*1 majority opinion of the recitation in the forms, paragraphs to six verdict three Pamela Board DANIELS. to as
of the indictment were referred No. paragraphs alleged prior “counts.” These of felony convictions enhancement Texas, Appeals Court of Criminal They are punishment. therefore Banc. En as “counts” not be referred to and should Jan. such. Appeals In 1942 of Criminal the Court State,
Square Tex.Cr.R. (1942),explained: 193-194 “The did three indictment not contain separate really There was but counts. charged theft,
one count which allegations his convictions former capital alle- less than were but felonies gations, by proof, when sustained punishment.
enhance his To refer loose allegations such is a ‘counts’ expression in some appear
adjudicated meaning cases. The charges ‘count’ is that it a distinct of- fense, there more than and where are indictment, count
one count in an each charge definitely must the commission an offense so that the court submit upon either counts case one of the supported by in order which is evidence prescribed therefore conviction, may, imposed upon upon accused. basis for a conviction entirely upon in this rested case charge theft. If the failed State allegation
sustain then said evidence convictions, no allegation of former evidence, matter how well sustained words, passed when also out. other folded moved out up the main circus (Emphasis all side went with it.” shows supplied.) *2 Alexander, Houston,
Robert F. appel- for lant. Holems, Jr., Atty.
John B. Dist. and Ed- Porter, Houston, ward D. Asst. Atty., Dist. Huttash, Austin, Robert Atty., State’s the State.
OPINION
McCORMICK,Judge. application This is an for writ of habeas corpus pursuant provisions filed to the 11.06, Article Y.A.C.C.P.
Applicant was held to be in direct crimi- nal of court the Honorable sitting assignment Boyer, Max W. County.1 308th District Court Harris The order was the result of an January incident which occurred on applicant appearing pro while se. proceedings, appli- In the course of the argument cant became involved an with Judge Boyer. applicant ordered to leave the courtroom and to not return applicant counsel. until obtained When immediately, failed to leave the courtroom ordered to escort the bailiff was her out. Applicant apparently peacefully went they until reached bailiff the door- way point, appli- of the courtroom. At that physically is attacked cant have the master of the court. The bailiff then applicant general moved to restrain erupted peo- disturbance which several ple involved. were point
The record indicates that at some
judge or-
after this occurrence the trial
brought
him for a
dered
before
During
summary contempt proceeding.
Leg.,
pursuant
which enacted Title
Judicial
was sentenced
to the
ch.
1911a, V.A.T.C.,
Government Code which became
visions of Article
which has
Branch of the
September
repealed
on
been
Section 1 of Acts
69th
effective
adjudicated.
In cases of construc-
hearing, applicant
tempt
did not
of this
the course
contempt in
factual issues relat-
but
tive
the benefit of retained counsel
pres-
the court’s
capaci-
ing to activities outside
pro
to act in a
se
instead continued
resolved,
process re-
due
found to be in direct
ence must be
ty. Applicant was
afforded notice and a
quires
con-
the accused be
contempt and ordered to be
criminal
Standard,
hearing.
period
thirty days. No
jail
fined in
for a
*3
Mouille,
parte
Ex
(Tex.Cr.App.1980);
218
imposed. Applicant was ordered
fine was
In a
(Tex.Cr.App.1978).
sit-
in court costs.
