History
  • No items yet
midpage
Ex Parte MacEyra
690 S.W.2d 572
Tex. Crim. App.
1983
Check Treatment

*1 appearance eral and foreclosed subse-

quent hearing special appearance. on its Hale, See St. Louis and S.F.R. Co. (1918); Tex. 206 S.W. 75 see also R. McDonald, Texas Practice in District Civil (rev. 1982); County 9.04 Courts see Thode, Jurisdiction;

also Personam 2031b, “Long-Arm” Art. The Texas Juris- Statute; Appearance diction and the Challenge in Texas and Else- Jurisdiction where, 317-318 Tex.L.Rev.

Therefore, judgment reverse the we appeals it court of relates to the jurisdictional question. In all other re-

spects judgment we affirm the of the court appeals thus, we affirm the trial judgment entirety. court’s in its Victor MACEYRA.

No. 69163. Texas, Appeals Court of Criminal En Banc. Sept. Rehearing May Denied *2 applicant’s pa- the revocation with providing applicant with an

role without opportunity to be heard. V.A.C.C.P., 42.12, provides in

Art. part: pertinent person grant- prisoner or a “Whenever pardon accused of a ed a conditional parole, mandatory super- violation of his vision, pardon on informa- or conditional complaint by a law enforcement tion and officer, enti- he shall be officer pro Maceyra, se. Victor charges on such before tled to be heard Huttash, Austin, Atty., State’s Robert designee under such the Board or its for the State. regulations as the Board rules and added) (Emphasis adopt....” Before the court en banc. promulgated Although the Art. rules to which rules OPINION right to be heard purport to eliminate DAVIS, Judge. W.C. persons for those convict- before corpus pro- The this habeas ed of felonies while ceeding awaiting he is the results contends statutorily granted may not subvert wrong appeal place. in the We Morrissey v. right to be heard. agree. 2593, 471, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 408 U.S. theft, was and his Applicant convicted

punishment years’ at 10 confine- assessed purporting the order to hold that We filing timely ment. Prior to his of a notice Appli- applicant’s parole is void. revoke custody appeal he was transferred to the custody improperly cant is therefore (TDC). Department of Corrections TDC, custody of is remanded to the Lampasas County to await the sheriff custody of applicant was in the While appeal. the outcome of TDC, parole on a the Governor revoked his conviction, previous upon the recommenda- Paroles

