75 P. 1 | Nev. | 1904
Lead Opinion
The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion. Petitioner was arrested, convicted, and sentenced for working *328 in an underground mine more than eight hours in one day, contrary to the provisions of an act passed by our last legislature which provides:
"SECTION 1. The period of employment of working men in all underground mines or workings shall be eight hours per day, except in cases of emergency where life or property is in imminent danger.
"SEC. 2. The period of employment of working men in smelters and in all institutions for the reduction or refining of ores or metals shall be eight hours per day, except in cases of emergency where life or property is in imminent danger.
"SEC. 3. Any person who violates either of the preceding sections of this act, or any person, corporation, employer or his or its agent, who hires, contracts with, or causes any person to work in an underground mine or other underground workings, or any smelter or any other institution or place for the reduction or refining of ores or metals for a period of time longer than eight hours during one day unless life or property shall be in imminent danger shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars, nor more than five hundred dollars, or imprisonment in the county jail not more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
"SEC. 4. This act shall take effect sixty days from and after its passage." (Stats. Nev. 1903, p. 33, c.
Upon his failure to pay the fine of $100 imposed, he was committed to the custody of the sheriff. He applies to this court for his liberty, and on his behalf it is urged that his conviction is void because the statute conflicts with section 1 of article I of our state constitution, which declares that "all men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness," and that the act is inimical to the
Although the constitutionality of this eight-hour law is now challenged before us for the first time, and questions of much interest and great import are involved, the fundamental principles which govern the determination of its validity have heretofore been recognized and enunciated by this court and by the Supreme Court of the United States, the earthly tribunals having final jurisdiction in this commonwealth; and the purpose, force, and validity of similar statutes have been carefully considered by that court and others in several states. It will be seen that the act does not attempt in any way to regulate the amount of wages which an employer shall pay, or an employee receive, for services by the day or otherwise performed. The language forbids any person from working in underground mines, smelters, or mills for the reduction of ores more than eight hours per day, and the penalty is imposed alike on the man who labors in those places longer than the time prescribed, and on the owner who hires, and thereby encourages an infraction of the statute by others in his service. If he worked more than eight hours in his own mine, he would be subject to the same punishment as the man who labors for others, and the effect of the statute is to prevent all persons from working in the places named more than the designated number of hours. The employer is not required to pay any more per hour for the labor or value he receives than he paid previous to the passage of the act. He may hire as many men as he may choose, and he and the employee are as free to fix the compensation for services performed on the basis of their actual value as before. Both are prohibited from having the latter work more than eight hours per day in the employments affected, but if loss, temporary or otherwise, be occasioned by this curtailment of labor, it is apparent that the statute does not require it to be borne by the employer.
Labor properly directed creates wealth, and all honest toil is noble and commendable. The right to acquire and hold property guarantied by our constitution is one of the most essential for the existence and happiness of man, and for our *330 purposes here we may consider it to be the cornerstone in the temple of our liberties, and that it implies and includes the right to labor. It may also be granted that labor, the poor man's patrimony, the creator of wealth, and upon which all must depend for sustenance, is the highest species of property, and the right to toil is as sacred and secure as the millions of the wealthy; but individual rights, however great, are subject to certain limitations necessary for the good of others and the community, and inherent in every well-regulated government. While we are not forgetful of the important rights and constitutional guaranties of the individual, they are, at the most, only branches of the common tree, while the welfare of the state, which includes the protection of the health and lives of the people in their various industrial pursuits, is the trunk, without which the tree could not stand or bear fruit. The public good and the health of a considerable portion of our population, when placed in the balance, must outweigh and turn the scale, regardless of slight inconveniences and reasonable restrictions which individuals may suffer. This principle is of greater importance to every one than his more direct personal rights, for, without the prevalence and enforcement of this doctrine, no government could sustain itself and extend protection to its citizens. Broadly speaking, the right to acquire and hold property, which presupposes the one to labor at all ordinary pursuits, is subordinate to this greater obligation not to injure others, individually or collectively, and to contribute and aid in the support of the government in all its legitimate objects, among which we may consider the protection of the health and lives of that large portion of the people in this state who delve in the earth in search of the precious metals that help enrich the commerce of the world, and who there and in the smelters and ore reduction works come in contact with poisonous minerals, and breath dust, foul air, and obnoxious fumes and gases. In this connection it should be remembered that the statute applies to underground mines, and not to placer claims, or to men working in the open above the surface. That a large proportion of our population are engaged in the pursuits in which the hours of labor are restricted is a matter of general *331 knowledge. The legislature in 1875 declared the mining, milling, and smelting of ores to be for the public use, and, when necessary for these purposes, authorized the taking of private property by way of eminent domain. (Comp. Laws, sec. 283.) And in 1887 they declared that mining was the paramount interest of the state, and authorized condemnation proceedings for its promotion in certain instances. (Comp. Laws, see. 281.)