This Court has noted in Ex Flour- remedy harsh contempt adju- direct noy, supra: dications is authority ability for, peoples’ the courts to conduct . was committed business [RJelator for, compromised by represented disruptive a direct actions of obey his failure and refusal parte Harvill, contemner. Ex court, given
command of the
open
(Tex.1967);
711 Tex. alleges policy parte Heptinstall, that it Harris “In 118 is the Ex (1931), County Department award Court Sheriffs Cr.R. our good on for demonstrated Appeals, deciding credit sentences of Criminal whether behavior. states all other in contempt a woman found and sen- prisoners County Harris such receive pay tenced to a fine and serve $100.00 consideration. days be jail should released without fine, having paid first said: contention, addressing find we being a civil a criminal This not but guidance opinion Amarillo fine, omitted], the Appeals parte Rogers, [citations if 1982): judgment not reduced (Tex.App. Amarillo, S.W.2d — entered, in which it was must be question for “The threshold our deter- paid as or satisfied the same manner county mination whether a sheriff prescribed by law for the satisfaction give ‘good jail time’ credit on term for a of a conviction misdemeanor.... for criminal con- assessed Id. 39 S.W.2d tempt of court.... on to 5118a, “The court went hold that
“Article Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. pay- (Vernon satisfy judgment by must either Pamphlet Supp.1971-1981), pro- pertinent serving out her part: vides in fine before should be entitled to release. Id. encourage county jail In order to disci- pline, a distinction analy- made Supreme “Our Court used a like prisoners terms so as to extend to Genecov, sis Tex. in Ex orderly, (1945). all such as are There, industrious and the issue *5 obedient, privileges comforts and ac- power to ‘as- was whether had cording deserts; to their ... Commuta- act of punishment sess for more than one conduct, good of time industry single tion for proceeding, in a al- contempt granted in- may obedience be as- though aggregate punishment county jail by mates of punishment each the sheriff sessed exceeds the charge. in single to court is authorized assess for act_’ S.W.2d at statute, Id. 186 in construing “In this a some Holding that the court does 226-27. context, what different Court so, to do our court power have the Appeals said, Criminal has statute ‘[s]uch superior jurisdiction stated provides that the sheriff shall Id. 186 analogous is to a misdemeanor. granting sole discretion in commutation may A be con- S.W.2d at 227. defendant prisoners of time of Those his custo misde- separate, independent victed of serving jail dy county in the terms information, single meanors in a [Emphasis jail.’ State ex rel. added.] reasoned, therefore, court a contemnor Clawson, Vance committed, and be may to have be found (Tex.Cr.App.), cert. denied nom. sub for, than one more assessed Texas, Pruett v. 404 U.S. proceeding. in one Id. act of 182,rehearing L.Ed.2d denied U.S. L.Ed.2d analogy, “Utilizing the misdemeanor (1971). we find the sheriff was authorized give ‘good time’ question
“The
5118a
Article 5118a
whether Article
con-
thirty-day
for
gives
power
the sheriff
time
credit on her
sentence
commute
terms,
ap-
tempt.
prisoners serving contempt
By its
Article 5118a
for
sentences
serving jail terms
plies
persons
apparently
impression.
one of first
to all
course,
including,
those
Appeals
county jail,
Both the Court of Criminal
ex
have, however,
of misdemeanors. State
Supreme
our
decid-
convicted
Court
Thus,
Vance,
465 S.W.2d at
relating
contempt by
rel.
ed similar issues
serv-
give those
analogizing
procedures
just
fol-
as the sheriff
from the
credit
sentences
cases.
misdemeanor
lowed misdemeanor
served,
‘good
prospective jurors
do
time’
likewise
so
courthouse where
would
necessarily see them.”
contempt....”
on a sentence for criminal
Ex
[Emphasis
original opinion.]
reading
case,
From
of the instant
Rogers at 668-669.
immedi-
contumacious conduct took
ately
(emphasis
add-
front of
county
that a
We likewise find
ed)
it
unnecessary
is therefore
give ‘good
time’
sheriff is authorized
majority in the instant case to revisit the
serving
credit to one
a sentence for crimi
gymnastics engaged
Krupps
it
where
However,
contempt.
granting
since the
nal
personnel,
was observed “that court
such
‘good
solely
credit rests
of such
time’
bailiffs,
implicitly,
imagines,
one
Ex rel.
sheriff,
State
discretion of the
clerks,
reporters,
docket coordina-
Clawson, supra, and since the
Vance v.
tors,
officers,
etc.,
probation
prosecutors,
any
record fails to reveal
facts
instant
may, through
agency theory
sort of
some
tending
of such
to demonstrate an abuse
conduct, report
observe contumacious
said
discretion, we will not interfere.
unsuspecting judge thereby
conduct to the
magically transforming constructive con-
prayed
The relief
for is denied.
tempt into direct
all
the name
authority
of and
officers
MILLER, J., concurs in the result of
Krupps,
Ex Parte
the court.”
at 160
ground.
the first
(Campbell, Dissenting).
J.
CAMPBELL, Judge, concurring and dis-
CLINTON, Judge, dissenting.
senting.
states,
opinion
“At the
majority
While I believe the
reached
judicial
determi-
outset of
discussion
case,
I
once
correct result
write
of due
in a
nation of the
al.,
Krupps,
Parte
et
again,
as I did in
necessary to distin-
case,
it is
(Tex.Cr.App.1985) to ad-
At
opinion pg.
majority
*6
that once the
court
“The notion seems to be
presence
that in the
the
observes
kind
proper light
classification of
and
mean in the
immedi-
necessarily
“does not
[of
given
contempt]
nature of
is turned on
fur-
presence
judge”
ate
of the trial
and
conduct,
passive
one will know
active and
ther,
that “the court is
whenever
type
seeing particular
of contuma-
he is
a
any
parts,
of its constituent
the
to cri-
and then is enabled
cious conduct
engaged in
jury
room are
the
according
contextu-
tique
to its narrow
it
Citing
of the court.”
pursuing the work
surrounding tradi-
al classification
395, 334
Aldridge, 169 Tex.Cr.R.
