Case Information
*1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE
SCOTT EVERS and SHARON EVERS, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
) v. ) No. 3:25-CV-199-CEA-DCP
)
TENNESEE DEPARTMENT OF )
CHILDREN’S SERVICES, et al. , )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This case is before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and the Rules of this Court on Plaintiff’s Applications to Proceed in Forma Pauperis with Supporting Documentation (“Application”) [Docs. 1 & 2], their Complaint [Doc. 3], and the exhibits thereto [Doc. 4 & Docs. 4-1 to 4-7].
For the reasons more fully stated below, the Court GRANTS the Applications [ Docs. 1 & 2 ] and will therefore allow Plaintiffs to file their Complaint without the payment of costs. The undersigned, however, RECOMMENDS that the District Judge DISMISS the Complaint [Doc. 3].
I. DETERMINATION ABOUT THE FILING FEE
Plaintiffs have filed Applications [Docs. 1 & 2] with the required detailing of their financial
condition. Section 1915 allows a litigant to commence a civil or criminal action in federal court
without paying the administrative costs of the lawsuit.
Denton v. Hernandez
,
The Court finds the Applications are sufficient to demonstrate that Plaintiffs have little income and that their expenses exceed their assets. Considering Plaintiffs’ Applications, it appears to the Court that their economic status is such that they cannot afford to pay for the costs of litigation and still pay for the necessities of life. The Court will allow Plaintiffs to proceed in the manner of a pauper. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to file the Complaint in this case without payment of costs or fees. The Clerk SHALL NOT , however, issue process at this time. II. RECOMMENDATION AFTER SCREENING THE COMPLAINT
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), the Court is required to screen complaints. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. To accomplish this end, the Court must evaluate the litigant’s indigence, but notwithstanding indigence, a court must dismiss a matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) if [it] determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who *3 is immune from such relief.” To survive an initial review, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v Twombly , 550 U.S.544, 570 (2007)).
Specifically, under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must provide:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction . . . ;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)–(3). Otherwise, the complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)
for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Courts
liberally construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases and hold them to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.
Haines v. Kerner
,
A. Summary of the Complaint
Plaintiffs Scott and Sharon Evers filed a pro se Complaint, naming as Defendants: (1) Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”); (2) Jeremy Crenshaw (“Defendant Crenshaw”), the DCS caseworker, in his individual and official capacities; (3) New Hope Children’s Advocacy Center (“CAC”); (4) Magistrate Judge Beddingfield (“Judge Beddingfield”), in his individual capacity; (5) Gina Jenkins (“Defendant Jenkins”), the guardian ad litem (“GAL”), *4 in her individual capacity; (6) Erin Schaad (“Defendant Schaad”), the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) in her individual capacity; (7) Kristen Leonard (“Defendant Leonard”), a DCS caseworker, in her individual capacity; and (8) Margerie Quinn (“Defendant Quinn”), the DCS Commissioner, in her official capacity [Doc. 3 pp. 1–2].
Plaintiffs, who are husband and wife, “bring this action on behalf of themselves and all Tennessee residents subjected to DCS’s unconstitutional training practices, including warrantless entries, coerced consent, and evidence destruction, from August 1, 2019, to the present” [ Id . at 2]. They allege that the class is numerous, there are common questions, Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the class, and a class action is superior [ Id .].
On July 26, 2022, Plaintiffs state that a therapist reported to DCS that Plaintiff Scott Evers was abusing Plaintiff Sharon Evers’s daughter [ . at 3]. Later, on August 1, 2022, Defendant Crenshaw entered Plaintiffs’ home without a warrant and “interrogated the children without informing [Plaintiff] Sharon Evers that cooperation was voluntary” [ .; see also Doc. 4-1 (outlining the details of the visit)]. Plaintiffs allege that “[o]n August 4, 2022, [Defendant Crenshaw] forged [Plaintiff] Scott Evers’[s] signature on an Immediate Protection Agreement (IPA)” [Doc. 3 p. 3; see also Doc. 4-2 (Affidavit of D. Colton Baker); Doc. 4-3 (statement of April Heatherly)]. On the same day, Plaintiffs state that “[Defendant] Crenshaw coerced [Plaintiff] Sharon Evers into signing the IPA by threatening to place her children in foster care” [Doc. 3 p. 3; see also Doc. 4-3)]. Plaintiffs contend that “[o]n August 5, 2022, Detective T. Rex Ogle of the Blount County Sheriff’s Department cleared Scott Evers of any criminal charges after a thorough investigation, including reviewing his phone and forensic interviews” [Doc. 3 p. 3 (citation *5 omitted)]. “Despite this clearance, DCS proceeded with the IPA and later placed [Plaintiff] Scott [Evers] on an internal sex offender registry, showing deliberate bad faith” [ Id .].
