26 Haw. 299 | Haw. | 1922
OPINION OF THE COURT BY
These two causes are here on original submissions containing agreed statements of fact—a proceeding authorized by section 2381 R. L. 1915 as amended by Act 82 S. L. 1921. The questions involved in both cases are in all material respects parallel and will therefore be consolidated and discussed in a single opinion but a separate judgment will be entered in each proceeding con-formably to the decision. The two plaintiffs above named, to wit, Ewa Plantation Company and Hawaiian Sugar Company, are domestic corporations and the defendant Charles T. Wilder is the tax assessor for the first taxation division of the Territory of Hawaii. The controversy is in respect to the amount of income taxes due from the two plaintiff corporations to the Territory of Hawaii in the year 1921 from income received in 1920.
The agreed statements of fact are entirely too voluminous to be recited here but the questions at issue may be summarized as follows: (1) Whether the amount received by Ewa Plantation Company from the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association in 1920 by way of compensation for losses incurred by reason of the laborers’ strike
As thus categorically classified the several subjects will be taken up and disposed of except that the questions set forth in paragraphs 3 and 4 being closely allied and so nearly analogous will be considered and determined together.
STRIKE RECEIPTS.
The first question concerns solely the Ewa Plantation Company and grows out of a laborers’ strike begun in the early part of 1920 and which ended in July of the same year, conducted by the Filipino and Japanese laborers employed on the sugar plantations on the Island of Oahu, the Ewa Plantation being among those affected. It appears that the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, which is composed of practically all of the sugar produc
It is agreed that should the contention of the assessor be sustained on this point the amount of income taxes payable by said company should be increased by the sum of $18,607 over the amount shown by the company’s said return. The statutory provisions bearing upon the questions at issue are to be found in section 1305 R. L. 1915 which provides that the taxation period shall be the year immediately preceding the first day of January of each year in which the tax is payable. Section 1306 R. L. 1915 provides that there shall be levied and collected a tax of two per cent, on the net profit or income above actual operating and business expenses derived during the taxation period from all property owned and every business, trade, employment or vocation carried on in the Territory of Hawaii, and section 1307 provides that “in estimating the gains, profits and income of any ⅝ * * corporation, there shall be included all income derived from interest upon notes,” etc., “and all other gains, profits and income derived from any source whatsoever during said taxation period.” Section 1307 also provides that “in estimating the gains, profits and income of any person or corporation, there shall be included * ⅞ * the amount of sales of movable property, less the amount expended in the purchase or production of the same.”
The company contends that under the paragraph last above quoted the several sums received from the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association should not be taken into account for taxation purposes until and as each crop shall have been sold and the net result ascertained. The company relies upon the decisions rendered in Tax Assessor v. Laupahoehoe Sugar Company, 18 Haw. 206, and in the Income Tax Appeal Cases, 18 Haw. 596, 599. In each of these cases it was held that moneys expended prior to the
INTEREST ON MAINLAND SECURITIES AND BANK DEPOSITS.
It is set forth in the submissions that ever since the
The Ewa Plantation Company and Hawaiian Sugar Company, respectively, deducted the interest arising from these investments as income for the year 1920 in its territorial income tax return, the amount deducted by the Ewa Plantation Company being $52,442.23, and the amount deducted by the Hawaiian Sugar Company being $32,659.66. Upon these facts it is the contention of said companies that the interest accruing from said bonds, notes and bank deposits was not taxable as income derived from property owned in the Territory of Hawaii or otherwise under the laws of said Territory. On the other hand it is claimed by the assessor that said interest upon said bonds, notes and bank deposits was and is taxable income of said companies under the laws of Hawaii. It
In the case of the latter company there is an attempt to draw a distinction between interest on mainland and foreign investments and municipal bonds of mainland cities. We think these investments are all on the same plane so far as the principles involved áre concerned and will be dealt with in this opinion accordingly.
It is regrettable that while the submissions contain statements to the effect that the proceeds of the sales of sugar by the mainland agencies of the taxpayers were placed to the general credit of the local companies to be drawn against from time to time as funds were required by them for the payment of their operating expenses, etc., the submissions are silent respecting the disposition and use of the income derived from the mainland investments now in question. In the absence of a showing to the contrary we are led to assume that the income received from these mainland securities and bank deposits was dealt with in the same manner as the proceeds from the sales of sugar.