We cannot close our eyes and deny that employment in the places named in the statute is unhealthful, when it is so commonly known that men contract rheumatism and miner's consumption working underground in powder smoke, and damp, bad air; that they become leaded from the fumes in smelters; and that the most of those employed in one of the largest quartz mills in the state during the past several years became afflicted in from a few to several months with fine particles of flinty dust, which, with the inflation and contraction in breathing, cut the lungs, and resulted in premature and early death. We are not prepared to say that the mining, milling, and smelting of ores are not vocations so unhealthy and hazardous that they may not come under the protecting arm of the legislature; but to recognize these conditions, and pass measures for their amelioration, and which may protect the health and prolong the lives of the men so employed, we think, is within the legitimate powers of the lawmaking branch of our government. As we will indicate later, the Supreme Courts of Utah and the United States have held these occupations to be unhealthful in that state, and there is no apparent reason why they are not equally so here. If these matters were uncertain when there existence is necessary to sustain the law, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the statute, for, as held by this court in several decisions, its validity will be presumed until it is clearly shown to be unconstitutional. Justice Harlan, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States a few weeks since in the case involving the Kansas law making eight hours a day for all engaged on public work, state, city, or county — a different question than that involved here — made these pertinent statements: "So, also, if it be said that a statute like the one before us is mischievous in its *332 tendencies, the answer is that the responsibility therefor rests upon the legislators, not upon the courts. No evils arising from such legislation could be more far-reaching than those that might come to our system of government if the judiciary, abandoning the sphere assigned to it by the fundamental law, should enter the domain of legislation, and, upon grounds merely of justice or reason and wisdom, annul statutes that had received the sanction of the people's representatives. We are reminded by counsel that it is the solemn duty of the courts, in cases before them, to regard the constitutional rights of the citizen against merely arbitrary power. That is unquestionably true. But it is equally true, indeed, the public interests imperatively demand — that legislative enactments be recognized and enforced by the courts, as embodying the will of the people, unless they are plainly and palpably, and beyond all question, in violation of the fundamental law of the constitution."
In Wallace v. Mayor and City of Reno,
73 Pac. 531,
The cases holding that the legislature may pass measures for the protection of the health, safety, and lives of the citizens are too numerous to require citation. These have been enacted and upheld in a variety of forms which limit in a greater or less degree the control and acquisition of property. *333 Quarantine regulations, state and national, for the protection of the many and in restraint of the individual, and affecting people and various animals, prevail generally. The use of safety devices has been enforced in mining, mills, and factories, and on railroads. By ordinance, vestibules are required on street cars to protect motormen from the inclemency of the weather. Various trades are prohibited or regulated, so as not to injure the health of those employed or others. A proportion of private property is exacted by way of taxation for the support of schools, asylums, hospitals, and for other public and beneficial purposes, present and future. More directly, laws have been sustained shortening the hours of labor in bakeries, barber shops, and laundries — places less unhealthy and affecting a smaller class than mines and smelters — and for women in manufacturing establishments. Considerations peculiar to sex have been advanced in some instances in support of the latter, but to have strong, healthy men, instead of sickly and disabled ones, without earning and self-supporting capacity, and resultant widows and orphans dependent upon private and public charity, is quite as important to the state in time of peace or war; and the health and lives of all the people, wherever endangered, should receive care and protection.
Of the statute we have under consideration, sections 1 and 2 are copied literally, and section 3 substantially, from an act found in the Session Laws of Utah for 1896, at page 219, c. 72, which was sustained as being not unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of that state and of the United States. (State v. Holden,
The Utah Bill of Rights, in slightly varying language, contains the same guaranty as ours for acquiring and holding property, but section 6 of article XVI in the constitution of that state directs that "the legislature shall pass laws to provide for the health and safety of employees in factories, smelters and mines." This must be regarded as a command to the legislature there on a subject in regard to which our constitution is silent, but the validity of the statute under *334
challenge depends upon power which may exist without the command. This direction to the legislature would imply and supply power if it did not otherwise exist, but, as we have already seen, the authority to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of the citizen is inherent in the police power of the legislature, without any express provision. Our constitution being silent in that regard, our legislature could exercise the power at their discretion, while there the command made action obligatory. Here the legislature is the uninstructed general agent of the people, free to exercise its own judgment in. matters coming within the police powers of the state; and the power necessary to sustain the validity of the statute exists here as well as there, and would exist there regardless of the command. It should be remembered that the Utah constitution does not direct the legislature to regulate the hours of labor in mines and smelters, but only to provide for the health and safety of employees therein, and that this law in that state can be sustained only as a health regulation, such as are within the general police powers, regardless of the constitutional command, for otherwise it is not authorized any more there than here. The extent of the command is for the legislature to provide for the health of these employees. Every legislature is authorized to provide for the health of the people, where endangered, and for their welfare in other ways. The power is as inherent here as it is complete there, and, if the curtailment to eight of the hours of labor' in the mines and smelters in Utah promotes the health of the employees, ergo it does the same here. Since the constitution of Utah confers no power that is not possessed by our legislature, and the conditions in mines and smelters may not be considered materially different there from what they are here, it is presumed that when our legislature adopted this statute it adopted the construction which had been placed upon it at the time of its adoption by the Supreme Court of that state and the United States. It was said in State v. Robey,
The questions involved have been carefully considered and ably discussed in a number of decisions, from which we quote (State v. Holden, supra):
"If the power to pass the law is conceded, the court cannot set it aside because it may deem its enactment unnecessary or injudicious, or because the court may think that experience has proven it so, or because the court may think itself more sagacious than the legislature, and can therefore see more clearly that the law will retard, rather than promote, progress and prosperity, and will be a detriment to the common good when actually applied to human affairs amid the conditions of the future.