tion of the Board of Pardons and ON STATE’S MOTION OPINION (the Board), upon the conviction based REHEARING FOR theft, provision appli- but without Judge. ONION, Presiding by, opportunity to cant of notice or an post-convic- involves before, proceeding This the Board. corpus for writ of habeas application that, without It is uncontroverted 11.07, V.A.C.C.P. brought under Article his incar- applicant’s parole, revocation of held original this Court submission authori- would be without ceration at TDC Paroles was Pardons and 42.09, V.A.C.C.P., Board of Art. zation. See authority proceed statutory of the without that the actions Applicant contends parole without applicant’s revoking his the Board in Governor and opportunity applicant with providing the right due of his parole were violation in Article provided heard as to to be he entitled process, and that is therefore opinion held Court’s Y.A.C.C.P. appeal in the outcome of his await the applicant’s revoke purporting to order Lampasas County “the custody of the sheriff parole is void.” pending appeal. on bail or to be released convict- applicant was shows The record applicant’s reach We need not robbery on December aggravated contention, Board ed of we find the cess because sen- County and was Lampasas authority proceed- statutory without was years’ imprisonment tenced to 15 on Janu- formation and complaint by a law en- ary 1977 in the 27th District Court. No forcement parole officer, officer or appeal was taken. Later was shall be entitled to be heard on such released on One of the con- charges the Board or designee its before ditions or rules was that he not violate under such rules and municipal, county, state or federal laws. may adopt.” (Emphasis supplied.) *3 charged onWhile he was with com- Section 145.41 of the of Rules the Texas mitting burglary of a habitation. He was provides: Board of Pardons and Paroles by jury July convicted of that offense on “§ (001.) Allegation Viola- I45.4I 8, 1982, punish- and the court assessed his tion: Review and Disposition. Initial years’ imprisonment ment at 10 the “(a) At such time as the Board learns concurrently sentence to run with the sen- allegation of violation of one or aggravated tence in the earlier robbery more by terms and conditions of release conviction. After was transfer- releasee, an administrative Department red to the of Corrections on shall refer parole panel the matter to a 20, 1982, July burglary virtue of the for review and initial determination of conviction, gave appeal he notice of from disposition. July that conviction which was filed “(b) A panel shall review information and make an initial determi- 19, 1982, August the Board of Par- nation to: dons and Paroles met 145.- “(1) request governor to order 41(b)(5),Rules of the Texas Board of Par- prerevocation the issuance of a war- applicant’s dons and Paroles to consider rant; parole and make an initial determination of “(2) disposition. was held without order the issuance of a notice of appli- allegation notice to and in the vi- absence of administrative release olations; cant. The Board recommended to the Gov- (on applicant’s parole aggravated ernor “(3) continue the release of the al- conviction) robbery be revoked for violation leged pending disposition violator (condition) of Rule No. his 7 of release any charges; felony that he had been convicted of the “(4) disposition of the make final Burglary offense of of a Habitation. On by continuation of release un- matter 16, 1982, November the Governor conditions; der the same or modified applicant’s parole State Texas revoked appli- and issued an arrest for the warrant “(5) re- recommend revocation and cant. quest governor to issue a revoca- application applicant In his habeas warrant, provided that this action process contends was denied due of law releasee only shall be taken when the Brewer, Morrissey as enunciated in v. during has committed a offense 2593, 2595, U.S. 92 S.Ct. 33 L.Ed.2d and has the time of his or her release We need not answer the consti court level at the trial been convicted process tutional due penal sentenced to incarceration issue before us is controlled the statu offense, whether conviction tory provision upon which the appealed or not. also relies. “(A) of administrative Revocation § 22, V.A.C.C.P., provides (5) of this paragraph release under part: accomplished ad- shall be subsection proceeded ministratively a release person prisoner “Whenever a or a not be entitled against hereunder shall granted pardon a conditional is accused release revocation administrative parole, mandatory to an of a violation of hearing; pardon on in- supervision, or conditional “(B) Supreme panel Morrissey After the under true that in has acted It is Court, discussing process require- (b)(5) section, further subsection ments, made clear that a cannot proceedings shall be in accord with against him relitigate issues determined (re- (205.03.03.020)of this title 145.53 forums as when the other lating to Revocation of Administrative of another is based conviction (Parole, Mandatory Supervi- Release Morrissey 408 U.S. at crime. Proclamation; sion) Recommendation; at Warrant). much The State contends that it is more “(C) conviction Should releasee’s maintain economical for State to competent reversed court of § 145.41(b)(5); automatic revocation rule of jurisdiction then he or she shall be parolee’s fully protect- rights are admin- entitled to reinstatement of the ed; policy of that it has never been the previously revoked istrative release *4 in parolee to have a confined the Board hereunder, upon the notification of the result Department of Corrections as of judicial provi- of said action and board remaining felony while on a new conviction copy to the board of certified of sion parole felony on an older conviction where effectuating the re- judicial the order represented new conviction a violation the versal; however, provided, the granted with an parole of in connection may proceed against a releasee board conviction; mitigating circum- older that no under the on the reinstated subsection allowing presented justify stances could any allegation(s) of of the of vio- basis parole remain on he has parolee to where previously against lation the re- filed parole violated his conditions commit- yet not disposed leasee but of.” ting felony for which he has been convict- is now rehearing ed and incarcerated. argues the State the Board adopt regulations is authorized to rules and § Rules, enacting 145.41(5) its the In of governing parole non-felony In revocation. however, Board, scope the of was without cases, designated the conviction Board has seemingly authority, no eco- its matter how agents, “hearing its offi- own denominated nomical, logical the rule and reasonable parole cers” to hear violation of cases. See a violation may seem where there has been Rules of the Texas of Pardons and Board committing parolee a felo- parole of the §§ 145.47(6) Paroles, 145.45(i), 141.111 and in conviction ny offense which has resulted In falling 147.1-147.7. within cases in a district court. the of the rule ambit automatic revocation § 42.12, 22, gives the Board the 145.41(b)(5)], argues, the State the [§ rules relat- right to make Board of Pardons and has de Paroles facto cannot hearing, the Board ing to the but District the State designated the Court of granted abrogate statutorily the its of in which the criminal trial on the Texas hearing. right to a “desig- felony new offense is its held as § 22, light reading of said A mere purposes nee” 22 of Article for the a number interpretation, raises the State’s 42.12, V.A.C.C.P. all, the issue of questions. First of urges merely the Board has II, The State powers, Article Tex. separation of to fact-finding responsibility Board, its agency deferred Constitution, may the forum; court is government, that the district another the Executive Branch of the to constitutionally required court, without statutorily and with or designate a district be the greater procedural knowledge,1 safe- afford the consent or its hearings on agent conducting guards protections Board than the Board’s Putting aside the required parole violations? to afford. designees under Article as its nothing the courts record to show siders There is this notify attempted notified or 42.12, § con- this district courts of state that separation powers, any request tion of the of the we made for a until such 42.12, 22, pro- further note that Article post-conviction time as he filed his writ of vides the is entitled to be heard on is, corpus. however, habeas There no charges” referring to “such violations of showing affirmative waiver of such Nothing in this record shows that hearing. copy “charges” brought had of the been We are aware that Court to the attention of district court or interpreted a forerunner of Article fact, applicant. upon served § 22, supra,2 regard to this matter. does not instant case it Lewis, In Ex 170 Tex.Cr.R. sought Board to invoke the revocation (1960), simply S.W.2d 900 it was said: “The cedure until after the conviction in district impose any mandatory statute does not court, “charges” were not even and the duty upon the board to initiate and conduct is not drafted until then. The district court hearing.” reasoning There was no from required, during prosecution of an of- otherwise, language statute3 or upon fense indictment or informa- authority. Subsequently and no citation of tion, if to turn aside and determine spent sought an inmate credit for time “charges” pa- upon have served been a hear- which was revoked without rele- rolee-defendant or to hear evidence Sellars, ing. In Ex 384 S.W.2d 351 “charges” to such immaterial to vant but stated, (Tex.Cr.App.1964), “Rela- this Court prosecution it. before position in no the failure tor is written, Much more but need- could be Pardons and Paroles to *5 § 145.41(b)(5) say ex- less to we hold that hearing hold a on the of revoca- statutory authority of the Board ceeds the Lewis, parte tion of his Ex 170 deprive parolee attempts insofar as it a 254, opin- The 339 S.W.2d 900.” Tex.Cr.R. “charges” hearing of a to which he is there was a ion is otherwise silent whether § 22 by entitled to be heard virtue of hearing by parole request for a 42.12, Article V.A.C.C.P. Sellars. hearing The conducted (5th Beto, 934 Cir. Loper 440 F.2d v. in the instant case without notice to and 1971), interpreted Lewis the federal court although in applicant absence of the con requiring request for a revoca as § 145.41(b)(5) Board’s formity with prerequisite under the hearing tion as a statutory provisions of rules violated the Estelle, Fitzgerald v. Texas statute. And § 42.12, 12, depriving Article 1975), (5th cited Lewis 505 F.2d 1334 Cir. opportunity heard. The Gover to be pre-Mor- determining that a footnote in revoking applicant’s parole nor’s order for a hear request in Texas a rissey cases upon the recommendation of the based ing necessary. was hearing following parte ex is void. had, may have it validity Whatever Lewis The stat- seriously eroded. has now been a re regard to the issue of With since the three times ute amended has been quest hearing, it does not for a revocation Sellars,4 and while decisions Lewis appear from this record V.A.C.C.P., 1925, 20, original V.A.C.C.P.,1925, 781b, Id, 22, cle § as amend- 2. Article 78 § 1947, 466, (Acts 1957, Leg., p. The Parole Law 452). ch. 226. Probation and ed Acts 55th Adult 781d, 1049, supra, was Article Leg., p. forerunner of Article ch. 50th 781b, V.A.C.C.P.,1925. 722, 2, 317, 1965, Leg., p. ch. Vol. 4.Acts 59th 781d, 22, (Art. supra) provided § 3. The statute 1973, V.A.C.C.P.; 42.12, enacting Acts Article days of 45 hearing held within “shall” 447; 1977, 1235, Leg., 65th Leg., p. Acts ch. 63rd place time and set the date of arrest and at a amendment to p. ch. 347. The 1973 Legislature appear that the the Board. It would 42.12, 22, for a hear- supra, the time extended § placed on the intended some burden to be days, amend- the 1977 to 60 from 45 hearing. language regard The Board with days. the time to 90 ment extended Id, supra, Arti- the same as in in Article 78 was

