for the failure allow but State, 3; Roberts v. n. at 485 & S.W.2d “inten the difference between the terms (Tex.Cr.App.1990). I do not con- “deliberate,” tional” and the first indulge harm sider the refusal issue have been answered would different reason, appeal, on for this direct Washington, Strickland ly. 466 U.S. declaring equivalent of functional S.Ct. at L.Ed.2d “void,” or error rendered conviction short, my it has been demonstrated to magnitude as of sufficient was otherwise rely it on satisfaction that was a mistake to interest justify suspending the State’s post Amendment the Sixth as a source of finding finality even absent voidness. corpus relief in this conviction habeas applicant’s claim is not I would hold that purely cause. error is consti- state post-appel- cognizable post-conviction, Only tutional dimension. three 11.07, Article collateral attack under late plurality explains why state opinion rehearing By denying the Court supra. Ar- constitutional error under majori- than opinion by stand less lets parte Truong 11.07, not- supra, ticle claim, but ty only that not entertains I, withstanding. presumably the three extraordinary in this grants relief cause. my concurring opinion, judges joined who respectfully dissent. rejected plurality’s explanation. Judge rejected it Presumably Berchelmann majority That means a of the Court too. CAMPBELL, J., joins. yet agree

has available only present- collateral attack 10, supra. here—violation of Article

ed § cannot Until we address that issue we grant relief. intelligent peremptory

Denial use of susceptible challenges ordinarily analysis. See Nunfio Cf. Gard- (Tex.Cr.App.1991). at 690 n. 9 ner Nevertheless, I (Tex.Cr.App.1987). hold under Article Particularly reject the fiction supra. we

Case Details

Case Name: Ex Parte McKay
Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Sep 12, 1990
Citation: 819 S.W.2d 478
Docket Number: 70850
Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.
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