"This brings us to the question, Is the first section of the statute, limiting the period of employment of laboring men in underground mines to eight hours per day, except in cases of emergency, where life or property is in imminent danger, calculated to protect the health of such laboring men? The effort necessary to successful mining, if performed upon the surface of the earth, in pure air and in the sunlight, prolonged beyond eight hours, might not be injurious, nor affect the health of ablebodied men. When, so extended beneath the surface, in atmosphere laden with gas, and sometimes with smoke, away from the sunlight, it might injuriously affect the health of such persons. It is necessary to use artificial means to supply pure air to men laboring any considerable distance from the surface. That being so, it is reasonable to assume that the air introduced, when mixed with the impure air beneath the surface, is not as healthful as the free air upon the surface. The fact must be conceded that the breathing of pure air is wholesome, and that the breathing of impure air is unwholesome. We cannot say that this law, limiting the period of labor in underground mines to eight hours each day, is not calculated to promote health; that it is not adapted to the protection of the health of the class of men who work in *336 underground mines. While the provision of the constitution under consideration makes it the duty of the legislature to enact laws to protect the health and to secure the safety of men working in underground mines, and in factories and smelters, it does not prohibit the legislature from enacting other laws protecting such classes, to promote the general welfare. The authority of the general government is ascertained from the powers delegated, while those of the state government are ascertained from those not prohibited. This leaves the state legislature in the possession of all the lawmaking power not prohibited to it by the constitution of the United States, or the laws made in pursuance of it, or by the state constitution. The enactment of some laws is made mandatory. The enactment of others is left to the discretion of the legislature as the public welfare may demand.
"The
"An ordinance of the city and county of San Francisco prohibited the washing and ironing of clothes in public laundries and washhouses within certain prescribed limits of the city and county from ten o'clock at night until six o'clock on the morning of the following day; and one Soon Hing was fined and imprisoned for a violation of it, and he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, on the ground that the ordinance was void, because it discriminated between the classes of laborers engaged in the laundry business and those engaged in other kinds of business, and it discriminated between laborers beyond the designated limits and those within them; that it deprived the petitioner of the right to labor, and, as a necessary consequence, of the right to acquire property; and that the board had no power to pass it. The writ was denied by the lower court, and the judgment was brought before the Supreme Court of the United States, and affirmed by that court. Among other things, that court said in its opinion: `The specific regulations for one kind of business which may be necessary for the protection of the public can never be the just ground of complaint because like restrictions are not imposed upon other business of a different kind. The discriminations which are open to objection are those where persons engaged in the same business are subject to different restrictions, or are held entitled to different privileges under the same conditions. It is only then that the discriminations can be said to impair that equal right which all can claim in the enforcement of the laws.' (Soon Hing v. Crowley,
"Judge Cooley says: `Whether a statute is constitutional or not is always a question of power; that is, a question whether the legislature, in the particular case, in respect to the subject-matter of the act, the matter in which its object is to be accomplished, and the mode of enacting it, has kept within the constitutional limits, and observed the constitutional limits. In any case in which this question is answered in the affirmative, the courts are not at liberty to inquire into the proper exercise of the power. We must assume that the legislative discretion has been properly exercised.' (Cooley, Const. Lim. 6th ed. p. 220.)
"The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in the case ofCom. v. Hamilton Mfg. Co.,
"The section of the statute of which the constitutionality is involved in this case includes all employees and employers engaged in working underground mines. None are omitted who may be subject to the peculiar conditions that attend such mining. And we are not authorized to hold that the law in question is not calculated and adapted in any degree to promote the health and safety of persons working in mines and smelters. Were we to do so, and declare it void, we would usurp the powers intrusted by the constitution to the lawmaking power." *339
In affirming the decision of the Supreme Court of Utah, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Holden v. Hardy, made a clear and elaborate statement, which is peculiarly applicable here, and of which we reproduce a part of the most direct paragraphs:
"This right of contract, however, is itself subject to certain limitations which the state may lawfully impose in the exercise of its police powers. While this power is inherent in all governments, it has doubtless been greatly expanded in its application during the past century, owing to an enormous increase in the number of occupations which are dangerous, or so far detrimental to the health of employees as to demand special precautions for their well-being and protection, or the safety of adjacent property. While this court has held, notably in the casesDavidson v. New Orleans,
"The extent and limitations upon this power are admirably stated by Chief Justice Shaw in the following extract from his opinion in Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 84:
"`We think it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that its use may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations established by law as the legislature, under the governing and controlling *340 power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.'
"This power, legitimately exercised, can neither be limited by contract, nor bartered away by legislation.
