Ex parte Edwards

11 Fla. 174 | Fla. | 1867

Lead Opinion

DuvPOXT, C. J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case arose from the refusal of a Judge of the Circui t Court to award a writ of habeas corpus, and is brought to this court by writ of error, under the provision,- of the statute, which is in these words: “If any party to such judgment rendered by a Judge of the Circuit Court hi vacation, or the said court in term time, shall led himself aggreived thereby, it shall be lawful for the Supreme Court having jurisdiction on his motion, to grant a writ of error, and upon the trial, to reverse or affirm the judgment wholly or in part, and to cause such other judgment to be entered, and such other proceedings to be had, as the law and the right of the case may require, either awarding costs or not, at their discretion.”

At the hearing before us, a motion was made by the counsel for the contestants, to dismiss the casé, upon the ground that no “judgment” had been rendered by the Judge of the Circuit Court, to whom the application for the writ of habeas corpus had been made,, upon which a writ of error would lie. In support of the motion, it was insisted that a refusal to grant the writ was not such a “judgment” as was contemplated by the statute. We think otherwise, and it is only necessary to recite the order- entered in this case, to show that it contains all the elements of a judicial “judgment.” It is in these words: “ On this day, the petition of A. K. Edwards, asking,that ‘ a writ, of .habeas corpus’ might be granted to him, and lie discharged from further custody, was presented • and considered : Whereupon the court doth adjudge and order that the prayer of said petition be refused,”* &c.

Having arrived at the conclusion that the writ of error does lie, we proceed now to the investigation of the ease, to ascertain whether or not an error was committed in the refusal to grant the writ of habeas corpus. In making this investigation, we concur in'the position held by the counsel for the contestants—that the court must be confined to the petition asking for the issuance of the writ, and that it is not permissible in this proceeding to investigate the merits of the cause out of which the commitment arose. The statute (vide Thomp. Dig., pp. 527-’8,) is very peremptory in its terms as to the duty of the Judge to whom the application may be made for the award of the writ. It is iu these terms: “ Whenever any person detained in custody, whether charged with a crminal offence or not, shall, by himself or by some other person in his behalf, apply to the Circuit Courts in this State, or to any Judge thereof in vacation, for a writ of habeas corpus, and show by affidavit or evidence, probable cause to believe that he is detained in custody without legal authority, it shall be the duty of the Court or Judge to whom such application shall be made, forthwith to grant the writ, signed by himself, directed to the person in whose custody the applicant is detained, and returnable immediately before such Court or Judge, or any of the said Courts or Judges.” The terms of this statute are peremptory upon the Judge to whom the application may be made, to grant the writ in all cases where it shall be shown by the affidavit or evidence that “probable cause” exists for believing that the applicant may be detained in custody without legal authority. It is to be presumed that the Judge below did his duty in this particular—that he did look into the affidavit to ascertain whether ‘ there was such “ probable case ” therein set forth as would warrant him in granting the prayer of the petitioner, and finding none, he refused to award the writ. It was upon this judgment of refusal that the petitioner founded his writ of error, and brings the case before the Supreme Court for its supervision, and we are now called upon to do what the Judge below did, viz: to look into the petition or affidavit to see if there is therein set forth such “ probable cause ” as ought to have entitled him to the award of the writ of habeas corpus.

The petition or affidavit shows upon its face that the petitioner is deprived of his liberty, by an order of the Chancellor, for an alleged contempt of the authority of the court of Chancery, and but for the statutory provisions in this State upon the matter of “contempts,” this isolated showing would be sufficient ground for the dismissal of -this writ of error ; for it is not to be denied, (and the numerous authorities cited at the hearing by the counsel for the contestants abundantly establishes the position,) that, in the absence of any statutory limitations or restrictions, the power of the several courts over “ contempts” is omnipotent, and its exercise is not to be enquired into by any other tribunal. This is the great bulwark established by the common law for the protection of courts of justice, and for the maintainance of their dignity, authority and efficiency, and neither in England nor in the United States has this unrestricted power been seriously questioned.

The genius of our people, however, ever sensitively jealous of restraints upon the personal liberty of the citizen, has caused them, through the action of the legislative department, to limit and restrict this common law power of the courts. The act of the Legislature here referred to gives to the courts the power “ to punish for contempts, by fine or imprisonment, and not otherwise,” but expressly* provides, that “ the fine in any case not to exceed one hundred dollars, or the imprisonment thirty days.”

