218 F. 185 | D. Mass. | 1914
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The respondent, Frederick F. Flynn, is -a member of the Massachusetts district police, and he is detaining the petitioner under a warrant‘issued by the Governor of Massachusetts for the removal of the petitioner to the state of Illinois upon extradition proceedings instituted by the Governor of that state. Two questions are presented: (1) Whether the petitioner is a fugitive from the justice of the state of Illinois; (2) whether the requisition papers are sufficient in law to justify the warrant for removal.
The material facts are as follows: On or about February 13, 1912, at Chicago, in the state of. Illinois, one Mark Chung was assassinated, by being shot to death in a shop in which he was working. The murderer fled. Plarry Eng Hong was immediately accused of the mur
The view which I was at first inclined to take, upon analogy to habeas corpus proceedings in immigration and army cases (see Chin Yow v. U. S., 208 U. S. 8, 28 Sup. Ct. 201, 52 L. Ed. 369; Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 100, 23 Sup. Ct. 611, 47 L. Ed. 721; In re Grimley, Petitioner, 137 U. S. 147, 150, 11 Sup. Ct. 54, 34 L. Ed. 636), that the decision of the Governor of Massachusetts was conclusive, if fairly made upon fundamentally correct principles of law, cannot, I think, notwithstanding the language used in Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80, 95, 6 Sup. Ct. 291, 29 L. Ed. 544, and in Ex Parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642, 652, 5 Sup. Ct. 1148, 29 L. Ed. 250, be supported in view of the other decisions referred to. See, too, Moore on Extradition (1st Ed.) § 634.
It seems to me to be established by a fair preponderance of the evidence, and I accordingly find, that the prisoner is Harry Eng Hong, the identical person named in the requisition of the Governor of Illinois, and that he was in Illinois at the time when the alleged murder was committed, and is now a fugitive from the justice of that state. In' arriving at these findings I have assumed, as contended by the petitioner, without so deciding, that the burden of proof upon the whole case was upon the respondent to justify his detention of the prisoner.
Petition dismissed; writ discharged; petitioner remanded.