The statute by virtue of which the assessor claims the income from these investments is properly taxable as income is section 1306 R. L. 1915. This statute reads as follows: “On corporation income. There shall be levied, assessed, collected and paid annually, except as hereinafter provided, a tax of two per cent, on the net profit or income above actual operating and business expenses derived during each taxation period, from all property owned, and every business, trade, employment or vocation,
If it be conceded that the statute refers to the income from property situated in Hawaii the position of the assessor can only be sustained by invoking the doctrine of the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam, that is to say, that movables follow the person of the owner. Counsel for the taxpayers urge that the maxim has been repudiated in this jurisdiction by the supreme court in Hackfeld v. Minister of Finance, 3 Haw. 292; Hackfeld v. Luce, 4 Haw. 172, and Estate of Hall, 19 Haw. 531. It is further contended that if the maxim is an enforceable rule in this jurisdiction yet under the circumstances here divulged the bonds, notes, etc., have become localized and thus have acquired a business situs in San Francisco. Counsel for the taxpayers cite many authorities bearing upon the question, the leading ones being State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300; New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309; Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S. 133; Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194; Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 221 U. S. 346; DeGanay v. Lederer, 250 U. S. 376. The general trend of these authorities is that tangible personal property permanently located in a State other than the domicile of the owner acquires a situs and is subject to be there taxed irrespective of the domicile of the owner and any attempt on the part of the State in which the owner is domiciled to tax such property is unlawful; that the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam is a legal fiction to be resorted to only when convenience and justice require. It is further held that bonds and other
It is worthy of note that in the DeGanay case the court emphasized the fact that the stocks, bonds and mortgages were held in Pennsylvania under a power of attorney which gave authority to the agent to sell, assign and-transfer any of them and to invest and reinvest the proceeds of sale as it might deem best in the management of the business and affairs of the principal. No such situation exists in the cases at bar. The mainland agents of-the taxpayers were apparently clothed only with authority to purchase and hold the securities and as the income thereon Avas received to place the same to the credit of
And finally the principle involved was again passed upon in the late case of Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U. S. 12. This is not only a most recent case but is we think the controlling authority. The question in that case was whether the income received by the beneficiai*y from a trust estate consisting of bonds and equipment certificates held and administered by the trustee in another State is taxable by the State of the beneficiary’s domicile. The question was answered in the affirmative. It appears that the beneficiary resided in the State of Massachusetts and was taxed upon income from a trust created by the will of one Matilda P. McArthur, formerly of Philadelphia. The securities consisting of bonds of other corporations and certain certificates of the Southern Railway Equipment Company were held in the possession of the trustee in Philadelphia and the trust was administered under the laws of the State of Pennsylvania. The tax commissioner of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts attempted to levy a tax upon the revenues derived by the beneficiary from said securities under the income tax statute of that State. In its opinion the court says: “It is true that in some instances we have held that bonds and bills and notes although evidences of debt have come to be regarded as property which may acquire a taxable situs at the place where they are kept, Avhich may be elsewhere than at the domicile of the owner. These cases rest upon the principle that such instruments are more than mere evidences
This case is important for here in the last word upon the subject the Supreme Court of the United States has not only adopted and applied the maxim mobilia sequun-iur personam but has directly reaffirmed the decision in Kirtland v. Hotchkiss. In Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra, the court points out that stocks, bonds, notes and dioses in action are classified as intangible property and a clear distinction is drawn between that kind of property and tangible personal property such as railway cars having a situs of their own and taxable only in the territorial limits of that situs. But with intangible personal property such as stocks,- bonds and bank credits the rule ordinarily is different. This class of property takes the situs of the domicile of its owner by virtue of the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam, except under unusual circumstances which do not exist in the cases at bar.
The further point is made by counsel for .the taxpayers that the local supreme court in the three Hawaiian cases supra has repudiated entirely the maxim mobilia sequim-tur personam but with this ive cannot agree. Some of the expressions made use of would perhaps lead to that inference but after a careful review of those opinions, taken in the light of the law and facts involved, we conclude that the most that ought to be said of them is that the court merely intended to hold, as the Supreme Court
And finally it is urged that “at no time heretofore has said assessor or his predecessors in office considered income derived from such investments as taxable or included the same in assessing the incomes of corporations or individuals under the laws of the Territory” and that the rule of contemporaneous construction should he given great weight by this court. The rule is that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by those charged with its execution, especially when it has long prevailed, is to .be regarded as a ligitimate aid to statutory construction and is entitled to most réspectfnl consideration and should not be disregarded or overturned except for cogent reasons. See United States v. Moore, 95 U. S. 760, also United States v. Johnston, 124 U. S. 236, at 253, and authorities there cited. But the rule which gives determining weight to contemporaneous, construction put upon a statute by those charged with its execution applies only in cases of doubt and ambiguity. Courts will ordinarily make use of the contemporaneous construction of a statute by executive and administrative officials as an aid to interpretation but an erroneous construction can never be binding upon the judiciary.