Ex Parte
Sometimes, however,
trappings.
a
tional
S.W.2d,
(1960)
majority continues
the
label,
by
classification
problem defies
appli-
“it
for this reason
that
was
by rote.”
may not be resolved
and thus
Parte
supra, was
cant
problems.2
is one of those
In
view this
committed di-
properly determined to have
recites,
contemptu-
placed
The
order of
rect
when
written
alia,
hearing in
a
the fami-
inter
the
that after
in the corridors of
publications
ous
judge
for others and
throughout
of the trial
counsel
emphasis
unless other
All
is mine
leading
she be removed
applicant
to orders that
wise indicated.
courtroom;
pages
four
reflect
the last
from the
family
pro
underlying
law
Appearing
an
se in
judge
appli-
exchange
the
a brief
between
matter,
simply
applicant
perhaps
did
because
cant,
contempt,
pronouncing
an order
his
it,
protect
presents an
she
not know how to
incredibly meager
it,
handing
certify copy,
having
signing
clerk
a
a
Essentially
we
record.
bailiff,
custody
directing
him to take
a
it to
a written order
short statement of facts and
and,
jail
finally,
applicant
her to
and commit
pages of
contempt." The first seventeen
"direct
The
request
a statement.
denying her
to make
among
report
lengthy colloquy
the
former
the
Court, Judge Boyer
applicant
ordered
Master of the
was
ly law matter
“was
some-
from
this Court
to be removed
the Court-
Applicant had done
aware that
causing
the
room for
a disturbance
thing
at the courtroom door which dis-
According to the brief on behalf
bench.”3
rupted the Court’s business.”
appli-
judge,
of the
at the courtroom door
pronouncing
findings
in his order of
of the
cant “tried to strike the Master
contempt inter alia
stated,
judge
“This
purse
in the head
brief-
committed
an area
conduct was
within
[appli-
case at which time the bailiff threw
which was
of the Court
within
against
the wall and had to tackle
cant]
Court could
hear and ob-
and where
[applicant].”
serve the conduct” —not that he did.
applicant
In her
contends “that
it
brief
event,
regardless
In the
of what
told of an
after
was
hear or see of the
judge did or did not
doorway
to the courtroom—
incident
the entrance
“second disturbance” —that at
relying on the
of the bail-
only after
word
according
applicant,
to the
Master,
iff,
possibly
courtroom —
others —that
in a conference room for
she was detained
contempt.”
judge
found
hours;
preparing the
four
[emphasis by applicant]. To that
the brief
says his
order of direct
brief—
correctly responds
until he
court
for a
not reflect he had
discus-
convened
record does
anyone,
proceeding. Already
sion with
but elsewhere states:
bereft of counsel
matter,
primary
perforce
applicant
Judge Boyer expressed no
“Although
knowledge
attempt
again
represent
had to
herself.
assault
3. An
to leave until I
peal
tested
plicant
courtroom;
der went to a stated determination
of law.
Rule
latter
court.
dispatch
you?
do
dispatch and
you
Accordingly,
ing. You could ask counsel—
Court?
Do
pass
explain
THE
THE COURT: You don't think so
THE COURT: I didn’t ask
THE COURT:
THE COURT: There is no
objected and
“THE COURT: From what
[APPLICANT]:
[APPLICANT]:
[APPLICANT]:
[APPLICANT]:
afford to hire an
[APPLICANT]:
you,
74(f),
exchange immediately preceding that or-
you
contains
that she would be taken
don’t think
or reconciled recitations in briefs of
the case until
and of the trial
COURT: This Court tries
now." Then came the
what occurred are taken
think
with a
Texas Rules of
way
get justice,” only
findings
some
there
you
announced
person
you
You have heard what I
I am
You could
I
Is this—
Is this a democratic
applicant
factual
*7
thought
pay
will
is no
attorney
will
rejoined
judge, respectively.
of fact and conclusions
acting?
like
get justice
Appellate
get justice
way
statements
she
taxes.
I would.
you
you.
retained
change your
you
to be told
bodily
that she
politics in this
following:
would
I can deal
were
from
said,
Procedure.
to deal in
from this
from
from the
question.
now, do
counsel;
tending
"refuse
saying,
uncon-
court?
