125 Ky. 510 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1907
Opinion op the Court by
Affirming.
Paducah is a city of the second class. In April, 1906, its general council enacted an ordinance providing that "from and after the passage, approval, and publication of this ordinance the number of the Paducah police force shall not exceed 18 men; hut there shall he in addition thereto one chief of police, one captain of police, one lieutenant of police.” Pur
The validity of the legislative act is assailed upon two grounds-: First, that the title is defective; second, that it is an unwarranted interference with the right of local self-government. Section 51 of the Constitution provides, in part, that: “No law enacted by the General Assembly shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.” In considering a like objection made to an act passed under the Constitution of 1850, which contained a
A consideration of the second objection opens up á wide and complicated field of investigation; but we think that, by the application of a few well-settled principles, the difficulty in determining the validity of the act in question may be disposed of. The Constitution does not undertake to prescribe the power that the Legislature may exercise over municipal corporations. The only provision contained in it pertinent to the question under consideration is contained in section 156, declaring, ini part, that “the cities and town© of this commonwealth for the purposes of their organization and government shall be divided into six classes. The organization and powers of each class shall be defined and provided for by general laws, so that all municipal corporations of the sanm class shall possess the same powers and be subject to the same restriction.” It will thus be seen that there is no conditional limitation upon the right of the General Assembly to enact laws for the govern-
In the widely quoted case of People v. Common Council of Detroit, 28 Mich. 228, 15 Am. Rep. 202, the court, through Judge Cooley, said that: “Though municipal authorities are made use of in state government, and as such are under complete state control, they are not created exclusively for that purpose, but have other objects and purposes peculiarly local, and in which the state at large, except in conferring power and regulating its exercise, has legally no more concern than it has. in the individual and private concern of its several citizens. Indeed, it would be easy to show that it is not from the standpoint of the state’s interest, but from that of local interest, that the necessity of incorporating cities and villages most distinctly appears. The twofold character of these corporations as organizatzions on the one hand for state purposes, and on the other for the benefit of the individual incorporators, is invariably recognized by this court wherever there has been occasion to refer to it. And municipal corporations, considered as communities, endowed with peculiar functions for the benefit of their own citizens, have always been recognized as possessing powers and capacities and as being entitled to exemptions distinct from those which they possess or can claim as conveniences
In the absence of constitutional prohibition or restraint, it is difficult to draw with precision the line which separates the powers retained by the Legislature in the government and direction of cities and towns, and that placed beyond its control by the acts granting to the people of these localities the rigid to exercise a large measure of governmental functions in the management of their internal, and what may be termed domestic, affairs; and this free from super
We therefore conclude that it'was competent for the Legislature to fix the number of policemen in cities of the second class.
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.