R. Lora EWERS, trustee for the Heirs of Patrick Keith Ewers, Respondent, v. THUNDERBIRD AVIATION, INC., et al., Appellants. Stan DAVIES, Trustee, et al., Respondents, v. Brandt L. DAHLBERG, et al., Appellants.
Nos. 49615, 49642 and 49812.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Sept. 7, 1979.
ROGOSHESKE, Justice (concurring specially).
I join in the concurring opinion of Justice Wahl.
SHERAN, C. J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Doherty, Rumble & Butler, Boyd H. Ratchye and Stephen I. Halper, St. Paul, for Dahlberg, et al.; Conklin, Leahy & Eisenberg, Chicago, Ill., of counsel.
Fred Allen and Bradley J. Behr, Minneapolis, for Ewers.
Hvass, Weisman & King and Charles T. Hvass, Minneapolis, for Davies, et al.
SCOTT, Justice.
These cases involve the issue of whether Minnesota law imposes vicarious liability on an owner of a Minnesota-based airplane for the negligence of a renter-pilot, when the negligent acts and impact of the airplane occurred in another state. The appeals are taken from the orders of two Hennepin County District Court judges which denied defendants’ motions for summary judgment. Certain questions presented by the motions were certified by the respective trial judges as important and doubtful and thus those issues are properly before this court. See,
Ewers v. Thunderbird Aviation, John Hendrickson, Sr., and Albert Grazzini
On October 18, 1974, defendant John R. Hendrickson, Sr., purchased an aircraft from defendant Thunderbird Aviation, Inc. (Thunderbird). On that same day, Hendrickson leased the airplane to Thunderbird. This sale and lease-back arrangement was originally suggested by defendant Albert J. Grazzini, president and sole stockholder of
On April 30, 1977, Thunderbird leased the aircraft to Fred Graf. On that same day the plane, with Graf piloting and Keith Ewers, plaintiff‘s husband, as passenger, departed Eden Prairie for Denver, Colorado. Upon approach to the airport in Denver, the aircraft crashed, killing both Graf and plaintiff‘s husband. Both Graf and passenger Ewers were Minnesota residents.
Thereafter, plaintiff, acting as trustee for the heirs of Patrick Ewers, commenced this action against defendants Thunderbird, Hendrickson, and Grazzini. Defendants moved for dismissal or summary judgment in their favor on various grounds, including that the terms of
Davies and Jordan v. Dahlberg and Mayer Aviation, Inc.
For purposes of defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the pertinent facts have been stipulated to by the parties. The airplane accident in question occurred on April 10, 1977. At that time defendant Brandt Dahlberg was the owner of the aircraft, and had leased the plane to defendant Mayer Aviation, Inc. (Mayer). The lease agreement authorized Mayer, in turn, to lease the aircraft to others. The airplane was maintained and hangared at Lake Elmo Airport in Lake Elmo, Minnesota.
On the date of the accident Mayer leased the aircraft to Glenn G. Bauer, a Minnesota resident. At about 4:15 p. m. that day, Bauer, as pilot, accompanied by Patrick Jordan and Julie Koponen, both Minnesota residents, departed Lake Elmo in the aircraft on a pleasure flight to Durand, Wisconsin, and return. At approximately 4:40 p. m. the plane crashed and burned in a stubble field approximately 6 miles south of Hudson, Wisconsin. The pilot and the two passengers were killed in the accident.
Prior to the crash, witnesses observed the aircraft executing a series of nose-high attitudes, accompanied by a corresponding reduction in power, followed by a pitchover to a nose-low attitude with application of power. These maneuvers, the alleged negligent acts, occurred entirely within the physical boundaries of the state of Wisconsin.
The trustees for the heirs of the passengers brought this wrongful death action against Dahlberg and Mayer. The defendants subsequently moved for summary judgment in their favor, claiming that under Minnesota law neither could be held vicariously liable for the negligence of the pilot. On January 8, 1979, the district court denied the motion, but certified the question presented as important and doubtful.
These cases present the following issues:
(1) Does
(2) Are lessees/sublessors, such as defendants Thunderbird and Mayer, “owners” within the meaning of
1. In Haskin v. Northeast Airways, Inc., 266 Minn. 210, 123 N.W.2d 81 (1963), this court declared that, absent legislation providing otherwise, the owner of an airplane cannot be held vicariously liable for the injuries of a passenger caused by the negligence of a pilot unless an agency-in-fact relationship is established.1 At the time of
“360.0216. OPERATOR OF AIRCRAFT DEEMED AGENT OF OWNER. When an aircraft is operated within the airspace above this state or upon the ground surface or waters of this state by a person other than the owner, with the consent of the owner, expressed or implied, the operator shall in case of accident be deemed the agent of the owner of the aircraft in its operation.” (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiffs claim that the above statute creates an agency relationship between the negligent pilots and defendants,2 thus authorizing the imposition of vicarious liability. Defendants counter by arguing that
In resolving this issue,3 the threshold inquiry is whether the legislation is ambiguous, thus allowing statutory construction. E. g.,
When construing a statute, our task is to search for, and give effect to, the legislative intent. E. g.,
It is consistent with the policy manifested by
The fact that the negligent act and impact occurred outside this state does not render this statutory purpose inapplicable. Rather, it is most reasonable to construe
Furthermore, if the legislature actually intended to limit an owner‘s liability to accidents occurring within the physical boundaries of Minnesota it could have clearly done so as it did in
“The owner of every aircraft which is operated over the lands or waters of this state is absolutely liable for injury or damage to persons or property on the land or water beneath, caused by the ascent, descent, or flight of the aircraft, or the dropping or falling of any object therefrom * * * .” (Emphasis added.)
