17 S.C. 446 | S.C. | 1882
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This was a motion, made by James P. Carroll, a junior judgment creditor of D. H. Tompkins, to set
1st. That the proceeding by motion was not the proper remedy. 2d. Because the application came too late, and was barred by the statute of limitations and lapse of time. 3d. Because the alleged defect in the statement upon which the judgment is based is a mere irregularity, and cannot be taken advantage of by third parties. 4th. Because rights have become vested under said judgment, and such rights cannot be attacked in a collateral proceeding. 5th. Because the Circuit Judge erred in holding that the said judgment could not be amended. 6th. Because judgment was good between the parties, and was not, therefore, void.
It will be observed that no question is made in any of the grounds of appeal as to the insufficiency of the statement upon which the confession of judgment was based, and indeed, it seems to be well settled that a statement like the one in the present case, that the indebtedness grew out of a note given by the defendant to the plaintiff, without stating a consideration of the note, or what it was given for, will not be sufficient. Chappel v. Chappel, 12 N. Y. 215; Dunham v. Waterman, 17 N. Y. 15, cited with approval as to this point in Wienges v. Cash, 15 S. C. 44.
"We proceed then to the consideration of the various grounds of appeal, not, however, in the order in which they are stated in the record, but in the order in which we have stated them above. As to whether the relief sought could be obtained by motion: — In New York, from whence the provision of our code upon the subject of judgments by confession has been borrowed, it seems to be settled that the proceeding by motion is proper. Chappel v. Chappel and Dunham v. Waterman, supra. See also Freemam on Judgments, sec. 558. This seems to be in accordance with the practice long prevailing in this State. Mooney v. Welsh, 1 Mill Con. R. 133; Barns v. Branch, 3 McC. 19.
The case of Clark v. Porcelain Manufacturing Company, 8 S. C. 22, relied upon by the appellant, does not support the position contended for, that four years will bar such a proceeding ; for as matter of fact the judgment was entered in that case March 18th, 1871, and notice of the motion to set aside was served March 2d, 1875, so that the proceeding there was commenced within four years, and hence the decision could not have rested on the ground that four years would be a bar. But in addition to this, the motion in that case was not made by a third party, but by the defendant in the action, and was based, not upon any substantial defect in the judgment, but upon a mere irregularity in the summons capable of being rectified by amendment, and upon the allegation that the president of the defendant corporation had omitted through accident and excusable neglect to make a defence to the action; and the court simply held that after the lapse of nearly four years, a motion based upon such grounds could not be sustained, and did not
For a third ground of appeal, the appellant insists that the alleged defect in the judgment is a mere irregularity, and cannot be taken advantage of by third parties. The judgment in questjon derives its origin from a special statutory provision, and to make it valid the requirements of the statute must be strictly complied with, Jreemcm on Judgments, see. 543. In the recent case of Wienges v. Gash, above cited, we have had occasion to consider the meaning of this part of the code, and from the authorities therein cited, as well as from what is said in that case, it is quite clear that this ground cannot be sustained. The object of the statement required by the code is to protect creditors against fraudulent confessions of judgment, b3r giving them such information as will enable them, by inquiiy, to ascertain whether the alleged indebtedness is bona fide or pretensive and fraudulent, and if the statement fails to furnish such information, then the judgment based upon it must be regarded as fraudulent and void as to other creditors, even though it may be valid as between the parties to it, who may be estopped from questioning its validity,
The next ground of appeal raises a question which was not
The fifth ground of appeal alleges that the circuit judge erred in holding that the judgment could not be amended. This ground cannot be sustained. The defect in the judgment is substantial, not of form merely. If the statement required by the code was not made, then there was no authority to enter the judgment, and so far as third persons are concerned, it was without any validity and absolutely void.
The only remaining ground taken by the appellant is that, as “ the judgment was good between the parties,” it could not, “ therefore, be void.” We are unable to perceive the force of this ground. A deed may be good as between the parties, and yet absolutely void as to creditors, and we see no reason why the same may not be said of a judgment.
The judgment of this court is that the judgment of the Circuit Court be affirmed.