We conclude that the income in question was and is taxable as now claimed by the assessor.
LOSS ON SUGAR FACTORS STOCK AND MAINLAND BONDS.
The material facts are that during the years 1904-1917 the Ewa Plantation Company purchased 4828 shares of the stock of the Sugar Factors Company paying therefor the par value of $100 per share. The stock thereafter declined in value and finally in the year 1920 the plantation company sold its entire holdings in said stock at $40
Counsel for the Territory concede that the transactions consisting of the purchase and sale of this stock resulted in losses in the above amounts to the two companies and they further concede that these losses have been actually sustained or actually incurred by the two companies as distinguished from losses which are merely conjectural or estimated; but they make the point, which they rely upon exclusively, that the losses were not sustained within.the taxation period now in question, which was the calendar year 1920. They point out that the statute expressly provides that all losses actually sustained must be sustained during the taxation period preceding January 1 of the year in which the tax is imposed. They assert that the stock fluctuated in value from time to time between the date of the purchase and the date of sale and that the losses which the sales demonstrated and fixed in amount were the result of the entire transaction covering the whole period of years in which they
The three leading cases relied upon by counsel for the Territory are In re Taxes Pacific Guano & Fertilizer Co., 16 Haw. 552; Appeal of J. B. Castle, 18 Haw. 129, and Gray v. Darlington, 15 Wall. 63. In the Pacific Guano case the taxpayer in 1894 paid |85,000 for all of the Laysan Island guano rights in the belief and upon the advice of experts that there were about 85,000 tons of guano on the island. In 1903 the company discovered that there was only about half of the anticipated amount of guano on the island and during that taxation period the company wrote off $50,000 to account of profit and loss and claimed that amount to be a loss deductible from its income for that year. It was held by this court that “the loss which was finally ascertained upon the termination of that business did not occur at the time when it was learned that the guano supply had failed, but it occurred when the purchase money was paid,” and the court proceeded to say: “In one sense a loss is made at the time when one learns that he has not got what he thought he had. In another sense, and as we think in the meaning of the statute, there is in such case no actual loss other than results from an unfortunate investment at the outset.” With that opinion we are in entire accord. But in the present case we are dealing Avith corporation stock which for a series of years following its purchase had fluctuated. It was held during the entire time by the purchaser and finally sold at the then prevailing market price. The losses it seems to ns were sustained or incurred at the time of the sale. If that were not true the loss incurred by the purchaser of this class'
The decision of this court In re Appeal of J. B. Castle, supra, asserts a mere conclusion, entirely devoid of any reasons therefor except that it is based upon the decision in Gray v. Darlington, supra, a case involving the construction, of the Revenue Act of 1867 (14 Stat. 477, c. 169).
The United States Supreme Court in a recent decision (Hays, Collector, v. Gauley Mountain Coal Co., 247 U. S. 189) distinguished the corporation excise tax act of August 5, 1909, from the act of March 2, 1867, under which Gray v. Darlington was decided, and held that where property is sold by a corporation at an advance over the original purchase price the amount of the advance must be deemed to be a gain or profit for the purpose of computing income for taxation under the federal statute. See also Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, decided by the federal Supreme Court March 28, 1921, and Holmes, Fed. Taxes, p. 632.
In October, 1913, Congress enacted an Income Tax
There are several subsequent treasury department regulations to the same effect, the latest one called to our attention being article 44, Regulations 451, April 7, 1919, which reads: “Shrinkage in securities and stocks. A person possessing securities such as stocks and bonds cannot deduct from gross income any amount claimed as a loss on account of the shrinkage in value of such securities through fluctuations in the market or otherwise. The loss allowable in such cases is that actually suffered when the securities mature or are disposed of.” The decisions and rulings promulgated by the treasury department are of course not binding upon the court but as indicated supra they are entitled to consideration. These rulings are significant when considered in light of the fact that the language of the federal statute is no broader or more comprehensive than the territorial statute now under consideration.
All that has been said respecting the losses suffered by the taxpayers on the Sugar Factors Company stock applies with equal force to their losses in respect to the various railroad, industrial, municipal and United States bonds, and sold as aforesaid in 1920.