"While this power is necessarily inherent in every form of government, it was, prior to the adoption of the constitution, but sparingly used in this country. As we were then almost purely an agricultural people, the occasion for any special protection of a particular class did not exist. Certain profitable employments, such as lotteries and the sale of intoxicating liquors, which were then considered to be legitimate, have since fallen under the ban of public opinion, and are now either altogether prohibited, or made subject to stringent police regulations. The power to do this has been repeatedly affirmed by this court, (Stone v. Mississippi,
"While the business of mining coal and manufacturing iron began in Pennsylvania as early as 1716, and in Virginia, North Carolina, and Massachusetts even earlier than this, both mining and manufacturing were carried on in such a limited way, and by such primitive methods that no special laws were considered necessary, prior to the adoption of the constitution, for the protection of the operatives; but, in the vast proportions which these industries have since assumed, it has been found that they can no longer be carried on with due regard to the safety and health of those engaged in them without special protection against the dangers necessarily incident to these employments. In consequence of this, laws have been enacted in most of the states designed to meet these exigencies, and to secure the safety of persons peculiarly exposed to the dangers. Within this general category are ordinances providing for fire escapes from hotels, theaters, factories, and other large buildings, a municipal inspection of boilers, and appliances designed to secure passengers upon railways and steamboats against the dangers necessarily incident to these methods of transportation. In *341 states where manufacturing is carried on to a large extent, provision is made for the protection of dangerous machinery against accidental contact, for the cleanliness and ventilation of working rooms, for the guarding of well holes, stairways, elevator shafts, and for the employment of sanitary appliances. In others, where mining is the principal industry, special provision is made for the shoring up of dangerous walls, for ventitation shafts, bore holes, escapement shafts, means of signaling the surface, for the supply of fresh air, and the elimination, as far as possible, of dangerous gases, for safe means of hoisting and lowering cages, for a limitation upon the number of persons permitted to enter a cage, that cages shall be covered, and that there shall be fences and gates around the top of shafts, besides other similar precautions.
"These statutes have been repeatedly enforced by the courts of the several states, their validity assumed, and, so far as we are informed, they have been uniformly held to be constitutional.
"In Daniels v. Hilgard,
In Commonwealth v. Bonnell et al., 8 Phila. 534, a law providing for the ventilation of coal mines, for speaking tubes, and the protection of cages, was held to be constitutional, and subject to strict enforcement. (Commonwealth v. Conyngham,
"But if it be within the power of the legislature to adopt such means for the protection of the lives of its citizens, it is difficult to see why precautions may not also be adopted for the protection of their health and morals. It is as much for the interest of the state that the public health should be preserved as that life should be made secure.
"Upon the principles above stated, we think the act in question may be sustained as a valid exercise of the police power of the state. The enactment does not profess to limit the hours of all workmen, but merely those who are employed in underground mines, or in the smelting, reduction, or refining of ores or metals. These employments, when too long pursued, the legislature has judged to be detrimental to the health of the employees; and, so long as there are reasonable grounds for believing that this is so, its decisions upon this subject cannot be reviewed by the courts.
"While the general experience of mankind may justify us in believing that men may engage in ordinary employments more than eight hours per day without injury to their health, it does not follow that labor for the same length of time is innocuous when carried on beneath the surface of the earth, where the operative is deprived of fresh air and sunlight, and is frequently subjected to foul atmosphere and a very high temperature, or to the influence of noxious gases generated by the processes of refining or smelting."
Continuing, the United States Supreme Court said:
"We concur in the following observations of the Supreme Court of Utah in this connection in its opinion in No. 2:
"'The conditions with respect to health of laborers in underground mines doubtless differs from those in which they labor in smelters and other reduction works on the surface. Unquestionably the atmosphere and other conditions in mines and reduction works differ. Poisonous gases, dust, and impalpable substances arise and float in the air in stamp-mills, smelters, and other works in which ores containing metals, combined with arsenic or other poisonous elements or agencies, are treated, reduced, and refined; and there can be no doubt that prolonged effort day after day, subject to such conditions and agencies, will produce morbid, noxious, and often deadly effects in the human system. Some organisms *343 and systems will resist and endure such conditions and effects longer than others. It may be said that labor in such conditions must be performed. Granting that, the period of labor each day should be of a reasonable length. Twelve hours per day would be less injurious than fourteen, ten than twelve, and eight than ten. The legislature has named eight. Such a period was deemed reasonable. The law in question is confined to the protection of that class of people engaged in labor in underground mines, and in smelters and other works wherein ores are reduced and refined. This law applies only to the classes subjected by their employment to the peculiar conditions and effects attending underground mining and work in smelters, and other works for the reduction and refining of ores. Therefore it is not necessary to discuss or decide whether the legislature can fix the hours of labor in other employments. Though reasonable doubts may exist as to the power of the legislature to pass a law, or as to whether the law is calculated or adapted to promote the health, safety, or comfort of the people, or to secure good order or promote the general welfare, we must resolve them in favor of the right of that department of government. But the fact that both parties are of full age and competent to contract does not necessarily deprive the state of the power to interfere where the parties do not stand upon an equality, or where the public health demands that one party to the contract shall be protected against himself.' The state still retains an interest in his welfare, however reckless he may be. The whole is no greater than the sum of all the parts, and when the individual health, safety, and welfare are sacrificed or neglected, the state must suffer.
