228 F. 547 | W.D. Wash. | 1915
The petitioner alleges that he is restrained of his liberty by the United States marshal, who holds him under an order of removal to the United States District Court for the territory of Alaska; that he was arrested upon a warrant issued by Robert W. McClelland, United States commissioner for the Western'district of Washington, Northern division, upon complaint filed by the United States district attorney charging the petitioner with the commission of a crime within the territory of Alaska, in violation of section 1907 of the Compiled Daws of the territory 'of Alaska, codified and arranged by act of Congress of August 24, 1912; that a preliminary hearing was had and petitioner bound over by the commissioner to the grand jury at Juneau, Alaska; and further alleges that, if a crime was committed, it was not an offense against the laws of the United States, but an offense against the laws of the territory of Alaska. On presentation of the petition an order was issued, and the United States marshal thereby directed to produce the petitioner before tire court for such disposition as may be directed. Obedient to tins order, the petitioner is produced in court.
It is urged that Judge Hanford held a fugitive from Alaska to be removable under the provision of this section. This holding it was alleged was in the case of Tiberg v. Warren, which was appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals and is reported in 192 Fed. 458, 112 C. C. A. 596; but an examination of the case shows that this question was not an issue. The emphasis upon the suggestion is placed upon the argument in the brief of the United States district attorney before the Circuit Court of Appeals, in which reference was made to the application of this section. The issue in that case was the right to extradite under the provisions of section 5278, Revised Statutes (Comp. St. 1913, § 10126). If Judge Hanford in that case said that an offender under the Alaska Criminal Code, being present in this district, could be removed under section 1014, supra, it was purely obiter dictum.
“It is clear that the District Court for Alaska was invested with the powers of a District Court and a Circuit Court of the United'States, as well as with general jurisdiction to enforce in Alaska the laws of Oregon”
—which, by section 7 of the act of May 17, 1884 (23 Stat. 24, c. 53), was declared to be the law of Alaska so far as they were applicable and not in conflict with the provisions of that act or of the laws of the United States, and held that a judge of the District Court of Alaska is not a judge of a court of the United States within the generally accepted meaning of that term.
The cases cited by the government do not appear to me to be to the issue. In Benson v. Henkel, 198 U. S. 1, 25 Sup. Ct. 569, 49 L. Ed. 919, the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia is held to be a court of the United States within the meaning of section 1014, supra, authorizing the removal of a person charged with an offense against the United States. Much emphasis was placed by the government upon United States v. Haskins, Fed. Cas. No. 15,322. In that case judge Hillyer, at page 215 of 26 Fed. Cas., says:
“The act of Congress, respecting fugitives from justice .(1 Stat. 302), in pursuance of article 4, section 2, Const. Ú. S., provides a mode by which offenders against state and territorial laws, who have lied from justice, may be delivered up to the * * * state or territory demanding them, but makes no provision for the case of those persons who have committed offenses against the United States in one district and have lied to another.”
These cases do not, it seems to me, help the complainant. They are all predicated upon an offense against the United States, which is the express requirement of section 1014, supra. If the offense here charged were an offense against the United States, there would be no question as to the duty of this court to order the removal. By act of Congress the territory of Alaska, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, became an inchoate state, not yet admitted, but organized, with separate Legislature, under a territorial Governor and other officers appointed by the' President by consent of the Senate. The legislative power extended to all rightful subjects pertaining to local
There is, by this provision, clearly a line of demarcation placed by Congress between the local laws affecting the territory and laws affecting generally all of the states and territories. Section 2099 of the Laws of Alaska, supra, provide:
That “the common law of England as adopted and understood in the United States shall be in force in said district, except as modified by this act.”
This expression, I think, further emphasizes the line of demarcation suggested, as it is fundamental that federal courts have no jurisdiction of common-law offenses, but are limited to acts made criminal by Congress, and Congress is charged with knowledge of this fact. The common-law offenses by this provision are placed in the came category and relation as .the offenses defined by the Criminal Code, and it would hardly be contended that this court would have jurisdiction, to direct the removal of an offender against the common law of the territory.
The authorities of Alaska are not without remedy; full and complete provision being made by the extradition laws, which are open to all the states and territories.
I think that the court has not the power to order the petitioner removed to the District Court of Alaska.