Following a hearing on appellant’s writ of habeas corpus, the trial court ordered that appellant be denied bail pending her appeal from the entry of a judgment nunc pro tunc. We will set aside the order of the trial court and remand the cause for the setting of bail.
In June, 1985, a jury found appellant guilty of voluntary manslaughter and assessеd punishment at imprisonment for five years. Appellant gave notice of appeal and was released on a $12,500.00 appeal bond. On July 6, 1985, appellant withdrew her notice of appeal and surrendered herself to the Department of Corrections.
On February 27, 1986, appellant was released on parole. On March 7, 1986, the State filed a motion in the trial court for entry of judgment nunc pro tunc. In its motion, the State alleged that the jury at appellant’s trial had affirmatively found that appellant used a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense, but that this affirmative finding had been erroneously omitted from the original judgment of conviction. 1 On March 18, 1986, after a hearing on the State’s motion, the trial court found that the jury had indeed made an affirmative finding and that this finding was omitted from the original judgment of conviction due to clerical еrror, and ordered that a nunc pro tunc judgment be entered containing the affirmative finding. The court further ordered appellant returned to custody because, in light of the affirmative finding, she was not eligible for parole.
Appellant gave notice of appeal from the entry of the nunc pro tunc judgment. 2 On the same date, appellant filed her writ of habeas corpus requesting that she be *880 permitted to post bond pending this aрpeal. Following a further hearing, the trial court concluded that appellant was not entitled to bail and ordered that the requested relief be denied. The instant appeal followed.
Before deciding whether appellant is entitled to bail pending appeal, we must first determine whether she has a right to appеal from the order entering the
nunc pro tunc
judgment. The answer to this question is found in
Shaw v. State,
Insofar as her right to appeal the nunc pro tunc order is concerned, appellant is in a position analogous to that of the defendant in Shaw. As in Shaw, appellant waived her right to appeal from the original conviction. As in Shaw, it has been determined, based on the original commitment papers, that appellant is entitled to release from custody. And as in Shaw, the trial court has entered a nunc pro tunc ordеr the effect of which is to require further imprisonment of appellant. We hold that, under Shaw, appellant may appeal from the trial court’s order. 4
In concluding that appellant is not entitled to bail, the trial court noted that by surrеndering herself into the custody of the Department of Corrections, appellant waived her right to bail pending appeal from the original conviction.
Thompson v. State,
The flaw in this argument is that while the legal effect of the nunc pro tunc judgment relates back to the original judgment, appellant’s right to сhallenge the order entering the nunc pro tunc judgment as an abuse of the trial court’s discretion cannot be abridged by events that took place before the order was еntered. Shaw teaches, and the State concedes, that appellant may appeal the nunc pro tunc order even though she waived her right to appeal from the original judgment of conviction. Simi-larily, the fact that appellant surrendered herself into the custody of the Department of Corrections in July, 1985, following the entry of the original judgment of conviction *881 does not work as a forfeiture of appellant’s right to bail pending her appeal of the order entered March 18, 1986.
All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for a capital offense when the proof is evident. Tex.Const. art. I § 11 (1984). The general rule favors the allowance of bail.
Ex parte Davis,
In
Ex parte Morris,
It is true that if the order entering the
nunc pro tunc
judgment is upheld and appellant is reincarcerated, she will be entitled to credit for the period bеtween February 27, 1986, when she was erroneously released on parole, and March 18, 1986, when the
nunc pro tunc
judgment was entered and she was returned to custody. However, it is well-establishеd that a defendant is not entitled to credit against his sentence for the time he is at large pursuant to an appeal bond. Tex.Code Cr.P.Ann. art. 42.03 (1979 and Supp.1986);
Ex parte Allen,
Whether appellant was erroneously admitted to parole on February 27 depends on whether it was within the discretion of the trial court to order the entry of thе nunc pro tunc judgment. This question is presently pending on appeal to this Court. Until this appeal is finally determined, appellant is entitled to reasonable bail.
As previously noted, thе trial court originally set appellant’s bail pending appeal at $12,500.00. At the habeas corpus hearing, appellant testified that she and her family were financially able to post a bond no larger than $5,000.00. In light of the fact that appellant voluntarily surrendered herself after she dismissed her original appeal, and taking into consideration that appellant is now subject to the various terms and conditions of her parole, we conclude that bail in excess of $5,000.00 would not be reasоnable.
The order of the trial court denying appellant bail pending her appeal from the nunc pro tunc order entered March 18, 1986, is set aside. The cause is remanded tо the trial court for the setting of reasonable bail not to exceed $5,000.00.
GAMMAGE, J., not participating.
Notes
. One effect of such a finding is to delay the parole eligibility date. Tex.Code Cr.P.Ann. art. 42.18 § 8(b) Supp.1986).
. This аppeal has been entered on the docket of this Court as our cause number 3-86-079-CR.
. Although the opinion in Shaw notes that the defendant remained free on bond after the nunc pro tunc order was entered, no issue as to the defendant’s entitlement to bail was raisеd and the opinion does not address this question.
. We voice no opinion as to the scope of this appeal. However,
see
and
compare Cunningham v. State,
.Of course, this was a moot point at the time because, before surrendering herself, appellant dismissed her appeal.