"We are of the opinion that the act in question was a valid exercise of the police power of the state, and the judgments of the Supreme Court of Utah are therefore affirmed."
In People v. Lochner (Sup.) 76 N. Y. Supp. 399, the Supreme Court of New York said: "The police power of the state is the power which enables it to promote the health, comfort, safety, and welfare of society. It is very broad and far-reaching, but it is not without its limitations. The line between the valid exercise of the police power and the *344
invasion of the private rights is clearly drawn by Judge Earl in his opinion in Re Jacobs,
"It was held in People v. Warden of CityPrison,
The opinions in California and Ohio holding that statutes *346
limiting the hours of labor on public works were unconstitutional, although not in point, may no longer be considered of weight, in the face of the recent decision to the contrary by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Kansas case. The employment was not shown or claimed to endanger health or life, nor could this be said of all the various occupations covered by the Nebraska act. When such strong considerations of public policy demand, it is not difficult to distinguish in principle between the cases relating to vocations unhealthful and dangerous, and those which are not, and we are unaware that any court where the conditions are the same has rendered an opinion contrary to the views we hold and express, excepting in Re Morgan,
Notwithstanding the attempt of the Supreme Court of Colorado to discredit and overrule the doctrines announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Holden v. Hardy, the latter tribunal has continued to affirm those principles, and in later decisions has stated regarding the case:
Orient Insurance Company v. Daggs,
In Austin v. Tennessee,
Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison,
Short v. Mining Co.,
Similar conclusions are stated in People v. Lochner (Sup.) 76 N. Y. Supp. 401.
We think the better reasoning and correct distinction are with the Supreme Court of the United States, and the cases in line with its decisions. As we have already shown, the objection to the statute as being special legislation was held to be untenable by that court, and its opinion based squarely on the fact that the legislature, in the exercise of its police power, could, by limiting the hours of labor, provide for the protection of the health of the men employed in underground mines and smelters. If the statute had been objectionable as class legislation, that court would have held it to be a denial of the equal protection of the laws under the
In Wenham v. State, 91 N. W. 421, 58 L.R.A. 825, the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that an act prohibiting females from laboring more than ten hours per day, or sixty hours per week, in manufacturing and certain other establishments, was within the police power of the state, and not objectionable as class legislation; and it is said in the opinion: "It would seem at first blush as though a law having the effect to interfere with the business of the one, or shorten the hours of labor of the other, would be repugnant to these constitutional provisions. It must be conceded, however, that every property holder is secured in his title thereto, and holds it under the implied rule and understanding that its use may be so regarded and restricted that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having the equal right to the enjoyment of their property, or to the rights of the community in which he lives. All property in this state is held subject to rules regulating the common good and the general welfare of our people. This is the price of our advanced civilization, and of the protection afforded by law to the right of ownership, and the use and enjoyment of the property itself. Rights of property, like other social and conventional rights, are subject to reasonable limitations in their enjoyment, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations by law as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think expedient."
To the same effect, and upholding a similar statute, isState v. Buchanan, 70 Pac. 52, 59 L.R.A. 342, a Washington case.
It may be assumed that, at the time of the adoption of our state constitution, underground mining had not progressed to such extent that the dangers to health incident were so apparent and well understood as to-day, and consequently that no provision was made for or against such legislation as that before us, and no consideration given the subject. Time and the light of experience and the progress of the age have shown the desirability of various enactments for the promotion of the happiness and good of the people, regarding which legislators and statesmen were formerly unmindful. As new conditions and necessities arise in the affairs of men, the law must advance to meet them. *352
For the reasons indicated, we conclude that it was within the power and discretion of the legislature to enact the statute for the protection of the health and prolongation of the lives of the workingmen affected, and the resulting welfare of the state.
The petitioner is remanded to custody.
Concurrence Opinion
The question for determination is, does the eight-hour enactment of the last session of the Nevada Legislature violate the Nevada constitution? True, it is claimed in the brief of counsel for petitioner that the said enactment violates also the constitution of the United States, in its
Counsel claim that the enactment violates the constitution of Nevada (1) in section 21 of article IV, as to generality and uniformity of laws; (2) in section 17 of article IV, as to multiplicity of subjects; (3) in section 20 of article IV, as to local and special laws; and (4) in section 1 of article I, as to (a) class legislation; and (b) its "Bill of Rights," as to, first, personal liberty; and, second, as to acquiring property.
While counsel have cited the foregoing sections as violated by the enactment in question, they have not, in their arguments, kept the discussion on each point separate; but several points are mingled together in their discussion. Hence the discussion here will have, to some extent, to follow the same method. The said points will, however, be separately discussed as far as, under the circumstances, may be practicable.