577 Glenn, similar, implications tional Ex 690 language is still somewhat (Tex.Cr.App. delivered this request S.W.2d 578 nothing there is to indicate that hearing. There has prerequisite is a for in all day), they are not resolved because statutory language so indicat never been in the stat- we find the answer the causes Further, process ing. the due decision Along way we also find that the ute. impact. It has been Morrissey has had its rule “without the promulgated it is the of the Board of held that burden authority, no matter how seem- scope of its Parole, parolee, proper to see that a not the economical, logical ingly and reasonable hearing is conducted. See Preston conclude, ...,” and the rule seem (6th Cir.1974); 496 F.2d 274 Piggman, therefore, that we need not reach (D.C.Cal. F.Supp. Sigler, Tunks v. 455 constitutionality. of its 1976). holding are that in enact- Essentially we that, in affirma- We hold absence of an 22, supra, the clear ing Article waiver, knowingly intelligently and tive legislative that “a is enti- intent is States, given, Brady v. 397 U.S. Cf. United hearing parole revocation tled to the [so 1463, 1468, L.Ed.2d made, though request is provided],” and no (1970), parolee pa- to the is entitled waiver, intelligent- without “an affirmative hearing provided in Article role revocation 577), stat- (p. knowingly given,” ly and 42.12, 22, supra, independent any “give every mandates that the Board ute requirements. request is es- process No personally heard at right to be trigger sential to the entitlement to such a proceedings,” parole revocation hearing. are statutory Lewis and Sellars Johnson, (Tex.Cr.App. 690 S.W.2d 585 here- overruled to the extent of conflict decided). day with. of a revocation hear- In the matter rehearing over- State’s motion global in nature ing Article is so ruled. exception. the statute That foreclose CLINTON, authorizes the Board to hold Judge, concurring. such rules “under Today opinions the Court delivers in a *6 power adopt” does not bestow

