Ex Parte Borden
Jаmes Henry Borden, Jr., was convicted of capital murder for intentionally causing the death of Nellie Ledbetter after he had been convicted of another murder within the 20 years before that offense. See
On October 18, 2001, Borden timely filed a Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., petition for postconviction relief, challenging his conviction and sentence of death. Among other things, Borden argued that he should not be executed because, hе alleged, he is mentally retarded, death by electrocution violates the prohibition in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution against cruel and unusual punishment, his trial counsel did not render reasonably effective legal representation, and the jury-engaged in misconduct. The State filed its initial response and supporting affidavits. On July 17, 2002, the State filed a motion for leave to amend its answer, included additional affidavits, and also filed a motion to dismiss. On June 20, 2002, the United States Supreme Court released its decision in
Atkins v. Virginia,
Borden appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case for the trial court to make specific findings of fact as to Borden’s claim that he is mentally retаrded and therefore could not be sentenced to death as a matter of law.
Borden v. State,
On the return to the second remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals in an unpublished memorandum issued on August 19, 2005, dismissed the remainder of Borden’s Rule 32 claims. We granted certiorari review to address the following two issues: (1) Whether, in its unpublished memorandum, the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly held that Borden failed to comply with Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. RApp. P., and thereby waived his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, and (2) whether the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly held that Borden failed to preserve for appellate review his juror-misconduct claims.
Were Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claims Waived?
The trial court summarily dismissed Borden’s Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., petition, which included his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that Borden waived the issue of ineffective assistance of сounsel on appeal by failing to comply with Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App. P. The Court of Criminal Appeals’ unpublished memorandum of August 19, 2005, states, in pertinent part:
“In Part 11(A) of his brief, Borden contends that the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing his claim that trial counsel were ineffective at the guilt and penalty phases of trial. 2 Because Borden has been resentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, his claims of ineffective penalty-phase representation are moot. His claims of ineffective guilt-phase representation are waived on appeal because his argument does not comply with the requirements of the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure.
“Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App. P., requires the argument section of an appellant’s brief to set out ‘the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with citations to the cases, statutes, other authorities, and parts of the record relied on.’ Borden’s argument consists of a single paragraph of general propositions of law; a lengthy recitation of the facts of his life and the facts of the offense; and an eleven-page list of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel allegations. The list of claims is unsupported by legal authority, and it is almost entirely devoid of citations to the record.
“ ‘This type of “scattergun” approach to appellate argument is forbidden by Rule 28(a)[ (10) ], Ala. RApp. P.’ Hamm v. State,913 So.2d 460 , 490-91 (Ala.Crim.App.2002). ‘Recitation of allegations without citation to any legal authority and without adequate recitation of the facts relied upon has been deemed a waiver of the arguments listed.’Hamm, 913 So.2d at 491 , citing Gay v. State,562 So.2d 283 , 289 (Ala.Crim.App.1990). ‘By failing to include any citation to the record on this issue, [the appellant] has failed to comply with Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App. P., and has waived this claim for purposes of appellate review.’ Hart v. State,852 So.2d 839 , 848 (Ala.Crim.App.2002).
“In Part 11(B) of his petition, Borden contends that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his ineffective-counsel claim for the following reasons: (1) His petition clearly exceeded .the spеcificity requirements of Rule 32.2(b), Ala. R.Crim. P.; (2) the affidavits submitted by his counsel created an issue of fact, and the court’s reliance on them to summarily dismiss his petition was improper; (3) the court was wrong to refuse to consider parts of his claim; (4) the court improperly dismissed his claim without permitting him to obtain discovery to prove the merits of his claim; and (5) the trial court improperly adopted the State’s proposed оrder ‘without scrutiny or modification.’
“The first four arguments fail to state a claim for relief because they address the same ineffective-counsel claims that are not properly before this court for review. This court is not required to review arguments which fail to meet the requirements of Rule 28(a). Hallford v. State,629 So.2d 6 (Ala.Crim.App.1992). Borden’s fifth argument must fail because this court does not find error simply because the trial court has adopted an order proposed by the State.