Section 20 of article IV provides: "The legislature shall not pass local or special laws" in certain cases therein named; but the enactment in question here does not seem to come under any of them, unless it be this one: "For the punishment of crimes and misdemeanors." If that be the contention, it will receive attention further on. *353
Section 21 provides that "in all cases enumerated in the preceding section [see section 20] and all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, all laws shall be general and of uniform operation throughout the state." Does counsel claim that a health law could "be made general and of uniform operation throughout the state"; that is, applicable to wholesome and unwholesome employments alike, if there are employments wholesome and employments unwholesome? If so, cases cited in the briefs oppose the contention.
Section 17 of article IV is: "Each law enacted by the legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title," etc. The title of this act is as follows: "An act regulating the hours of employment in underground mines and smelters, and ore reduction works, and providing penalties for violation thereof." Does this enactment violate this section as being multifarious in its title? Counsel, though citing the section as violated by the act's title, pay very slight attention to the paint in their argument. This fact and the subject itself justify only a brief reference to it here. It is thought that neither the title nor the body of the act violates said section.
This brief reference to the sections of the constitution claimed to be violated is made to show that all that were cited to the court by counsel received the court's attention. The main contention of counsel will now be considered: Section 1 of article I, called by counsel the "Bill of Rights," is: "All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness." The contention is that the enactment of 1903 violates this section, as (1) interfering with petitioner's "liberty," (that is, his "liberty to contract"); and (2) his right of "acquiring * * * property." These are the two precise questions in this case. And here, too, counsel have not chosen to discuss each point separately, but have mingled them together in a general manner. Therefore the brief discussion here to be made will be somewhat similar. One remark, however, *354 will be made, to wit, that although courts of great respectability have, it seems, held that the word "liberty," in other constitutions similar to ours, in said section 1 of article I, refers to the "right to contract" or "liberty to contract," is it, after all, entirely clear that it does? It would seem that the notion conveyed by the word "liberty" might ordinarily be deemed to be somewhat different from the word "contract," and also the "right to liberty" and the "right to contract" somewhat different from each other. But be that as it may, now to the points thus sharply put to issue:
The question presents itself in two aspects: (1) Its general aspect (that is, in reference to legislative enactments upon the right or liberty of all citizens "to contract in reference to their labor," and the right of all citizens to "acquire property"); and (2) the rights of a special class or special classes of citizens in these respects. The first or general aspect of the question does not arise in the matter now in hearing, and therefore will not be discussed. But the second aspect, to wit, the special one of the legislative power to regulate or restrain contracting as to laboring in underground mines and about smelters and reduction works, does arise, and will be considered.
On the specific question of such regulation and restraint as to laboring in underground mines and about smelting and reduction works but two cases have been cited by counsel. These are the case of State v. Holden,
Before considering these cases, let it be remarked that the *355 legislative power to regulate and restrain the hours of labor in employments other than those mentioned in the Nevada statute has been before numerous appellate courts of the Union, and that the decisions thereon are not uniform; some holding such regulation and restraint constitutional, and others unconstitutional. Therefore whatever aid could be gained from analogy in decisions in other cases would be divided aid — partly in favor of petitioner, and partly against him; but it is believed the preponderance in number and reason is against him.
As counsel for petitioner place great reliance on In reMorgan, that case will be examined. Here a puzzling statement appears. The chief justice in the opinion first gives the enactment of the Colorado Legislature in question in the case, which is the same as the one in question in the Utah case, and also in the case now before us; and, secondly, the clause of the Colorado Constitution claimed to be by it violated, which clause is essentially the same as the clause in the Nevada Constitution, and also as the clause in the Utah Constitution (it is not here overlooked (hat another clause is in the Utah Constitution enjoining upon its legislature the enactment of health laws as to laborers in mines, etc.); and then he says that it is "practically admitted to be true that this act contravenes the constitutional provision quoted in the statement. Let us see if, notwithstanding this conflict, it can be justified as a valid exercise of the police power." Curious admission. If admitted, it must have been by the counsel in the case who were endeavoring in their arguments to uphold the enactment of the Colorado Legislature; and, after admitting that the enactment contravened the constitution, how could counsel, in reason, ask the court to uphold such contravening enactment, under either the police power or under any other power of the legislature? If the enactment contravened the Colorado Constitution, it would seem that was an end of the matter. Saying or assuming that it did so violate was a petitio principii. It begged the whole question.
Again the Colorado court in In re Morgan, says: "If, in our constitution there was, as there seems to be in that of Utah, a specific affirmative provision enjoining upon the *356 general assembly the enactment of laws to protect the health of the class of workingmen therein enumerated, it might be that acts reasonably appropriate to that end would not be obnoxious to that provision of our constitution forbidding class legislation, for it could hardly be said that a classification made by the constitution itself was arbitrary or unfair, or that it clashed with another provision of the same instrument inhibiting class legislation."
Why could not a classification made by a constitution be "arbitrary" and "unfair"? Clearly such classification might in reality be arbitrary and unfair, but it probably would not lie in the mouths of justices constituting a court under such constitution to nullify it because of such arbitrariness and unfairness.