Plaintiffs assert that “[Defendant] CAC conducted forensic interviews on August 4, 2022, but deleted common area footage, violating National Standards for CACs[, which] requir[e] retention until the youngest child is 19” [ Id . (citing Doc. 4-5)]. A few days later, Plaintiffs submit that “[Defendant] Crenshaw contacted [the therapist] to verify the timeline of the allegation, confirming no delay between the allegation and report, yet [he] proceeded with aggressive actions without corroboration” [ Id . (citing Doc. 4-7)]. “On August 11, 2022, [Plaintiff] Sharon Evers retained Jason Rose as legal counsel to represent her in the Juvenile Court proceedings” [ Id . (citing Doc. 4-7)].
On September 6, 2022, Judge Beddingfield presided over a hearing, and according to Plaintiffs, “ignored evidence of forgery and constitutional violations, stating[,] ‘[W]e don’t deal with [c]onstitutional issues in this court’” [ Id . (citing Doc. 4-6)]. Judge Beddingfield then “ordered [Plaintiff] Scott Evers off his premarital property without due process” [ Id . (citing Doc. 4-6)]. Plaintiffs also claim that Judge Beddingfield denied Plaintiff Scott Evers accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) [ Id . (citing Doc. 4-6)]. At another hearing, on May 2, 2023, Plaintiffs state that the court audio was static, which “suggest[s] evidence tampering by [Judge] Beddingfield or court staff” [ Id . (citing Doc. 4-6)]. They allege that “DCS placed [Plaintiff] Scott Evers on an internal sex offender registry without criminal charges, causing reputation and financial harm” [ . (citing Doc. 4-3]).
Plaintiffs state that “[o]n April 21, 2023, DCS caseworker [Defendant] Leonard investigated an alleged IPA violation without addressing the underlying fraud of the forged IPA, further perpetuating the harm to Plaintiffs” [ . at 4 (citing Doc. 4-7)]. They further claim that the *6 GALs, “[Defendants] Jenkins and Schaad failed to investigate the children’s best interests or advocate for [a minor’s] ADA needs” [ Id . (citing Docs. 4-6 & 4-7)]. Plaintiffs contend that “DCS’s actions align with a broader policy of training caseworkers to avoid constitutional protections, as evidenced by [Defendant] Crenshaw’s warrantless entry, lack of informed consent, and coercion tactics” [ Id . (citation omitted)]. The DCS training manual, Plaintiffs allege, “directly contributed to [Defendant] Crenshaw’s unconstitutional actions on August 1, 2022, and August 4, 2022” [ Id .]. Plaintiffs state that “[t]his training is driven by Title IV-E funding incentives, encouraging unnecessary removals to maximize federal reimbursements” [ Id . (citation omitted)].
Plaintiffs state that “[o]n February 26, 2024, Judge Harrington of the Blount County Circuit Court concluded an appeal hearing from the Juvenile Court proceedings, issuing a final ruling in April 2024” [ Id .]. “While Judge Harrington’s ruling freed Sharon Evers and the children from court-mandated obligations, it failed to address Scott Evers’[s] ongoing harms, including the seizure of his premarital property and separation from his biological son, . . ., perpetuating the effects of DCS’s unconstitutional actions” [ . (citation omitted)]. They submit that the “[t]he state court appeal transcript (available from the February 26, 2024, hearing) documents [Defendant] Crenshaw’s perjury regarding the IPA forgery, yet Judge Harrington did not remedy this extrinsic fraud, further necessitating federal intervention to address DCS’s systemic practices” [ . (citing Doc. 4-7)].
Based on the above, Plaintiffs allege eight causes of action: (1) violation of the Fourth Amendment, (2) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, (3) violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C § 12132, (4) violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (6) retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, (7) unconstitutional policy or custom, thereby invoking Monell liability, *7 and (8) violation of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 [ . at 5–7]. They seek the following relief:
• A declaratory judgment that DCS’s training policies are unconstitutional.
