3 Wis. 145 | Wis. | 1854
Lead Opinion
We think that this application must he denied. The petitioner states in Ms petition for the writ, that he is imprisoned in the common jail of the county of Milwaukee; and that the cause or pretence of his commitment to the said jail, according to the best of his knowledge and belief, is a warrant from Andrew C. Miller, judge of the District Court of the United States, for the district of Wisconsin; a copy of which warrants annexed to the petition. The petitioner states further, that the indictment mentioned in the said warrant is founded upon a pretended violation of -the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which he represents as unconstitutional and void. The warrant annexed to the petition commands the marshal of the district to take the petitioner and him safely keep so that he should have his body before the District Court of the United States for the district of Wisconsin, forthwith to answer to an indictment pending in said ¡court against him, for aiding and abetting and assisting the escape of Joshua Clover from the custody of Charles 0. Cotton, a deputy marshal. The warrant is tested in the name of the judge of the District Court of the United States, for the district of Wisconsin; is sealed with the seal of that court, and signed by its clerk. In the case of Ableman vs. the State of Wisconsin, ex rel Booth, decided at the present term of the Court, we held that the issuing of a writ of Habeas Corpus by a State magistrate authorized to issue the writ, to bring before him a person who had been committed by a commissioner of the United States, for refusing to enter into a recognizance with sureties for his appearance before the District Court of the United States to answer for an alleged offence, and the discharge
We are still of this opinion, and if the present application for the writ showed that the petitioner was in confinement for refusing to recognize with sureties for his appearance before the District Court of the United States for this district, in obedience to the order of a commissioner, or other inferior magistrate, wo should not hesitate, to irsas the writ. But iho facts set forth in the petition for the wrir, show that the petitioner is in co'/JÍhiouK-nt by force of a warrant issued by the court, and that the objector the imp teomne-ut is, to compel him to answer an indictment now pending againot him therein. These facts show that the .District Court of the United States has obtained jurisdiction of the cajo, and S is apparent that the indictment ponding against the petitioner is for an of-fence of which the courts of the United States have exclusive jurisdiction. We do not'see therefore how we can, consistently with the principles of our termer decision, interfere. It is true, that we are not asked to take the ease from the District Court of the United Spates, and try the petitioner for the oífence with which he is charged, but we are asked to remove him from the custody of that court and to discharge him, if, in our opinion, hie imprisonment is illegal. In other words, we are called upon to do an act which would prevent the court of the United States from proceed
The application must be denied.
Concurrence Opinion
SmTH, Justice.
Concurring, as I do, with my brethren in the denial of the prayer of the petitioner for a writ of Habeas Corpus, upon the application now presented, it may not be improper for me to place on file my reasons for such concurrence. Although different minds may arrive at the same conclusion from
In my opinion upon the first application to me for a writ of Habeas Corpus, in reference to the award of such writ, I said :
“ There was no question pertaining to the subject matter of the application, nor connected with the parties, which approached in the slightest degree to a conflict of jurisdiction between the State and federal courts, or the judges thereof. The warrant, by virtue of which the petitioner was held, was not issued by a federal judge, or court, but by a commissioner of of the United States. No exclusive or ultimate jurisdiction can be claimed for an officer of this kind. As one of the justices of the highest judicial tribunal of this State, which tribunal represents in that behalf the sovereignty of the State, I could not deny to any citizen or person entitled to the protection of the State, the proper process by which the validity of a warrant issued by such authority, jould be examined. Nor could I admit, that a commissioner of the United States, holding his appoint* ment at the will of the court, responsible only to such court, in fact irresponsible and unimpeachable* has the right or the power, to issue any process by which a citizen of the State may be imprisoned, that may not be examined, and its validity tested by the proper judicial authority of the State.”
The distinction was here taken, at the very outset, between a warrant or process, issued by a commissioner of the United States, and process issued from a court of the United States. The judicial power of
When the prisoner was first brought up, on the writ of Habeas Corpus issued by me, he was for the first time brought within the cognizance of a judicial tribunal. Judgment was pronounced upon the hearing, and doubtless that judgment would have been enforced, had further process been found necessary. But obedience was yielded to the order of discharge, and no attempt has been made to arrest the prisoner on the original warrant, or any one similar. We declared the act of Congress of September 18, 1850, unconstitutional, and our judgment upon that process, and the subject matter then before us, has been respected and obeyed.
Put the judgment of this court upon the writ of Habeas Corpus was no bar to new and original pro
In this case when the prisoner was first brought up on the writ of Habeas Corpus, he was within the State jurisdiction exclusively. It then became our duty to decided upon the validity of the process and of the law, by virtue of which he was held. He was discharged. Thus ended our jurisdiction of the case. But our judgment in fhat case could not be pleaded in bar to a future indictment found against the prisoner for the same offence.
Subsequently, the petitioner is indicted in the District Court of the United States for an alleged violation of the fugitive act of 1850; but he presents no copy of the indictment. The proper process is issued to bring in the defendant to answer. His de» fence (among other things) is, that the law which he is alleged to have violated, is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. In the former case he was held under the process of an officer who had no
It may he said that the federal court can acquire no jurisdiction under an unconstitutional law. For the sake of argument admit the fact to be so. It only
The matter of jurisdiction is a legitimate question to be raised collaterally. But no principle of jurisprudence, no precedent can be found, by which one court is authorized to inquire preliminarily into the jurisdiction of another, or to Wrest the party or subject matter of a cause from such jurisdiction.
On the first writ, the State judge had jurisdiction, as he thought, and he could not have permitted any person to refuse obedience to his process, on the ground of his want of jurisdiction. No such course was attempted. The question of jurisdiction was raised, it is true, by the attorney for the United States, on the return of the writ, before the officer who issued it. The federal court was not applied to, for the pur
We have decided that the fugitive act of September 18th, 1850, is unconstitutional. But this decision is not binding upon the courts of another sovereignty over which we have no control. Whenever that act is brought in question in a proceeding in this court, or in the judicial tribunals of this State, that judgment will be the rule of decision, until it is reversed. Believing such to be the law, it would be both illegal and unwise to entertain a suspicion that other courts independent of this, would be less mindful of the great constitutional guaranties of personal liberty, than we ourselves have been.
For these reasons, as well as those urged by the Chief Justice, I concur in the judgment of the court denying this application.
These are general principles applicable to all courts
Perhaps it ought to be mentioned here, that there is a very great distinction between commissioners of the Uuited States, and commissioners of our own State. Our Constitution expressly provides for such qfficers, and authorizes the conferring upon them judicial power, which the Constitution of the United States does not do. Whatever may be the ultimate rights of the citizen, it is apparent that this application is premature, and that well established rules of law, as well as the positive provisions of our own statute, preclude our interference