In the paragraph just above quoted does not the Colorado court — that court so much relied upon by those assailing the enactment in question in this court — practically admit that such an enactment as this is a "reasonably appropriate" health regulation? It was only the "health" of the workmen that the Utah Constitution commanded its legislature to enact laws to protect. It did not say how this health was to be protected. The Utah Legislature deemed protection of miners by regulating and controlling the hours of daily labor "reasonably appropriate" protection, and the Utah Supreme Court likewise held it "reasonably appropriate" and valid. It may be added here that the United States Supreme Court also has held such legislation appropriate and valid. (See infra.)
Now, in essence, precisely the same situation existed in Colorado at the time of the decision in In re Morgan
as did in Utah at the time of the decision in State
v. Holden, and as does now in this state, By universal consent of courts and text-writers on the law, the legislature has, without express constitutional grant authorizing it, the power to protect the health of the people over whom it has jurisdiction. Therefore, as a question of legislative power, there is not a particle of difference, in essence, between the situation under the Utah Constitution and that under the Colorado and the Nevada. Constitutions. And the question here is purely one of legislative power. The expediency, propriety, or wisdom *357
of the enactment is not before this court. If the legislature has the constitutional power to make the enactment, this court has no power to annul the enactment; and should it, under the case supposed, do so, it could be justly charged with usurpation of power. And courts, the conservating governmental branch under the constitution or fundamental principles of government, should be most careful not themselves to set the example of usurping power. Let it, however, be said that courts should be equally scrupulous and fearless in preventing others from infractions upon the constitution which they are sworn to support, protect, and defend. Then, under the direct decision of the Utah Supreme Court that an eight-hour law is a reasonably appropriate provision to protect the health of those engaged in underground mining, and those in and about smelting and reduction works, and the pregnant admission of the Colorado Supreme Court to the same effect, and, again, the direct affirmance of the same doctrine by the Supreme Court of the United States in the following cases in that court:Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 36G,
It cannot be said that these decisions of the United States Supreme Court were obiter. They were necessary to the decision of the cases. The contention was that the Utah enactment was in violation of the
Now to the "class legislation" element in the enactment: Counsel, in their arguments in this case, have mingled the "class legislation" objection implied, they say, in the bill of rights, and the "class legislation" inhibited in subsequent parts of the constitution, to wit, sections 20 and 21 of article IV, and perhaps it may be permissible for me to do the same. Here it cannot truly be said that all class legislation is bad. Decisions by the hundred and by the thousand may easily be found that hold some class legislation is constitutional and valid. Such are too numerous to need citation of instances. The only question is, is there, or is there not, a real foundation — a foundation in fact, in the nature of things — for the class made? If there is such a foundation to support a legislative *359
enactment, then that enactment is constitutional and valid; but, if not, then it is unconstitutional, and therefore void. Should legislators so far forget their duty to God and to man, and so far disregard the oath of office taken by them to support, protect, and defend the constitution — the only instrument that gives them any power to act at all legislatively — as to join together in an enactment persons or things on a mere imaginary something that has no existence in the natures or situations of those persons or those things, and say that those persons or those things must be governed by said enactment, then it would be class legislation; and at least contrary to sections 20 and 21, above mentioned, and possibly, also, to the bill of rights, in section 1 of article I. But of the latter I do not desire at this place to discourse. For does it not seem that when provision so ample against class legislation, local and special, as that contained in sections
In support of this conclusion may be cited the direct decision of the Utah Supreme Court that workers in underground mines and workers in smelters and reduction works may with sound reason be made into classes, and the health of those classes protected by the legislature. To the same effect is impliedly the decision of the court most relied on in argument here, to wit, the Colorado Supreme Court, in In re Morgan. For I think I have above shown that the opinion in the Colorado case impliedly, at least, admits that, with a constitutional provision like that in the Utah Constitution, such legislation might be valid, and also further shown that, in essence, the additional provision of the Utah Constitution did not at all change the situation. True, the Colorado court held such legislation unconstitutional and void; but it would seem that after the facts stated, and after the admissions made *360 by it, its conclusion against the validity of the enactment before it was a non sequitur.
In addition, as stated above, I cannot say that my knowledge of medical science is so complete that I can, in conscience, say that I know that workers in underground mines or workers in smelters and reduction works are not engaged in unhealthy employments. The legislature of Nevada, at its session in 1903, impliedly said they were such, and legislated for the protection of such workers; and I cannot, under the reason of the thing, and the authority of the Utah Supreme Court and that of the United States Supreme Court, to say nothing of the pregnant admission of the Colorado Supreme Court (may I be permitted to explain that I mean an admission that is pregnant with a principle that is destructive of the final conclusion to which that court came?), say that the said enactment of the Nevada Legislature for that purpose was, beyond doubt, a violation of the constitution of Nevada.
For the foregoing reasons I concur in the conclusion of Justice TALBOT that the enactment in question here is not a violation of the constitution of Nevada, and also in the order that the petitioner be remanded to custody.
