Ex parte Dorough
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- See Justice., Hooper, Houston, Cook, Lyons, Brown, Johnstone, England, Maddox
SEE, Justice.
This is a civil-forfeiture case. The Court of Civil Appeals, on August 28, 1998, affirmed the order of forfeiture, without an opinion. Dorough v. State, (No. 2970379), 757 So.2d 489 (Ala.Civ.App.1998) (table). We granted Karl James Dorough‘s petition for the writ of certiorari, in light of this Court‘s holding in Kelley v. State, 766 So.2d 837 (Ala.1999), to determine whether the forfeiture of Dorough‘s 1991 Mazda Navajo truck, pursuant to
I.
The following facts are undisputed.1 In March 1997, two City of Birmingham police officers observed Dorough snorting a white powdery substance as he was sitting in the driver‘s seat of his 1991 Mazda Navajo truck. The officers also saw a plastic bag lying on the console of the truck; the bag contained a white powder, which the officers believed to be cocaine. The officers arrested Dorough and seized the white powder. It was later confirmed that the white powder was cocaine.2
Pursuant to
II.
Dorough argues that the mere possession of a controlled substance is an insufficient basis for a civil forfeiture under
A. “Possession” as a Basis for Civil Forfeiture
“(a) The following are subject to forfeiture:
“. . . .
“(5) All conveyances, including ... vehicles, ... which are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of any [controlled substances.]”
“‘When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, ... courts must enforce the statute as written by giving the words of the statute their ordinary plain meaning—they must interpret that language to mean exactly what it says and thus give effect to the apparent intent of the Legislature.’ ...
“‘In determining the meaning of a statute, this Court looks to the plain meaning of the words as written by the legislature. As we have said:
“‘“`Words used in a statute must be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly what it says. If the language of the statute is unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial construction and the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect.\‘“\‘”
Id. at 964 (citations omitted). There is no ambiguity in the word “possession.” Section 20-2-93(a)(5) clearly provides that a vehicle that has been used, or that is intended to be used, “in any manner” to facilitate the “possession” of a controlled substance is subject to forfeiture. Accordingly, we must enforce the plain language of
We do not read Weldon, Gilbert, and Dent as standing for the proposition that criminal conduct involving more than mere possession of a controlled substance is required in order for there to be a forfeiture under
It is undisputed that Dorough possessed a controlled substance in his truck. Thus, Dorough‘s truck was used in some manner to facilitate that possession. Therefore, we hold that Dorough‘s mere possession of a controlled substance in his truck is a sufficient basis for the civil forfeiture of the truck under
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to civil in rem forfeiture actions.5 See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 604, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993) (holding that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to forfeitures of property under
In United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998), the Supreme Court established a standard for determining whether a forfeiture constitutes an excessive fine for purposes of the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court held that “a punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant‘s offense.” 524 U.S. at 334, 118 S.Ct. at 2036. The Supreme Court explained:
“In applying this standard, the district courts in the first instance, and the courts of appeals, reviewing the proportionality determination de novo, must compare the amount of the forfeiture to the gravity of the defendant‘s offense. If the amount of the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the defendant‘s offense, it is unconstitutional.”
524 U.S. at 336-37, 118 S.Ct. 2028. The Supreme Court stated that, in determining excessiveness, (1) “judgments about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong in the first instance to the legislature,” and (2) “any judicial determination regarding the gravity of a particular criminal offense will be inherently imprecise.” 524 U.S. at 336, 118 S.Ct. 2028.
This Court recently applied the Bajakajian standard in Kelley v. State, supra. In Kelley, this Court held that the forfeiture of the claimant‘s 1997 Pontiac Grand Prix automobile (valued at approximately $30,000) was excessive under the Bajakajian standard. Four tablets of the controlled substance aminorex and 6.2 grams of marijuana had been found in the automobile. The claimant was arrested and was subsequently convicted of possession of a controlled substance, a violation of
“Comparing the legislature‘s assessment of the gravity of Kelley‘s crime with the $30,000 forfeiture the state seeks—a forfeiture in an amount six times the maximum fine the legislature has allowed the courts to impose in such a case—we conclude that such a forfeiture would be grossly disproportional to the gravity of his offense.”
The trial court did not address whether the forfeiture of Dorough‘s truck was grossly disproportional to the gravity of his alleged offense. However, we cannot undertake the proportionality analysis established in Bajakajian and followed by this Court in Kelley, because the record here is insufficient for us to do so. No evidence in the record indicates the value of Dorough‘s truck, the amount of cocaine seized from the truck, or the criminal charge, if any, made against Dorough.
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
HOOPER, C.J., and HOUSTON, COOK, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, and ENGLAND, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, J., concurs in the result.
MADDOX, Justice (concurring in the result).
Because the majority only remands at this time, I concur in the result. I would point out, however, that I dissented in Ex parte Kelley, 766 So.2d 837 (Ala.1999). See my special writing in that case for an explanation of my understanding of the law applicable to this case.