Ex Parte Blankenship
The complaint in this action was filed on October 17, 2003. It averred, in pertinent part:
“3. Defendant, Jason Lowell Blankenship, is over the age of nineteen years and is a resident of Talladega, Alabama, and is a Deputy Sheriff with the Talladega County Sheriff‘s Department.”
“. . . .
“6. Plaintiffs aver that on or about October 17, 2002, Plaintiff, Charles E. Higginbotham, was driving his vehicle on U.S. Highway 280, in Sylacauga, Alabama, near the intersection of James B. Payton Boulevard. “7. That at said time and place, Defendant Jason Lowell Blankenship, was performing his duties as a Deputy Sheriff for the Talladega County Commission and/or Talladega County.
“8. That at said time and place, the vehicle driven by Defendant Jason Lowell Blankenship, negligently and/or wantonly, was allowed to crash into, upon, and against the vehicle operated by Charles E. Higginbotham.
“9. The Plaintiff, Lavone P. Higginbotham was a passenger in the vehicle operated by Charles E. Higginbotham.”
(Emphasis added.)
Deputy Blankenship and the County filed a joint motion to dismiss on the ground, among others, that they were “entitled to absolute immunity.” The trial court denied the motion. Deputy Blankenship and the County then jointly answered the complaint, admitting the allegations of paragraphs three and seven. Subsequently, they filed this petition, “request[ing] that [this] Court enter an order granting their petition and directing the circuit court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss and to enter an order granting their motion to dismiss . . . this action.” Higginbotham concedes that the claims against the County are due to be dismissed. Thus, we address only the arguments regarding the viability of the claims against Deputy Blankenship.
Deputy Blankenship argues that he “has absolute immunity under Article
It is well established that mandamus will lie to compel the dismissal of a claim that is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Ex parte McWhorter, 880 So. 2d 1116, 1117 (Ala. 2003); Ex parte Alabama Dep‘t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 837 So. 2d 808, 810 (Ala. 2002); Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 176 (Ala. 2000); see also Ex parte Haralson, 871 So. 2d 802, 804 (Ala. 2003). Where it is undisputed that a deputy sheriff is “acting within the line and scope of his employment . . . at the time [he is involved in an automobile] accident” with the plaintiff,
Here, it is alleged in the complaint and admitted in the answer that Deputy Blankenship was acting in the line and scope of his duties at the time of the accident. Of course, in reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court “‘must accept the allegations of the complaint as true.‘” Ex parte Alabama Dep‘t of Youth Servs., 880 So. 2d 393, 397 (Ala. 2003) (emphasis added) (quoting Creola Land Dev., Inc. v. Bentbrooke Housing, L.L.C., 828 So. 2d 285, 288 (Ala. 2002)). Thus, an action against Deputy Blankenship based on this complaint is barred by
Although she has found no Alabama authority for her argument, Higginbotham cites a number of federal cases. Those cases, however, stand only for the general proposition that courts are not “required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). None of the authority on which Higginbotham relies stands for the proposition that a court, in considering a motion to dismiss, may simply disregard factual allegations in a complaint in order to eliminate an impediment to a claim, so that the case may go forward.
On the contrary, “[i]t is a ‘well-settled rule that a party is bound by what it states in its pleadings.‘” Help At Home, Inc. v. Medical Capital, L.L.C., 260 F.3d 748, 753 (7th Cir. 2001); Lucas v. Burnley, 879 F.2d 1240, 1242 (4th Cir. 1989); Best Canvas Prods. & Supplies, Inc. v. Ploof Truck Lines, Inc., 713 F.2d 618, 621 (11th Cir. 1983). Thus, “a plaintiff can . . . plead himself out of a claim by including unnecessary details contrary to his claims.” Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988 (emphasis added) (citing Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293 (9th Cir. 1998)). See also Soo Line R.R. v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 125 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1997) (“A plaintiff can ‘plead himself out of court by alleging facts which show that he has no claim, even though he was not required to allege those facts.‘“); Fraternal Order of Police, Strawberry Lodge No. 40 v. Entrekin, 294 Ala. 201, 212, 314 So. 2d 663, 673 (1975) (“‘The pleader must be careful not to allege facts that constitute a defense to his claim for relief, or, for that matter, a defense to his defense.‘“) (quoting 2A Moore‘s Federal Practice ¶ 8.02).
In effect, Higginbotham urges this Court to amend her complaint by striking paragraph seven, in order to eliminate the jurisdictional impediment that paragraph presents to her claim. We decline to do so. In order to state a cause of action for damages arising out of an automobile accident, she need not have pleaded that Jason Blankenship was a deputy sheriff acting within the line and scope of his duties at the time of the accident. Having done so, however, she cannot avoid the legal consequences of those factual allegations.1
Higginbotham next argues that if a writ of mandamus issues, it should direct the trial court to allow her to amend her complaint to omit the allegations in paragraph seven. We may not do so. Because the complaint purported to effect an action against the State in violation of
In summary, the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss filed by Deputy Blankenship and the County. Consequently, we grant the petition for a writ of mandamus and direct the Talladega Circuit Court to vacate its order denying the motion to dismiss and to enter an order dismissing the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, HARWOOD, and STUART, JJ., concur.