Now if this statute be applicable to Courts of Chancery as to courts of law, and from the very terms used in the act, (passing “ orders and decrees,” being mentioned among the powers accorded to the courts referred to,) there can be no doubt of * it, it becomes absolutely necessary that an interpretation be given to it, which, while it shall guard the personal liberty of the citizen, shall not operate to deprive this great dispenser of equity of its appropriate power and authority to enforce its orders and decrees. This can be done only by distinguishing between that class of contempts which are merely punitive in their character, and such as afford the means of enforcing the orders and decrees of the Court of Chancery. Of the former class are such as imply an indignity or some exhibition of disrespect to the officer, .such as indecorous conduct in Ids presence, or the violation of a restraining order of the Chancellor, passed before the final hearing of the cause. Such acts, win eh are merely the Subjects of punishment, are doubtless the only ones to which the restriction and limitation of the statute was designed to apply. It never could have been the design or intention of the Legislature to deprive the Court of Chancery of the only means which it possesses to enforce affirmatively its orders and decrees, or to enforce any decree, whether affirmative or otherwise, which may be passed upon the final hearing of the cause. We do not find this distinction in the books, nor was there any necessity for it, as the law anciently stood. It arises entirely from the enactment of our statute limiting the power of the courts to punish for contempts.

But, reverting to the petition, we think that there does appear upon the face of the petition such probable cause as entitled the petitioner to the issuance of the writ. The affidavit shows that the petitioner was imprisoned for the violation of the restraining order of the court, in removing certain cotton from the plantation, and had this been all, we are very clear in the opinion that, for that offence, the punishment of the party could not have extended beyond the limitation mentioned in the statute. But the petition also shows that the petitioner was ordered to restore.the cotton to the plantation, or to pay its value into the registry of the court. Such an order implies that the cause had come to a final hearing, and that this was the final decree in the case, and imprisonment was certainly one of the means to enforce the decree, and would not be affected by the restriction contained in the statute. How it was the right of this party to have his case investigated, in order that he might show, if he could, that there had been no such final decree in the cause.

Tire fact that the application for the writ was made to the Judge, who, as Chancellor, had ordered the commitment, can have no legal bearing in this investigation. The application could as well have been made to some other J udge, and, as we have done, he would have confined himself, upon the application for the writ, to the matters set forth in the petition. After the writ had been granted, he might then, as a matter of evidence, been permitted to use the record in the original suit.

With these views, we are constrained to reverse the judgment of the Circuit judge, and to remand the cause for such further proceedings as shall be conformable to the views set forth in this opinion.

In this cause a petition for a rehearing wras filed by the counsel for the contestants, but lias not been acted upon by the court.

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Dissenting Opinion

lion. T. T. LONG-,

delivered the following dissenting opinion: '

This cause comes up on the ground that the Judge below refused to grant the writ of habeas corpus. The record before this court does not show that the writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Judge below, or that the prisoner was even legally before the court, and the cause of his imprisonment inquired into; nor that any exceptions even were taken to the ruling of the court below; nor are any exceptions disclosed by the proceedings below.

It is before this court merely .upon the refusal of the Judge below to grant the writ of habeas corpus. No grounds are furnished for the writ of error by the proceedings below. Nor is it made the duty of the Judge below to grant the writ, unless probable cause is shown in, terms prescribed by the statute. Thompson’s Dig., 5th chap., 1st sec. Before the writ can issue, it must be shown to the court “ by, affidavit or evidence probable cause to believe that he is detained in custody without lawful authority.” What is probable cause, is a question to be decided by the court before whom the party appears for his relief, and that court must determine upon it without a knowledge of what that evidence was. It will be presumed that the court below acted upon the affidavit, and that the affidavit did not disclose sufficient reason for his discharge, or- that he was not in custody without lawful authority.

The judgment of the court below must be either to discharge the prisoner, admit him to bail, or remand him to custody; and this must be “ as the law and the evidence shall require.” Neither of these judgments have been rendered by the court below in terms of the statute.

There could be no judgment of the court below, as no matters of law or facts had been adjudicated, as appears from the record.

The law and the facts must have been fully weighed and ■adjusted, (3 Black, 387,) before it can become the judgment of the Court.

The office of a writ of error is to correct some error committed in the proceedings, and the proceedings must be full and complete before the cause could be heard by an appellate tribunal. Bacon’s Abridgement, Tidd’s Pr. 43.

A majority of the court being of the opinion that the writ does lie in this cause, we now come to the consideration of the grounds for which the writ was asked, and its refusal by the court below.

