Ex Parte Jackson
Willie Jackson seeks a writ of mandamus directing the Montgomery County Circuit Court to grant his motion to dismiss the capital murder indictment returned against him.
Jackson was arrested and charged with the murder of Alisa Desha Roberts. The grand jury of Montgomery County returned an indictment charging that Jackson,
“while attempting to intentionally kill George Prickett by shooting the said George Prickett with a gun while the said George Prickett was in an automobile and while the said Willie Jackson was outside that automobile, did intentionally cause the death of Alisa Desha Roberts with a gun, in violation of Section
13A-5-40 of the Code of Alabama. . . .”
Section
Jackson first petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus. That court denied the petition, and Jackson now seeks de novo review in this Court. Rule 21(e), A.R.App.P.
“Statutes creating crimes are to be strictly construed in favor of the accused; they may not be held to apply to cases not covered by the words used. . . .” United States v. Resnick, 299 U.S. 207, 209, 57 S.Ct. 126, 127, 81 L.Ed. 127 (1936). See also, Ex parte Evers, 434 So.2d 813, 816 (Ala. 1983); Fuller v. State, 257 Ala. 502, 60 So.2d 202, 205 (1952). Moreover, “criminal statutes should not be ‘extended by construction.’ ” Ex parte Evers, 434 So.2d at 817 (quoting Locklear v. State, 50 Ala. App. 679, 282 So.2d 116 (1973)). Section
Because the meaning of statutory language depends on context, a statute is to be read as a whole. King v. St. Vincent‘s Hospital, 502 U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 570, 574, 116 L.Ed.2d 578 (1991). Subsections of a statute are in pari materia and “should be construed together to ascertain the meaning and intent of each.” McCausland v. Tide-Mayflower Moving Storage, 499 So.2d 1378, 1382 (Ala. 1986).
Jackson asserts that because Roberts was not in a vehicle when she was killed, Jackson cannot be prosecuted under §
The State argues that §
Section
“Except as specifically provided to the contrary in the last part of subdivision (a)(13) of this section, the terms ‘murder’ and ‘murder by the defendant’ as used in this section to define capital offenses mean murder as defined in Section
13A-6-2(a)(1) , but not as defined in Section13A-6-2(a)(2) and (3). . . .”
Section
The State argues that, pursuant to §
Under the facts alleged in the indictment, Jackson‘s intent to kill Prickett can certainly be “transferred” to the conduct that actually resulted in the death of Roberts. However, Prickett‘s location (in a motor vehicle) cannot be “transferred” to Roberts so as to elevate the crime to capital murder.
First, the clear statutory language of §
Second, we presume that the Legislature knows the meaning of the words it uses in enacting legislation. Moreover, we are convinced that the Legislature, if it intended §
Finally, we note that both Jackson and the State rely on our holding in Ex parte Murry, 455 So.2d 72 (Ala. 1984). In its order denying Jackson‘s motion to dismiss the indictment, the trial court concluded “that Murry supports, rather than condemns the indictment against [Jackson] for capital murder.” The trial court‘s reliance on Murry is misplaced. The defendant in that case was charged with the capital murder of a police officer. We held in Murry that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that “the murder could be raised to a capital offense only if Murry knew that the victim was a police officer on duty.” 455 So.2d at 78. The doctrine of “transferred intent” was not at issue in that case. This Court defined the issue in that case as “whether [former §
We conclude that the holding in Murry supports the decision we reach today. In order for one to have “knowledge” of a given circumstance, that circumstance must exist in reality. That is, in order for the defendant in Murry to have “known” that his victim was a peace officer, that victim must have been a peace officer in reality. Similarly, we hold that Jackson must have “known” that his alleged victim was “in a motor vehicle.”2 It follows then, that for Jackson to have “known” that Roberts was in a motor vehicle, she must actually have been in a motor vehicle. She was not.
In Act No. 87-709, Ala. Acts 1987 (the act modifying §
Having determined that §
“mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ to be issued only where there is (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court. Barber v. Covington County Commission, 466 So.2d 945 (Ala. 1985)”
Ex parte Edgar, 543 So.2d 682, 684 (Ala. 1989).
Mandamus may issue to compel the exercise of discretion by an inferior court; however, it may not be used to control or revise the exercise of that discretion except in a case of abuse. Ex parte Edgar, 543 So.2d at 684 (citing Ex parte Smith, 533 So.2d 533 (Ala. 1988)). “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, but is appropriate in exceptional circumstances which amount to judicial usurpation of power.” Ex parte Nice, 407 So.2d 874, 877 (Ala. 1981). Mandamus is not to be used as a substitute for an appeal, but mandamus can be used to prevent a gross disruption of the administration of criminal justice. Id.
In light of the interpretation we have given §
Certainly, if Jackson were convicted under the present indictment and sentenced to death, he would be entitled to an automatic appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, §
A writ of mandamus shall, therefore, issue to the Circuit Court of Montgomery County directing that court to dismiss the indictment charging Willie Jackson with capital murder under §
WRIT GRANTED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and ALMON, SHORES and ADAMS, JJ., concur.