“ ‘While the practice of adopting a State’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law is subject to criticism, the general rule is that even when the court adopts findings and conclusions verbatim, the findings are those of the court and may be reversed only if clearly erroneous.’ Wood v. State,891 So.2d 398 , 420 (Ala.Crim.App.2003). Here, the order of dismissal specifically stated that ‘[t]he Court further has reviewed the record and the supporting affidavits and finds that the State’s proposed order submitted herein accurately reflects the findings and conclusions of the Court.’ The record fully supports the findings and conclusions of the court. 3
The purpose of Rule 28, Ala. R.App. P., outlining the requirements for appellate briefs, is to conserve the time and energy of the appellate court and to advise the opposing party of the points he or she is obligated to make.
United States v. Levy,
We note that waiver of an argument for failure to comply with
Were Borden’s Juror-Misconduct Claims Preserved for Appellate Review?
Borden alleged juror misconduct in his Rule 32 petition filed on October 18, 2001. On August 21, 2002, Borden filеd a motion for leave to amend his Rule 32 petition, specifically to add more details in support of his juror-misconduct claims. The trial court did not rule on Borden’s motion for leave to amend his Rule 32 petition.
On March 14, 2003, the trial court entered its final order dismissing Borden’s Rule 32 petition. With regard to Borden’s juror-misconduct claims, the trial court stated:
“In his claim, Borden asserts error because, he alleges, his ‘right to a fair and impartial jury was violated due to several jurors’ failure to respond truthfully to multiple questions on voir dire.’ (Borden’s Rule 32 pet. pp. 76-77.) The members of the jury were dismissed from serving on the jury on December 1, 1994, after recommending that Borden be sentenced to death. (C.R. 4, R. 1175-1177.) The hearing on Borden’s motion for a new trial was conducted on, or about, June 22, 1995. (SR. 2.) Thus, Borden, or his counsel, had more than six months to interview members of the jury to discover whether anyone on the jury failed to respond truthfully to any questions during voir dire. As such, Borden could have, but did not, raise this claim at trial or on direct appeal. This claim is, therefore, summarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 32.7(d), A.R. Cr. P., because it is procedurally barred. Rule 32.2(a)(3), (5), A.R. Cr. P.
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“In his claim, Borden asserts error because, he alleges, the jury considered extraneous evidence during its deliberation. (Borden’s Rule 32 pet., pp. 77-78.) The mеmbers of the jury were dismissed from serving on the jury on December 1, 1994, after recommending that Borden be sentenced to death. (CR. 4, R. 1175-1177.) The hearing on Borden’s motion for new trial was conducted on, or about, June 22, 1995. (SR. 2.) Thus, Borden, or his counsel, had more than six months to interview members of the jury to discover whether anyone on the jury considered extraneous evidence during deliberations. As such, Borden could have, but did not, raise this claim аt trial or on direct appeal. This claim is, therefore, summarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 32.7(d), A.R. Cr. P., because it is procedurally barred. Rule 32.2(a)(3), (5), A.R. Cr. P.”
The trial court did not address Borden’s amended petition in which he set out specific facts regarding the two claims of juror misconduct. On April 4, 2003, Borden filed a “motion for reconsideration.” In that motion, Borden stated that the trial court in its March 14, 2003, order failed to take into accоunt any of the facts alleged in his amended Rule 32 petition.
The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that Borden had failed to preserve the issue of juror misconduct for appellate review. That court’s unpublished memorandum states:
“The appellant contends that he was denied his right to a fair trial by virtue of several jurors’ failure to disclose information and the jury’s consideration of extraneous evidence. He argues, citing Ex parte Pierce,851 So.2d 606 (Ala.2000), and Ex parte Dobyne,805 So.2d 763 (Ala.2001), that the trial court erred in finding that these claims were procedurally defaulted under Rule 32.2(a)(3) and (5), Ala. R.Crim. P.
“In his original petition, Borden asserted that ‘several’ jurors failed to respond truthfully to ‘multiple ... critical questions’ during voir dire. 4 He also asserted that unidentified ‘extraneous information’ was introduced into the jury deliberations. 5 In addition to pleading that these claims were precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3) and (5), the State specifically pleaded that the claims were insufficient under Rule 32.6(b). Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R.Crim. P., provides:
“ ‘The petition must contain a clear and specific statement of the grounds upon which relief is sought, including full disclosure of the factual basis of those grounds. A bare allegation that a constitutional right has been violated and mere conclusions of law shall not be sufficient to warrant any further proceedings.’