trilogy raising causes a common reg- and authority promulgate is, tion. That when the Board of Pardons charged effectively deny any ulations (“Board”) and Paroles comes to consider Legisla- right to be heard. The parolee the revoked, is to whether what delegated nor au- ture neither enacted has who, by being convict- cess is due for an provide Board to thority for the ed of a offense committed while rule,” Rule 145.- as “automatic released on is shown to have violat- sug- 41(b)(5) The State is characterized. validly imposed obligation and condi- ed economy,” “an gests the rule is obey tion of release that the “shall approval “it should receive Municipal, County, and Federal all State 1 suggestion to that But merit Court.” laws?” Department to decide. Legislative is for course, are the Due Pro- Implicated, of policy lies public Such determination of the Fourteenth Amendment cess Clause Depart- of the Judicial outside the realm of the United States to the Constitution ment. §I, Article 19 of the Due Course Clause of join opin- I Texas, observations With those as the Constitution of the State quartet of causes ions of the Court V.A.C.C.P. well as Article today. However, we decide though discuss the constitu- we moot; restraint, case, ac- matter is now another under cordingly is raised in The same opin- unpublished per curiam made to but since it has been applicant finally discharged application. his sentences has ion we have dismissed custody longer consequence is no TEAGUE, Judge, concurring.

For the reasons I have stated in the concurring opinion that I filed in Ex

Glenn, (Tex.Cr.App.1985),I 690 S.W.2d578 only concur. Henry GLENN. Charles

No. 69056. Texas, Appeals of Criminal Court En Banc. May Rehearing 24, 1985. July Denied Tatum, Dallas, appellant. for

John G. Lown, Wade, Henry Atty. Dist. & Ruth Dallas, Huttash, Atty., Asst. Dist. Robert Austin, Atty., for the State. State’s

OPINION

ONION, Judge. Presiding application post-conviction This is corpus filed writ of habeas V.A.C.C.P. was denied due Applicant contends he Morrissey enunciated process of law as U.S. (1972), he was not af- in that L.Ed.2d *7 revocation hear- required parole forded the claims ings. He further 22, V.A.C.C.P., has been violated parole hear- denied a revocation he was also, Tex.Cr.App., 652 See S.W.2d provided therein. was convicted Applicant alleges he in 1966 and sen- County rape in Dallas imprisonment; years’ tenced to 99 1979; that while on was released burglary of a parole he was convicted sen- County and was in Dallas habitation He al- imprisonment. years’ tenced to 25 burglary con- result of his leges that as a his 99 parole on parole his while on viction

Case Details

Case Name: Ex Parte MacEyra
Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Sep 28, 1983
Citation: 690 S.W.2d 572
Docket Number: 69163
Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.