273 P. 1010 | Okla. Crim. App. | 1929
This is an original proceeding in habeas corpus. Petitioner alleges: That he is unlawfully restrained of his liberty by the sheriff of Oklahoma county, and that such restraint is based upon a commitment issued by a justice of the peace of Oklahoma City. That a complaint charging him with the crime of reckless driving was filed in said justice court, and your petitioner was arrested upon the warrant issued thereon and has been unable to make bond. That the statutes upon which said complaint is predicated, to wit, section 2, chap. 16, of the Session Laws of Oklahoma 1923, is unconstitutional and void. That petitioner has applied to a district judge of Oklahoma county for a writ of habeas corpus, which has been denied.
That part of chapter 16, Session Laws 1923, upon which the prosecution against petitioner is instituted, in part reads: "Any person * * * driving * * * any vehicle * * * designated in section 1, of this act, upon said highways shall * * * drive * * * same in a careful and prudent manner, and at a rate of speed not greater than is reasonable under the existing circumstances, and having due regard to the traffic and use of the highway, and having due regard for the safety of pedestrians or property, and drivers or operators of other vehicles. * * * No person * * * shall operate, propel or drive a motor vehicle as defined in section 1, of this act, on any highway at such rate of speed as to endanger the life or limb of any other person or persons, or the safety of any property. * * * Provided, further, that any person or persons violating any provision of section 2, of this act, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor for the first offense *401 and shall be fined not less than $25, nor more than $100, or imprisoned in the county jail for not less than ten nor more than thirty days, or by both such fine and imprisonment. * * *"
The amended complaint alleges that defendant, at a certain street intersection in Oklahoma City, "* * * did then and there unlawfully, wilfully and wrongfully, drive and operate a motor vehicle upon and over the public highway and at or about the intersection of the streets hereinbefore designated, * * * in such a reckless manner and at such an excessive rate of speed and without having due regard for the safety of pedestrians or property, and in such a manner as to endanger the life and limb of other persons and the safety of their property."
The sole contention here made is that the statute in question is violative of the state Constitution as being too indefinite and uncertain to be enforceable. The contention made by petitioner is sustained by the case of State v. Lantz,
This court, in the case of Missel v. State,
This court has adopted a liberal construction in the definition of public offenses. In the case of Stewart v. State,
In Fessler v. State,
Also in the case of Ex parte Westellison,
We think the statute before us is free from the objection in both the Missel Case and the Westelison Case. Here a standard of comparison is fixed at: "* * * A rate of speed not greater than is reasonable under the existing circumstances, and having due regard to the traffic and use of the highway, and having due regard for the safety of pedestrians or property, and drivers or operators of other vehicles. * * *" The terms of the statute are general, but they are sufficiently definite under the rule stated.
The writ is denied.
DAVENPORT and CHAPPELL, JJ., concur.