“In his August 22, 2002, motion to amend his petition, Borden attempted to add the necessary factual basis for his juror-misconduct claims. However, in its order dismissing Borden’s petition,the circuit court did not address the requested amendments, 6 and Borden did not object to the court’s failure to rule. Therefore, these matters are not properly before this court on appeal. Appellate review is limited to rulings invoked on the trial level. Cross v. State, 536 So.2d 155 (Ala.Crim.App.1988). ‘[T]he trial court may not be рut in error in the absence of any attempt to invoke a ruling of the court in the matters complained of.’ Bush v. State,717 So.2d 438 , 441 (Ala.Crim.App.1998) (citations omitted).
It is well settled that an appellate court’s review is limited to matters seasonably raised in the trial court.
Ross v. State,
The trial court clearly ruled that both of Borden’s juror-misconduct claims were procedurally barrеd by Rule 32.2(a)(3) and (a)(5), Ala. R.Crim. P. Rule 32(a)(3) provides that ⅛ petitioner is precluded from postconviction relief if the ground the petitioner asserts as a basis for relief could have been, but was not,' raised at trial, and Rule 32(a)(5) bars postconviction relief if the ground could have been, but was not, raised on appeal. Borden’s brief to the Court of Criminal Appeals addresses the trial court’s application оf Rule 32(a)(3) and (a)(5) to his claims of juror misconduct. 2 Accordingly, there is an adverse ruling regarding Borden’s juror-misconduct claims for the Court of Criminal Appeals to review.
' Further, the Court of Criminal Appeals’ holding that appellate review of Borden’s juror-misconduct claims is barred because Borden failed to obtain a ruling from the trial court on his motion to amend his Rule 32 petition appears to conflict with this Court’s decision in
Ex parte Rhone,
This Court in Ex parte Rhone held that the Court of Criminal Appeals hаd erred in imposing upon a Rule 32 petitioner an initial burden to show that he had been diligent in filing an amendment or that the facts underlying the amendment were unknown when the original petition was filed. The defendant is entitled to amend his petition for postconviction relief to assert additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel when the amendment is necessary for a full determination on the merits and thеre would be no undue delay in the hearing because of the amendment or undue prejudice to the State by the filing of the amendment. In the present case, the Court of Criminal Appeals’ unpublished memorandum places a burden on Borden to secure a ruling on his proposed amendment to his Rule 32 petition when the amendment should be freely allowed if it is necessary for a full determination on the merits and if the аmendment does not unduly prejudice the opposing party or unduly delay the hearing.
Conclusion
We conclude that Borden did not fail to comply with
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Notes
"2 Issues I and II in Borden’s Rule 32 petition.
"3 The court erred in finding one of Borden's claims [ineffective counsel resulting from inadequate compensation] procedurally barred under Rule 32.2(a)(3) and (5), Ala. R.Crim. P. However, the court properly found that this claim also was barred under Rules 32.6(b) and 32.7(d). When the circuit court’s denial of a Rule 32 petition is correct for any reason, it will be affirmed by this court on appeal. Long v. State, 675 So.2d 532 (Ala.Crim.App.1996).”
. At leаst three members of the Court of Criminal Appeals have questioned the scope and application of
"4 Issue VII in the Rule 32 petition.
"5 Issue VIII in the Rule 32 petition.
"6 The State erroneously states in its appellate brief that 'the trial court accepted Borden’s amendments to both of the other claims he sought to amend.1 The court’s order of dismissal addresses the twо claims as they were set out in the original petition, and it does not address Borden’s requested new claim.”
. The Court of Criminal Appeals' unpublished memorandum indicates that the trial court could have dismissed Borden's Rule 32 peti- ' tion on the grounds of lack of specificity under Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R.Crim. P. However, the trial court did not dismiss Borden’s argument regarding juror misconduct for lack of specificity. Furthermore, there is a question as to whether the State adequately asserted a lack of specificity.