Ex Parte Buchanen
- Reporters:
- , , , ,
- Before:
- Williams
(after stating the facts as above). We have decided at this term of the court in the case of
Ex parte Bailey,
reported in this volume, 94 Pac. 442, that an indictment for the crime of murder — an offense committed under the territory
“That all causes , proceedings, and matters, civil or criminal, pending in the district courts of Oklahoma Territory, or in the United States Courts in the Indian Territory, at the time said territories became a state, not transferred to the United States Circuit or DistrictCourts in the state of Oklahoma, shall be proceeded with, held, and determined by the courts of said state, the successors of said district courts of the territory of Oklahoma and the United States Courts in the Indian Territory; with the right to prosecute appeals or writs of error to the supreme or appellate court of said state, and also with the same right to prosecute appeals or writs of error from final determination in such cases made by the supreme or appellate court of such state to the Supreme Court of the United States, as is provided by law for appeals and writs of error from ‘the supreme or final appellate court of a state to the Supreme Court of the United States. All criminal cases pending in the United States Courts in the Indian Territory, not transferred to the United States Circuit or District Courts in the state of Oklahoma, shall he prosecuted to a final determination in the state courts of Oklahoma under the laws now in force in that territory.”
In the decision of this court in the case of
Higgins v. Brown
(decided at this term of court and reported in this volume), 94 Pac. 703, it was held said section, having been concurred in on the part of the state by virtue of provisions contained in sections 27 and 28 of the Schedule to the Constitution , vested jurisdiction in the proper state courts of all criminal cases, not of a
Section 1 of the Schedule to the Constitution provides:
“No existing rights, actions, suits, proceedings, contracts, or claims shall be affected by the change in the forms of the government, but all shall continue as if no change in the form of government had taken place. And all process which may have beenissued previous to the admission of the state into the Union, under the authority of the territory of Oklahoma, or under authority of the laws in force in the Indian Territory, shall be as valid as if issued in the name of the state.”
When this provision is construed in the light of the provisions of section 20 of the enabling act, as amended by the act of March 4, 1907, we are aided in reaching an interpretation as to what was intended by said section 1,
supra;
and we conclude that said provision has the same effect as that contained in said section 20,
supra,
where it is stipulated that certain cases “shall be prosecuted to final determination in the state district courts of Okla
“Its civil and political powers were transferred to other officers ; those of peculiarly internal character to officers of the new state; those which bore any relation of the national system of government, of which the state formed a part, to officers holding commissions under that system, and possessing only the powers derived from their commission. As one of the states of the Union, and in virtue of that character forming one of the districts of the United States, the district of Utah, and the Circuit Courts sitting in that district, would possess no peculiar jurisdiction or authority; one which did not appertain to other districts and the Circuit Courts having cognizance of matters within those districts.”
In the case of Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 48, 14 Sup. Ct. 548, 566, 38 L. Ed. 331, the court says:
“By the Constitution, as is now well settled, the United States having rightfully acquired the territories, and being the only government which can impose laws on them, having the entire dominion and sovereignty, national and municipal, federal and state, over all the territories so long as they remain in the territorial condition,” etc. (See, also, Higgins v. Brown, ante, this volume, and authorities therein cited.)
It may be contended, however, that the people of the state, through their constitutional convention, could not provide for the continuance of laws enacted by Congress for the government of the Indian Territory for the purpose of prosecuting to final
Whilst we do not readily reach these conclusions, yet we are clear that it was the intention of ‘Congress, as well as the constitutional convention, that malefactors, who had committed