Ex Parte Johnson
We granted сertiorari in this case to determine whether the Court of Civil Appeals erred in concluding that a juvenile court cannot entertain a petition by a parent to have a child declared dependent, and following such declaration, terminate the other parent‘s parental rights, where the petitioning рarent has legal custody of the child by virtue of a divorce decree. We hold that the Court of Civil Appeals, 474 So.2d 712, did err, and we therefore reverse its judgment.
Mary Johnson and James W. Abney were divorced in 1977; the divorce decree awarded custody of their only child, Michele Kathleen Abney, to Johnson. The decree conditioned Abney‘s visitation rights upon paymеnt of child support.
Johnson filed a petition with the Juvenile Court of Jefferson County in 1983, seeking to have her child declared “dependent” and, thereby, to terminatе the parental rights of Abney. Johnson alleged that Abney had neither contacted the child, nor provided any support payments, since 1977. Further, Johnson had remarried, and the termination of Abney‘s parental rights would allow the child‘s stepfather to legally adopt her.
After an ore tenus hearing, the juvenile court entered an order terminаting Abney‘s parental rights. Abney appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which reversed the judgment of the juvenile court. After rehearing was denied, Johnson pеtitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the juvenile court‘s judgment because it concluded that Johnson cоuld not herself bring a petition to have her child declared dependent. The court‘s opinion reads in part as follows:
Cases that involve termination of parental rights arise out of the juvenile court‘s jurisdiction over children. Wright v. Montgomery County Department of Pensions and Security, 423 So.2d 256 (Ala.Civ.App.1982);
§ 12-15-30, Code of Alabama 1975 .Sections 12-15-50 to-76 of the Code set out the procedure to follow in order to have a child declared “dependent” and to terminate parental rights. The proceedings are in the nature of an action by the state.Although any interested party may sign a petition calling for the proceedings, the typical design of the proceedings is to seek removal of the affected child from the custody of its parents, or parent, and to place the child under the custody of the state, or in the custody of a relative or persons other than the parents. The proceedings are not designed to allow one parent who already has legal custody of a child, following a divоrce, to terminate the parental
rights of the other parent. [Emphasis added.]
The court cited no specific statutory language, nor any precedent, for its conclusion. Similarly, our reseаrch reveals no legal principle to support that conclusion.
(a) The juvenile court shall еxercise exclusive original jurisdiction of the following proceedings, which are governed by this chapter:
(1) Proceedings in which a child is alleged to be delinquеnt, dependent or in need of supervision; and
....
(b) The court shall also exercise exclusive original jurisdiction of the following proceedings, which shall be govеrned by the laws relating thereto:
....
(6) Termination of parental rights.
Article 3 of Chapter 15, Title 12, sets out thе procedure involved in having a juvenile declared dependent and in terminating parental rights as to a juvenile declared dependent.
Last year our legislature passed the Child Protection Act,
A petition may be filed by any public or private licensed child-placing agency or parent, with permission of the court, or any interested party. (Acts 1984, No. 84-261, § 5.)
Moreover, there is no logical reason to allow only the state to file a petition to have pаrental rights terminated. Why should a parent, who has direct knowledge and familiarity with a situation, be required to go to the state to obtain such a result, when it would be more direct for the parent to file the petition?
Even the Court of Civil Appeals, in the portion of its opinion excerpted above, acknowledged thаt “any interested party may sign a petition calling for the proceedings” (emphasis added), but went on to say, however, that “the typical design of the proceedings is to seek removal of the affected child from the custody of its parents.” That court thus reasoned that a parent could not file the petition, since the typical purpose of such a petition was to remove the child from the parent‘s custody.
Although we know that many cases have been, and will be, filed by the state to terminate parental rights, this is not to say that the state has exclusive authority in this regard.
As we have said, our examination of
The issue we now address is whether there was sufficient evidence presented to the trial court to warrant the termination of Abney‘s parental rights. Where the trial court hears ore tenus testimony and has an opportunity to observe the parties on the stand and in the courtroom, the judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal, unless found to be so unsupported by the evidence and contrary to law as to be plainly and palpably wrong and unjust. In re Palmer, 387 So.2d 215 (Ala.Civ.App.1980).
Thе Court of Civil Appeals concluded that the termination of Abney‘s parental rights was plainly and palpably wrong in light of the evidence presented at the trial. We disagree. The facts stated in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals are sufficient to support the judgment of the trial court. Not only were there fаcts showing that the father had not supported the child, but there were also facts tending to show that the father had even abandoned the child. The termination of Abney‘s parental rights was not so unsupported by the evidence as to be plainly and palpably wrong or manifestly unjust.
We, therefore, hold that Johnson was a рroper party to bring this petition for termination of parental rights in the juvenile, court, and that the court‘s termination of Abney‘s parental rights is supported by the еvidence. For these reasons, the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals is reversed and the judgment of the Juvenile Court of Jefferson County is hereby reinstated.
REVERSED; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT REINSTATED.
FAULKNER, JONES, EMBRY and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, J., dissent.
ALMON and SHORES, JJ., not sitting.
MADDOX, Justice (dissenting).
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals; therefore, I must respectfully dissent.
TORBERT, C.J., concurs.