We are unpersuaded by defendants’ contention that the decision in Darian v. McGrath, 215 Minn. 389, 10 N.W.2d 403 (1943), dictates a different conclusion than that reached by the trial courts. Defendants argue that the Darian case construed the Minnesota motor vehicle vicarious liability statute,
Based on the foregoing, we hold that an aircraft is “operated within * * * this state” within the meaning of
2. Defendant Thunderbird claims that even if
We also believe that reference to
“360.511 DEFINITIONS. Subdivision 1. For the purposes of
sections 360.54 to360.67 [provisions relating to aircraft registration and taxation] the following words, terms, and phrases shall have the meanings herein given, unless otherwise specifically defined, or unless another intention clearly appears or the context otherwise requires:* * * * * *
“Subd. 7. ‘Owner’ means any person owning or renting an aircraft, or having the exclusive use thereof, under a lease or otherwise, for a period greater than 30 days.” (Emphasis added.)
This statutory definition of “owner” includes a lessee/sublessor because he is renting an aircraft (assuming, of course, the rental period exceeds 30 days, as is the case here). Section 360.59, subd. 1, requires such an owner to apply for the registration of the aircraft within a certain time after he
In summary, consistent with well-established principles of statutory construction such as the requirement that
Affirmed and remanded for trial.
OTIS, Justice (dissenting).
The single issue for determination in these two cases is whether or not
The statute to be construed could not, in my opinion, be more unambiguous and straightforward in its language and purpose.
“When an aircraft is operated within the airspace above this state or upon the ground surface or waters of this state by a person other than the owner, with the consent of the owner, expressed or implied, the operator shall in case of accident be deemed the agent of the owner of the aircraft in its operation.”
In essence the statute provides very simply that when an aircraft is operated over the State of Minnesota, the pilot, in case of accident, is deemed to be the agent of the owner. The word “when” quite obviously defines the circumstances under which the statute is operative. The ordinary and obvious purpose of the word “when” in the context of this statute means “if at the time” an aircraft is operated within the airspace above this state there is an accident, the operator shall be deemed the agent of the owner.
The majority takes a position that leads to a totally absurd result. For example, as construed by the majority, the statute would impose vicarious liability on an owner if an aircraft owned, licensed, and hangared in the State of Washington passed over a corner of Minnesota for as briefly as 60 seconds and proceeded to crash land in New York.
Section 360.0216 was adopted following our decisions in Darian v. McGrath, 215 Minn. 389, 10 N.W.2d 403 (1943) and Haskin v. Northeast Airways, Inc., 266 Minn. 210, 123 N.W.2d 81 (1963). In the Darian case we were construing
“When any motor vehicle shall be operated upon any public street or highway of this state by any person other than the owner with the consent of the owner, express or implied, the operator thereof shall, in case of accident, be deemed the agent of the owner of such motor vehicle in the operation thereof.”
We held in Darian that our Financial Responsibility Act did not apply with respect to an accident which occurred in Wisconsin and said:
“As this cause of action arose in Wisconsin, it is conceded that we are governed by the law of that state. Wisconsin has no owner‘s responsibility statute, and our statute does not apply to Minnesota cars while operated in Wisconsin.” 215 Minn. at 391, 10 N.W.2d at 405.
Significantly the language used in
In 1963 we decided Haskin v. Northeast Airways, Inc., 266 Minn. 210, 123 N.W.2d 81 (1963) and held that airplane owners are not vicariously liable for the negligence of their operators. We said:
“The strong considerations of public policy which would justify a change in the law in this regard are for the legislature and not this court to evaluate.” Id. at 216, 123 N.W.2d at 86.
The legislature has now spoken in derogation of what we stated the common law to be. Quite obviously they had in mind the Haskin case in adopting
In my opinion, it is of considerable significance that the Haskin case denying vicarious liability dealt only with an intrastate flight beginning in Eveleth, Minnesota, and ending near Hibbing, Minnesota. If, as seems likely, the legislature was addressing our decision in Haskin, it was not called upon to deal with any airplane accidents except those which occurred within the boundaries of the state. In any event, the rules with respect to construing statutes in derogation of the common law have been stated by this court on numerous occasions. In Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 44, 70 N.W.2d 886, 897 (1955):
“* * * This court has also said that, when legislation, even though in derogation of the common law, is remedial in character, a liberal construction should be adopted; but it has likewise recognized that the remedial nature of such legislation does not, however, justify a construction which gives to the statutory language an application and a meaning not intended by the legislature.”
In Car Lease Incorporated v. Kitzer, 276 Minn. 289, 291, 149 N.W.2d 673, 675 (1967), we cited with approval the rule:
“’ * * * A statute in derogation of a well-established principle of common law will not be extended by construction beyond its most obvious import.‘”
Again in In re Involuntary Dissolution of Lakeland Develop. Corp., 277 Minn. 432, 442, 152 N.W.2d 758, 765 (1967) we approved the rule in the following language:
“’ * * * A statute is not to be construed in derogation of well-established principles of common law, * * * unless so required by express words or by necessary implication and then only to the extent clearly indicated.‘”
If the legislature had not acted, and Minnesota had jurisdiction as the forum state, we would be at liberty to apply whatever we deemed to be the better rule of law in extra-territorial matters. Where, however, the legislature has explicitly defined the rights and obligations of the parties, they have exercised a prerogative exclusively theirs, and we have no authority to modify, amend, or expand their determination of policy. All of the reasons cited by the majority opinion for extending the statute to cover accidents beyond the borders of the state are valid arguments for urging the legislature to amend the statute but are not reasons for our taking on that responsibility, out of hand, to include what is not covered by the unambiguous language of the statute.
I would reverse.
SHERAN, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I concur in the views of Mr. Justice OTIS.
I join in the dissent of Mr. Justice OTIS.
PETERSON, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Mr. Justice OTIS.