"l
could
said.
me,
rul-
See
ap-
ap-
business when
business
The last
court had recessed
the court or the
curred. From
is so
of the
en a
room door the
ion infers that after
that other
had turned to
should have
Most
this.
me,”
him;
room and
"remove her without
told the bailiff to
courtroom
not
back
you
THE
THE BAILIFF: Let’s
(Recess).”
(Mrs.
Remove her from
[APPLICANT]:
[The
picture
likely
justice
ambiguous that one cannot tell whether
case rather than
to remove this woman from the court-
only way
but was informed
I don’t believe this
she
parenthetical note of the court
[******]
"by
COURT: And don’t let her
bailiff asked
Daniels
is to have counsel with her.
matter rather
the
protested
of the
don’t
been
and I
unless she has counsel.
calling
other business
that notation the
reporter was
the "second disturbance”
you
case was "recessed.”
took a
permit
taking
judge,
just
don’t
I want to take a
the disturbance
a
get help if needed and to
can
that "he can’t do that
recess,”
the courtroom.
further
the court.
applicant to leave with
interrupted
after
accept
than in instant
go.
picture
it was not
down
her to come back in.
and I
permit
"he
indicating a recess
the court
activity."]
but
can;”
it.
proceedings in
object.
majority opin-
her to come
at the court-
if the court
back in this
the court’s
engaged
picture
had
reporter
reporter
I order
Judge.)
This is
If the
cause.
tak-
oc-
calling
order,
After
court to be
findings
on extensive
of facts
made
him
announced,
the
“The Court has made
for the court.
findings
certain
concerning
family law
[the
outset,
“At the
let it be understood
Denying
request
to record
matter].”
that we are
proposi-
not committed to the
proceedings,
the
he then stated into the
tion that this is a case of constructive
findings
record
and order of the Court and
is,
occuring
one
outside
—that
committed,
promptly ordered her
viz:
presence
the
of the court—as distin-
“THE COURT: She is
jail.
remanded to
guished from
direct
which oc-
May I make a state-
[APPLICANT]:
presence
curs
the
of the court.”
ment?
Aldridge, at 165.
No,
THE
you
COURT:
may not.”
original submission,
On
majority
the
Principally relying
parte
on Ex
Aldridge,
opinion
out,
points
here
the Aldridge court
(Tex.Cr.
169 Tex.Cr.R.
715
(1974)
labeled it a case of “direct con-
Taylor Hayes,
488,
v.
418 U.S.
tempt,”
by
as outlined and described
the
2697,
(1974),
Regardless label, of its the ultimate findings conclu- and include written question proceeding is whether the com- according sions the order of ported requisites of due taken premises. the brief Codispoti Pennsylvania, —before By then “action without U.S. L.Ed.2d 912 back into court. *9 trial, during Hayes, supra, 418 Taylor v. hearing kind notice or [was not] at 1703. U.S. at preserve and enable necessary to order [the proceed with its business.”4 court] Accordingly, respectfully dissent. Furthermore, after the order was DUNCAN, JJ., join. TEAGUE nounced, requested though specifically it, opportunity denied “an applicant was in the nature of
speak in own behalf [her] allocution,” thereby de- and was sum- is due when nied “[e]ven imposed mary punishment hold the was unable to W. bias that the 4. We judicially that Honorable Max know vindicating Legal the interests judge. Texas balance between Boyer trial See 1 is a retired Contrary of the accused.’ Directory p. to another the court and the interests despite stringent bar trial Hayes, supra, rule sometimes Taylor v. ‘Such lesson of exchanges stormy by judges at the actual bias and who personal who have no nature matter, family weigh hearing very the scales of law do their best to bench while would contending parties,’ visiting judge apparently did not consider hav- justice equally between contempt proceed- conduct a process requires a local no less." but due ing. judge does appears that a trial Thus it when running controversy in a become “embroiled conduct, per- short of a "But mounting dis- [party]’’ "there [is] with a attack, provoke a trial still sonal personal toward play attitude of an unfavorable controversy that he him in and so embroil motives, ability party], his suffi- nice, clear, his [that true cannot hold the balance should ciently [be] issue so that the accused....’ [cita- the state and between ..., finally adjudicated [one] another throughout]. making this tions omitted purpose of final- should substituted inquiry [be] judgment, must be not ultimate charges contempt....’’ ly disposing re- a actual bias on whether there was 501-503, supra, Hayes, U.S. at Taylor v. spondent’s part, whether there was but also appearance S.Ct. at 2704-2705. of bias or an ‘such a likelihood
