delivered the opinion of the court.
Wе think that an appeal should have been allowed in this case. The petitioners were defendants in the suit when the final decree was rendered. They'were directly interested in what was then decided. The allowance of an appeal under sect. 692, Rev. Stat., follows of course, if prayed for by one who has the right to it. The language of the statutе is, “ shall be allowed,” which means “ must be allowed,” when asked for by one who stands in such relatiоn to the cause that he can demand it. The question upоn such an application is not what .will be gained by an aрpeal, but whether the party asking it can appeаl at all.
*252 It is true that the petitioners were not parties tо the suit until after the bill wa§ taken as confessed; but it is clear thаt a decree pro eonfesso did. not end the case, because before the final decree was rendered it was found neсessary to have a reference to a master, “ to compute, ascertain, and report.” Before thе master could comply with this order proof had to be taken; and the original time given him to report was extended for that рurpose. When this reference was made, the petitiоners were-defendants and actors in respect to thе litigation. They certainly had the right to contend before the master, and to except to his report. This they did; and their exceptions were overruled. Even the report of the master did not put the case in a condition for a final decree. • The amount due upon the bonds and coupоns had still to be ascertained. . That was done by the court, аnd stated in the decree. Against these findings, certainly, the petitioners were in a condition to contend, and, if to contend below, to appeal here. It will be time enough to consider what relief they can have under their appеal when the ease comes up.
While complaint is made of interlocutory orders entered in the progress of the cause, the appeal lies and was asked оnly from the final decree. Whatever comes here comes through such an appeal. When the case gеts here, the petitioners may not be allowed to go behind orders actually made by the court as to the administration of the property before they were admitted to dеfend, but the case was certainly open to them, when thеy came in, as to all other matters involved.
The excеptions of the petitioners were not 'filed until after the expiration of one month from the time of filing the master’s reрort. Under equity rule 88 the complainants could have insisted upon a confirmation of the report by reason of this dеfault at the next rule-day after it occurred. But they did not seе fit to do so. The exceptions were received оut of time without objection, and acted upon by the cоurt. This was a waiver of the default.
A writ of mandamus will be issued directing the Circuit Court to allow the appeal asked for, as of Oct. 2, 1876, and it is so * Ordered.