Dissenting Opinion
It is claimed that the law should be upheld as a health law, and was adopted for that purpose by the legislature in its exercise of the police power. The police power is inherent in the legislature, and founded upon the duty of the state to protect life, health, and property of the community, and to preserve good order and morality. Professor Tiedeman, in his treatise upon the subject, says: "The police power of the government, as understood in the constitutional law of the United States, is simply the power of the government to establish provisions for the enforcement of the common as well as civil law maxim, `Sic utere tuo, ut alienum non lædas.'"
This police power of the state extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property within the state. According to the maxim, "Sic utere tuo, ut alienumnon lædas," it being of universal application, it must, of course, be within the range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in *361 which every one may use his own as not to injure others.
In Lawton v. Steele,
In the Matter of Jacobs,
To justify the law, it is not sufficient that underground mining and working in smelters may be injurious to the men employed in the mines or smelters, but it must be injurious to the public health. It is not claimed that the law is injurious in this respect. If this law is beneficial to the *363 men working in underground mines and smelters — and that is insufficient, under the authorities — it is so only in a remote degree. Rheumatism, miners' consumption, and lead poisoning, it is said, are the maladies to which men affected by this law are exposed. It is difficult to understand how these afflictions may be prevented by its provisions. Lead poisoning and miners' consumption are caused by inhaling fumes from the smelters, or dust in the deep mines. Any daily exposure for a materially less time than eight hours may result in their contraction. In its most favorable aspect, the statute is not helpful to these men, except that shorter hours of labor tend to preserve the system, while longer hours produce exhaustion and its consequent ill effects. I think the statute was adopted by the legislature in conformity to the trend of legislation throughout the country, shortening the hours of labor in many industrial pursuits, and not as a health regulation.
The principle upon which the police power is exercised by the legislature is based upon the maxim, "So use your own as not to injure others," the literal transaction of which is, "Enjoy your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another person." (Broom's Legal Maxims, p. 364.) "Any law which goes beyond that principle — which undertakes to abolish rights, the exercise of which does not involve an infringement of the rights of others, or to limit the exercise of rights beyond what is necessary to provide for the public welfare and personal security — cannot be included in the police power of the government. It is a governmental usurpation, and violates the principles of abstract justice, as they have been developed under our republican institutions." (Tiedeman, sec. 1.) The maxim can only be invoked in the support of laws for the protection of the public health, and not for the protection of an individual against himself. There can be no more justification for such a law than laws prohibiting men from working in the manufacture of white lead, because they are apt to contract lead poisoning, or to prohibit occupation in certain parts of iron smelting works, because the lives of men so engaged are materially shortened. (Tiedeman, sec. 86.)
In the case of In re Morgan,
Holden v. Hardy,
In Holden v. Hardy, it is said: "The Supreme Court of Utah was of opinion that, if authority in the legislature were needed for the enactment of the statute in question, it was found in that part of article XVI of the constitution of the state which declared that the legislature shall pass laws to provide for the health and safety of employees in factories, smelters, and mines." We have no such constitutional provision, and for this reason the case of Holden v. Hardy is inapplicable as an authority here. The only question in that case was whether the statute of Utah violated the provisions of the
In People v. Budd,
In Barbier v. Connolly,
In the Morgan case, supra, the Supreme Court of Colorado was urged to follow the decision in the Holden-Hardy case, as controlling upon it. After fully considering that decision, and conceding that in the construction of federal questions it is the duty of state courts to be governed by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, the court said: "If the language used by that august tribunal in Holden v. Hardy is to be understood as limiting or defining how far a state legislature may go in the exercise of the police power without transcending any of the limits prescribed by the federal constitution, we agree with counsel for petitioner that it was needful to the ascertainment of the question before the court. But if it is not to be thus restricted, and if it was employed with the view of determining what are the true limits of the police power of a state under the provisions of the constitution of that state, the remarks in that connection are wholly obiter, and not authority in that court itself, much less in any other jurisdiction. (Wadsworth v. U. P. Railway Co.,
Section 1 of article I of the constitution of this state declares: "All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness." Substantially the same principles *367
are embodied in the Declaration of Independence and in the constitutions of the states. "Among these inalienable rights, as proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence," said the Supreme Court of the United States in ButcherUnion Co. v. Crescent City Co., Ill U. S. 757,
In the same case Bradley, J., said: "I hold that the liberty of pursuit — the right to follow any of the ordinary callings of life — is one of the privileges of a citizen of the United States," of which he cannot be deprived without invading his right to liberty, within the meaning of the constitution. And again: "There is no more sacred right of citizenship than the right to pursue unmolested a lawful employment in a lawful manner. It is nothing more or less *368 than the sacred right of labor." (Live Stock Assn. v. Crescent City Co., 1 Abb. (U. S.) 399, Fed. Cas. No. 8408.)
In People v. Gillson,
In Ritchie v. People,
My conclusion is that the constitutional right of employer *369 and employee is destroyed by the express terms of the act, in this: that its provisions undertake to prevent employer and employee from making their own contracts concerning underground mining and work in smelters, or in any institution or place for the reduction or refinining of ores or metals, and that it is not a valid exercise of the police power, as a health regulation.
I therefore dissent from the judgment of the court.