We therefore hold that the losses sustained by the taxpayers through the sales of stocks and bonds referred to in the third and fourth paragraphs above, realized upon during' the year 1920, amounting in the case of the Ewa Plantation Company to $487,432.11, and in the case of the Hawaiian Sugar Company to $268,431.78, are deductible as losses in computing the income taxes of said respective companies for the year 1920 under the facts set forth in the submissions herein.
DEPRECIATION OF LEASEHOLD
This controversy affects only the Hawaiian Sugar Company. It appears in the submission that the company’s plantation is situated entirely upon leasehold lands
The deduction clause of the foregoing local statute is copied from the federal Income Tax Act of 1916. The
It is urged by counsel for the Territory that there can be no such thing as either exhaustion, wear or tear of intangible property; that these terms refer solely to physical property and can in no case be held to apply to leasehold interests. We agree with counsel that, taken in their usual and ordinary sense, the words “wear and tear” could not be applied to a leasehold, but we are not ready to agree that there cannot he an exhaustion of a leasehold. It seems to us that a leasehold for a term of years is gradually being exhausted as the term or life thereof is shortened by the efflux of time.
It is further urged by counsel for the Territory that even if a leasehold may be exhausted the exhaustion under the statute must arise out of the use or employment of the property in the business or trade; that the passing away of the lease by the efflux of time did not arise out of its use or employment in the plantation business of the company and was not caused by any such use or employment; that by the very nature of things the exhaustion of the lease was bound to occur irrespective of whether or not the lands covered by the demise or the lease itself were used or employed in the business; that the lands might lie idle during the whole tenure of the lease yet the passing of the term would be going on in spite of the nonusage. It must be conceded that this is an argument of much plausibility and in the interpretation of the statute in this respect a question of- much difficulty is encountered. If we were to indulge in the refinements of the lexicographer or of the strict gram
Having determined that the loss sustained by reason of the exhaustion by efflux of time of the lease in question is under the facts and circumstances of the case at bar properly deductible from gross income the method to be employed in ascertaining the amount of such deduction will next be inquired into. Counsel for the taxpayer take the position that because in the year 1919 the com.pany appraised the leasehold as of March 1, 1913, at a valuation of $2,069,134.58 and because it is stipulated in the submission that the value of the leasehold was as great on January 1, 1917, as on March 1, 1913, the valuation thus fixed should control and be taken as the proper valuation thereof throughout the life of the lease. It does not follow at all that because the company appraised the leasehold at the value above stated as of March 1, 1913, the true value thereof at that or any subsequent time was ascertained nor could any such appraisement
The proper course would have been for the parties, following the-31st day of December, 1917, to reappraise the leasehold at its then true value and based thereon to fix a proper amount to be allowed for the exhaustion of the leasehold occurring between the effective date of the act and the end of the taxation period, to wit, April 27, 1917, to Decembér 31, 1917, this course to be repeated thereafter at the end of each succeeding taxation period until the termination of the lease, for a lessee should be al
We are only concerned with the value of tbe leasehold and tbe amount of depreciation for tbe year 1920 but we have nothing in tbe record before us from wMcb that value or tbe amount to be allowed for exhaustion covering that year can be determined. Each taxation period should be dealt with separately and independently from every other taxation period. Tbe value of property and the amount of income for each period should be determined annually. To say that tbe value of taxable assets either for property tax or income tax purposes should for all time remain the same as that value happened to be at tbe date tbe statute levying tbe tax became effective is to assert .a proposition palpably unsound, untenable and grossly unfair to both tbe taxpayer and to tbe government. Property values shift from year to year and these changes should be taken into account in determining tbe amount of taxes to be required of each taxpayer annually. Tbe value of tbe leasehold in question as one of tbe capital assets of tbe Hawaiian Sugar Company has varied in tbe past and will vary in tbe future as tbe price of sugar advances, at least so long as tbe leasehold interests, are devoted to tbe production of sugar.
Tbe mere stating of this well-knoAvn economic fact sets
We therefore hold that the actual amount of depreciation in value of the leasehold should be allowed as a deduction in computing the income tax of the Hawaiian Sugar Company for the year 1920 under the laws of the Territory of Hawaii, but because the value of the leasehold at the end of the year 1920 has not been properly ascertained and is unascertainable from the record before us we are not able to fix the amount.
A separate judgment will be entered in each of the proceedings conformably to the views expressed in this opinion.