35 Cal. 97 | Cal. | 1868
The return shows that on the 20th of March, 1868, one Alfred Briggs recovered a judgment in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, against the petitioner arid others, for the sum of three thousand six hundred and twelve dollars and twenty-eight cents, with costs taxed at six hundred and forty-five dollars and twenty-five cents, and that the same has never been reversed or modified, nor satisfied that on the 23d of March, 1868, Briggs caused an execution to he issued upon said judgment, directed to the Sheriff of Sutter County; that on the 15th day of May, 1868, Briggs made an affidavit before the Judge of the Sixth Judicial District, showing that the petitioner had certain property which he
Habeas corpus is undoubtedly the proper remedy for every unlawful imprisonment, both in civil and criminal cases; but an imprisonment is not unlawful in the sense of this rule merely because the process or order under which the party is held has been irregularly issued, or is erroneous. Process which has been irregularly issued may be set aside by the Court or officer by whom it was issued, and erroneous judgments and orders may be reversed on appeal or writ of error. The writ of habeas corpus has not been given for the purpose of reviewing judgments or orders made by a Court, or Judge or officer acting within their jurisdiction. To put it to such a use would be to convert it into a writ of error, and confer upon every officer who has authority to issue the writ appellate jurisdiction over the orders and judgments of the highest judicial tribunals in the land. County Judges, though occupying an inferior position, and exercising an inferior jurisdiction, would be, by such a rule, empowered to review and practically reverse the judgments and orders of the District Courts, and of the Supreme Court itself, and also of the Federal Courts exercising jurisdiction within the State. Establish the doctrine that the judgments and orders of Courts may be reviewed on habeas corpus, upon the ground of error, and appeals for the correction of errors may be dispensed with in all cases in which the arrest or imprisonment of persons
The order requiring the petitioner to deliver the policy in question to the Sheriff was made in the regular course of proceedings, authorized by the statute, supplementary to execution. By the statute, (Practice Act, Chap. H,) the Judge of the Sixth Judicial District was authorized to institute an inquiry as to the property of the petitioner in the mode which he adopted, and to subject all the property which might be discovered, not exempt from execution, to the satisfaction of the judgment in favor of Briggs. To that end he necessarily had jurisdiction to determine whether the property found in the possession of the petitioner was or was not exempt from execution. Such was the subject matter with which he had to deal. That he had jurisdiction to deal with it, cannot be questioned. That he had jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, is not denied. Such being the conditions, his order directing a surrender of the policy may be erroneous, but it cannot be void. Whether it is erroneous or not, I am not allowed to inquire while acting under this writ. My power extends no further than to declare whether his order is void for the want of jurisdiction, or his process, upon its face, invalid. In my judgment, his