• A permanent injunction barring DCS from training caseworkers to bypass constitutional Protections and enforcing forged IPAs.
• Return of [Plaintiff] Scott Evers’[s] property and restoration of familial association.
• Compensatory damages of $1,500,000 for emotional distress, reputational harm, and business losses.
• Punitive damages to be determined at trial. Treble damages and a relator’s share under the FCA.
• Attorney’s fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, if counsel is retained.
• A jury trial on all issues so triable.
• Removal of Magistrate [Judge] Beddingfield for constitutional violations.
• A public apology from DCS and Jeremy Crenshaw.
• A mandate for DCS to reform its training policies.
• Appointment of a special master or court-appointed expert to evaluate DCS’s practices.
• Such other relief as the Court deems just.
[ . at 7].
B. Screening of the Complaint
As an initial matter, the Court will address Plaintiffs’ class action allegations. “A party in
federal court must proceed either through licensed counsel or on his own behalf.”
Sillah v. Davis
,
252 F. Supp. 2d 589, 597 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (citations omitted)). Plaintiffs therefore cannot
*8
proceed as a class action “because a
pro se
litigant is not an adequate class representative.” .;
Harris v. Exxon Mobil Corp.
, No. 25 CV 414,
The Court will now turn to Plaintiffs’ claims.
1. Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The Court notes that Plaintiffs bring a majority of their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
This statute allows a plaintiff to seek redress from state actors for “the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
see also Nelson v.
Campbell
,
Starting with DCS, “Plaintiff’s claims against . . . DCS are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment and, thus, subject to dismissal.”
Annette v. Haslam
, No. 3:18-1299,
With respect to Defendants sued in their official capacities, Defendants Crenshaw and
Quinn, Plaintiffs cannot seek monetary damages against them in their official capacities.
See Petty
v. Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs.
, No. 3:19-CV-01085,
*10
Plaintiffs also sue Judge Beddingfield in his individual capacity [Doc. 3 p. 2]. He is
protected by juridical immunity. “‘Judicial immunity’” is shorthand for the doctrine of absolute
immunity that operates to protect judges and quasi-judicial officers alike from suit in both their
official and individual capacities.”
Dixon v. Clem
, 492 F.3d 665, 674 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing
DePiero v. City of Macedonia
,
Plaintiffs also name two GALs, Defendants Jenkins and Schaad, alleging that Defendant
Jenkins failed to investigate the children’s best interest and that Defendant Schaad failed to
*11
advocate for a minor’s ADA needs [Doc. 3 p. 2]. “Guardians
ad litem
are entitled to [quasi-
judicial] immunity when they act within the scope of their roles as ‘advocate[s] for the child in
judicial proceedings.’”
Arsan v. Keller
,
In any event, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are time barred. “The statute of limitations
applicable to a § 1983 action is the state statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions
under the law of the state in which the § 1983 claim arises.”
Eidson v. Tenn. Dep’t of Children's
Servs.,
Here, the conduct at issue began on July 26, 2022, and concluded with Judge Harrington’s
April 2024 final ruling [Doc. 3 p. 5]. Plaintiffs filed suit on May 7, 2025. This is too late. For
Arsan
In , the Sixth Circuit did not address “other threshold issues, like whether [the
guardian ad litem] was a state actor.”
Arsan
,
2. Claims under the ADA
Plaintiffs also allege violations of the ADA during court proceedings, stating that Judge Beddingfield denied Plaintiff Scott Evers accommodations [Doc. 3 pp. 3 & 6]. They also allege that Defendant Schaad neglected a minor’s ADA needs [ . at 6].
Under 42 U.S.C. § 12132, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C.A. §
12132. “The ADA defines ‘public entity’ as any state or local government or department, agency,
special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a state or local government. The definition
does not include individuals.”
Key v. Grayson
, 163 F. Supp. 2d 697, 715 (E.D. Mich. 2001)
(internal citation omitted). Further, “Nearly every court that has considered the issue has held that
Title II claims cannot be maintained against state officials in their individual capacities.” .
(collecting cases). Plaintiffs’ ADA claims fail as a matter of law.
See Baze v. Huddleston
, No.
5:10-CV-00086,
3. Claims under RICO
Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated RICO. They allege that “Defendants operated a RICO enterprise by training caseworkers to violate constitutional rights, forging documents, and destroying evidence to maximum Title IV-E funds through unnecessary child removals, constituting a pattern of racketeering” [Doc. 3 p. 6]. Plaintiffs claim that the predicate offenses include mail fraud, wire fraud, and obstruction of justice [ .].