The affidavit of Edwards shows that he is committed for a contempt for violating an injunction and restraining order of the Chancellor of the Middle Circuit, and it is from this that he is seeking to be discharged. Edwards admits in his affidavit that it was after full hearing of the motion to dissolve the injunction and to commit by the court, that he was committed to the common jail of the county. The question before this court, as it was in the court below, is restricted to the lawfulness of the authority by which he is confined. The merits of the chancery cause out of which his imprisonment grew cannot be inquired into.

A writ of error cannot lie when a court of competent jurisdiction, in the exercise of its legitimate authority, lias made a commitment for contempt. In such a case, neither the court below nor the appellate court will inquire into the cause of commitment by writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte Kearney, 7th Wheaton, 38, 5th U. S. Con’d Rep. ; Lord Mayor of London, 3d Wilson, 188; Yate’s case, 9th Johnson, 395; 14th Texas, 436; 13th Maryland, 632 ; 15th B. Monroe, 607; ex parte Alexander, 2d Law Register, 44; 1st Blackford, 166; 1st Briese, 266; 21st Bagley, 18; J. J. Marshal, 1st Bibb, 598.

In the case of ex parte Kearney, the Judge who pronounced the opinion, said: “That the court, will not grant a habeas corpus where a party has been committed for a contempt by a court of competent jurisdiction.” In the ease of Yates, 9th Johnson, the whole doctrine of commitment for contempt was fully and ably discussed, and it was settled that the Supreme Court cannot discharge on habeas corpus a person committed by a court of chancery for a contempt of that court.

In the case 14th Texas, it was held that a writ of habeas corpus did not lie to reverse the action of a court, of competent jurisdiction in case for commitment for contempt.

In the case cited in‘Bibb, the Supreme Court of Kentucky say; Error to cases like the present is not specially permitted nor prohibited by onr statutes; therefore, in determining whether this writ lies, we must be governed by the general principles; and the court unanimously decide that the writ, of error does not lie in such cases, and the Supreme Court will not inquire into a case of commitment for contempt. He further says on page 603, that the Circuit Court below exercises its power of commitment free and independent of this court. This decision is fully sustained by the Virginia ease cited.

The statute, Thompson’s Digest, pages 321, §2, provides that the Superior Courts shall severally have jurisdiction to administer oaths, make rules, pass orders and decrees, and give such judgments as may be necessary to support their authority: to punish for contempt by fine or imprisonment, and not otherwise—the fine not to exceed in any case one hundred dollars, or the imprisonment thirty days; and shall exercise all the necessary powers appertaining to their jurisdiction respectively, according to law.

Sec. 1st, page 322, provides that a refusal to obey any legal order, or mandate, or decree, made or given by any J udge of the Superior or County Court, either in term time or vacation, relative to any of the business of said court, after due notice thereof, shall be considered a contempt and punished accordingly, &e.

It must be evident that the punishment prescribed on page 321 refers to the matters declared to be a contempt on page 322, and does not refer to those orders or judgments'as may be necessary to support the authority of the court. In this case, the order is to re-produce the cotton taken away in violation of the injunction, or pay its value into the registry of the court, and, in order to support the authority of the court, the order further directs, that Edwards' be committed until lie performs what is required. The order is not punitive. The commitment is not ordered as a punishment for a contempt in the sense intended by the law on page 322, but is a judgment intended to support the authority of the court in respect to the mandate contained in the injunction, otherwise a court would be powerless to execute its decrees which require any act to be done or not to be done by a party before it. For example: a decree for the specific execution of a contract for the delivery of a deed or other papers, and the like. ISTo just distinction exists between an interlocutory and final decree, because, in many cases the execution of the interlocutory order is essential to the final decree; and if the court cannot support its authority by compelling tlie performance of tlie iwiloentory order in tlie form adopted here, then the final decree will he uwle—. and will result in'nothing, because the thing to be acted on has been placed beyond the jurisdiction and power of the court. We may admit in this case, without prejudice to the action of the court, that no punitive order punishing for a contempt can exceed one hundred dollars, in case of fine, or thirty days, in case of imprisonment. But that does not affect the question here, for here the order is not punitive, and the party need not have gone to jail at all, or need not have remained there; a simple compliance would have satisfied the order at any moment; and it was for Edwards to say, by his own act, whether he should be imprisoned at all, or how long he should remain confined.

A due consideration of tlie law, therefore, will, it is believed, satisfy us that the provision of the statute on page 831 does not apply to- this case, and that the decision of tlie court below should have been confirmed.