101 So. 179 | Ala. | 1924
A motion to require an election under chancery rule 112 can only prevail after the bill of complaint has been fully answered. Roman v. Dimmick,
"It is a general rule that where a plaintiff is prosecuting an action at law and a suit in equity against a defendant at the same time for the same cause he may be compelled by the court, on application by the defendant, to elect whether he will proceed with the one or the other; but to come within this principle it is required that the two suits must have substantially the same aim and scope, and the relief sought must be in each case substantially the same. In other words, the plaintiff should not be compelled to elect unless the remedy in the suit at law is equally complete and adequate with the remedy in equity." 9 R. C. L. p. 964, § 11.
See, also, note and cases cited Ann. Cas. 1914B, p. 1218.
"To come within the principle of election, the two suits must have substantially the same aim and scope, and the relief sought in each case must be substantially the same." Ex parte Ala. Gold Life Ins. Co.,
While the ultimate purpose of the two suits is the collection of the plaintiff's demand against the Barclay Planing Mill Company, the parties are not the same, as there are several respondents to the equity suit who are not parties to the action at law. Nor is the remedy in the action at law equally complete and adequate with the remedy in equity. One simply seeks a judgment at law against one of the respondents to the equity suit, while the suit in equity seeks the enforcement of a lien on certain property and the annulment of certain sales or transactions as fraudulent. Moreover, should the complainant fail to establish the equity of its bill, it could not get a judgment or decree for its demand, which he could do in his action at law, regardless of the equity of the bill in chancery. We therefore hold that the record does not justify the requirement of an election either under chancery rule 112 or section 2451 of the Code of 1907.
As disclosed by the opinion in Dunlap's Case,
The case of Jones v. Jefferson County,
It is suggested by counsel for appellees that this court should not award the writ of mandamus directing the trial judge to vacate the order requiring an election, because the petitioner had not first applied to the trial judge to vacate the same, and reliance is placed upon the case of Ex parte Edwards,
The writ is awarded, with directions to the trial court to vacate and set aside the order requiring the petitioner to elect between the two suits.
Writ awarded.
SOMERVILLE, THOMAS, and BOULDIN, JJ., concur.