RICO allows “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of violation of
section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district court[.]”
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). The plaintiff must plead: “(1) that there were two or more predicate offenses;
(2) that an ‘enterprise’ existed; (3) that there was a nexus between the pattern of racketeering
activity and the enterprise; and (4) that an injury to business or property occurred as a result of the
above three factors.”
Hooker v. Hooker
, No. 2:11-CV-02252,
“The Sixth Circuit has held that Congress did not abrogate states’ sovereign immunity to
claims brought under RICO.”
Page v. United States
, No. 3:23-CV-00851,
But further, even liberally construed, these allegations do not state a plausible RICO
violation against Defendants. Plaintiffs simply allege that DCS’s training policies are
unconstitutional and driven to receive Title IV-E funds, generally asserting that “Defendants use
the mail to submit false Title IV-E reimbursement claims” and “electronic communications to
coordinate forensic interviews and removals without legal basis” [Doc. 3 p. 6]. In support of the
mail fraud claim, Plaintiffs reference “Exhibit H,” which does not exist in the record [
see
Doc. 3
generally
], and in support of the wire fraud claim, they reference “Exhibit G,” which is merely
Plaintiffs’ “General Timeline of Events” [Doc. 4-7]. Without adequately pleading facts showing
that the reimbursement claims were false or that the electronic communications were fraudulent,
Plaintiffs fail to adequately allege a pattern of racketeering activity.
See Illinois Farmers Ins. Co.
v. Mobile Diagnostic Imaging, Inc.
, No. 13-CV-2820,
Plaintiffs’ general allegations are insufficient to state a claim under RICO.
4. Claims under the False Claims Act
Plaintiffs allege a violation of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, stating that “Defendants knowingly submitted false claims for Title IV-E reimbursements by removing children without legal basis” [Doc. 3 p. 7 (citations omitted)].
“[T]his Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear a
qui tam
action brought on behalf
of the United States by a
pro se
litigant.”
McGhee v. Light
,
5. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Plaintiffs claim intentional infliction of emotional distress under state law [Doc. 3 p. 6].
Considering the above analysis, the undersigned recommends that supplemental jurisdiction not
be exercised over this claim.
See McGhee v. Light
,
C. August 13, 2025 Letter On August 13, 2025, Plaintiff Sharon Evers filed a letter that references “whistleblower,” “federal witness tampering,” intimidation,” “harassment,” and “retaliation” [Doc. 11 p. 1]. She submits that she moved to Kentucky with her parents while Plaintiffs “sort out the constitutional violations” [ Id . at 4 (emphasis omitted)]. She claims that “[t]he magistrate gave [her] permission to live there, but [Plaintiff] Scott [Evers] was the sole proprietor of the house, and the property was rightfully his” [ Id .].
She states that two months after they filed this lawsuit, on July 7, 2025, DCS caseworkers, Anna Pendleton and Jessica Lively, with the assistance of Deputy Williams and Deputy McMurry of the Blount County Sheriff’s Department violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment by trespassing on Plaintiff Scott Evers’s property without a warrant [ Id . at 5]. According to Plaintiff Sharon Evers, they violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights [ Id .]. On July 9, 2025, Plaintiff Sharon Evers states that “Cabinet of Health and Family Services (CHFS) caseworkers, Megan B. Haynes, and Tammy E. Nelson trespassed on [her] father’s property where [her] children and [she] are currently residing” [ Id . at 6]. They informed Plaintiff Sharon Evers that they were there on behalf of Tennessee DCS [ Id .]. While Plaintiff Sharon Evers was on the telephone with an intake person at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Deputy Hollenbeck and Deputy Foster from Madison County Sheriff Department arrived to ask for Scott Evers” [ Id .]. She states that they violated her rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments and that they violated 18 U.S.C. § 1512 [ .]. Later, on July 25, 2025, Megan B. Haynes (“Ms. Haynes”) and Skyler Hayes (“Mr. Hayes”) arrived at Plaintiff Sharon Evers’s property, along with Deputy Pfisterer and Deputy Tipton from Madison County Sheriff’s Department, to search for Plaintiff Scott Evers [ .] She states that this violated the Fourth Amendment and that there was a Fourth *17 Amendment violation against her parents because her father told them to leave [ Id .]. She also alleges harassment under 18 U.S.C. § 1512 [ Id .].
