10 Mo. App. 442 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1881
delivered the opinion of the court.
The prisoner is detained in the city work-house under an execution and commitment from the First District Police-Court of the city of St. Louis, issued upon a judgment, against him for a fine of $200, on account of the violation of a city ordinance prohibiting the sale of lottery tickets. In this proceeding by habeas corpus he demands his release from imprisonment, upon many grounds which are pressed by his counsel with zeal and ingenuity at various stages, in a motion to quash the respondent’s return, in objections to-testimony, and in a final demurrer to the evidence sustaining the return. The several grounds of his claim will be considered without reference to the form of their presentation.
The proceeding before the police justice was begun by
The State Constitution, Article II., section 16, provides “ that imprisonment for debt shall not be allowed, except for the non-payment of fines and penalties imposed for violation of law.” This, by implication, is conclusive that, the proper legislative authority may direct imprisonment for the non-payment of fines and' penalties, without a violation of the Constitution. It remains only to be seen whether such a legislative authority has sanctioned the imprisonment here complained of.
For certain purposes connected with the welfare and' good order of local communities, legislative powers are conferred on municipal corporations, to be operative within their respective territorial limits. In the case of the city of St. Louis, these powers are derived directly from the State Constitution, through the action of the board of freeholders, and its ratification by the voters of the city. We need look no farther than the Charter, for a sufficient
We are told, however, that if the proceeding against the
In City of St. Louis v. Sternberg, 69 Mo. 290, that-part of the city ordinance which denounced imprisonment-
Counsel for the prisoner says that the city of St. Louis had no authority to establish the First District Police Court, or to provide for the appointment of a clerk thereof. The authority to do both is directly traceable, through ordinance and charter, to the State Constitution. The respondent introduces in evidence City Ordinance number 10339, approved July 31, 1877. This, in plain terms, establishes the court and the clerk. Power to pass the ordinance is given in the Charter, Article IV., sections 25-28. The Charter authority derives sanction from Article VI., section 1, of the Constitution. We fail to appreciate the argument which finds in the use of the name “ First District Police Court,” a departure from the constitutional authority, for the establishment of municipal courts. The
It is too late, at the present day, to contend for the light of trial by jury in cases of petty offences cognizable by local courts, in the exercise of police jurisdiction. The subject has, long since, been judicially exhausted. No authority recognizes the claim, as here presented.
The objection that the ordinance against selling lottery tickets is not properly enforceable, because of the existence of a State law against the same offence, has no weight. It is completely disposed of in The State v. Gordon, 60 Mo. 383.
We find that the prisoner is detained in custody by virtue of a lawful execution issued upon the final judment of a court of competent jurisdiction; and therefore remand him to the same custody.