On August 1, 2025, Deputy Tipton served Plaintiff Sharon Evers with papers and that “[i]t appears that [she is] being summoned to juvenile court to decide [her] fitness as a parent in retaliation for defending [her] children and [her] rights” [ Id . at 6–7]. Plaintiff Sharon Evers claims that this was an illegal court order and that Ms. Haynes’s affidavit against her fails to mention certain facts [ . at 7]. She states that she is “reporting these crimes” and “requesting federal assistance” [ . at 8]. Plaintiff Sharon Evers includes an addendum, stating that a neighbor called her father and reported that “Ms. Haynes has gone about the neighborhood putting cards with requests to contact her in the neighbor’s mailboxes” [ Id. ].
As an initial matter, it is not clear if Plaintiff Sharon Evers’s August 13 filing was intended
to be a supplement to the original Complaint. Rule 15 states, “On motion and reasonable notice,
the court may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any
transaction, occurrence or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.
The court may permit supplementation even though the original pleading is defective in stating a
claim or defense.”
See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). The Sixth Circuit has stated that “Rule 15 sets a
liberal policy in favor of permitting parties to amend their pleadings, and courts have interpreted
the rule to allow parties to add new claims, defenses, and parties to the lawsuit.”
Mattox v.
Edelman
,
Even if the Court were to construe the August 13 letter as a supplemental pleading or part
of the original Complaint, it does not comply with Rule 8. Because it is written as a letter, the
Court is uncertain whether Plaintiff Sharon Evers intends to file suit against the individuals
identified in her letter. As for relief, she seeks “restraining orders to protect [her] family” and she
*18
would like to press criminal charges [Doc. 11 p. 8]. The District Judge has ruled on a similar
request [
see
Doc. 23] and to the extent she asks the Court to press charges, the Court cannot do so.
See Anderson v. TN Internal Affs.
, No. 3:20-CV-00550,
Further, she claims that Plaintiff Scott Evers’s and her parents’ constitutional rights were
violated. She cannot seek relief on their behalf.
See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc.
, 572 U.S. 118, 126, (2014) (standing encompasses, among other things, “the
general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights”) (citations omitted));
see
also Moore v. Warren
, No. 13-CV-11831,
Considering that the undersigned recommends dismissal of the original Complaint, and given that it is not clear whether Plaintiff Sharon Evers intended to assert claims against the individuals identified in the August 13 Letter, the undersigned recommends, to the extent she, Plaintiff Scott Evers, or both want to pursue claims against the individuals identified in the August 13 Letter, that they file a separate lawsuit in the appropriate forum.
*19 D. Amending the Complaint
The Court has considered whether to grant Plaintiffs leave to amend the Complaint. But the Court declines to do so here as Plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [ Docs. 1 & 2 ]. But no process shall issue until the District Judge has ruled upon this Report and Recommendation [8] because the undersigned RECOMMENDS [9] that the Amended Complaint [Doc. 3] be DISMISSED in its entirety.
Respectfully submitted, _________________________ Debra C. Poplin
United States Magistrate Judge
Notes
[1] Despite the reference to prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 requires the Court to screen complaints
filed by non-prisoners seeking in forma pauperis status.
McGore v. Wrigglesworth
,
[2] Plaintiffs also refer to Defendant Crenshaw as a “CPS Investigator,” which the Court construes to mean a “child protective services investigator” [Doc. 4-1 p. 2].
[3] Defendant Quinn is not mentioned as a party on page 1 of the Complaint, but Plaintiffs later identify her on page 2 [Doc. 1 pp. 1, 2].
[4]
See also Mikel v. Nichols
, No. 1:20-CV-345,
[5] Judicial immunity does not apply when a judge takes actions not within his judicial
capacity or when a judge takes action, “though judicial in nature, . . . in the complete absence of
all jurisdiction.”
DePiero v. City of Macedonia
,
[7] Plaintiff Scott Evers did not sign this letter.
[8] This matter is to be presented to the Chief District Judge pursuant to this Report and
Recommendation under the authority of
Gibson v. R.G. Smith Co.
,
[9] Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be served and filed within
fourteen (14) days after service of a copy of this recommended disposition on the objecting party.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Such objections must conform to the requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 72(b). Failure to file objections within the time specified waives the right to appeal
the District Court’s order.
Thomas v. Arn
,