68 F. 911 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York | 1895
The plaintiff, a citizen of Missouri, brings this suit against the defendants John W. Haulenbeek and William L. Mitchell, as principals, and Peter Haulenbeek, as aider and a,bettor under a pretended license, citizens of New York, for
Question is made whether this court has jurisdiction touching the license; but the suit is not brought upon the license, nor against it, but for infringement; and when the license is set up as an answer to allegations of infringement the existence of the license is involved, and must be tried in trying the question of infringement. Hammacher v. Wilson, 26 Fed. 241. More clearly, jurisdiction of a question of infringement must include all questions whether the license covers the infringement. This license was personal, for practicing the invention within prescribed territory, and required a monthly account, with payment of royalties. This would not seem to carry any right to aid and abet others in practicing the invention. The testimony of Peter Haulenbeek exhibits a desire to show that John W. Haulenbeek, with Mitchell as partner, practiced it for him, under this license; but the form of defense, the circumstances, and Mitchell’s testimony, are opposed to this view, and John W. has not testified. Upon the whole, their infringement seems to have been done in their own behalf, independently of, and.not for, Peter. In trespasses all who are guilty are principals, and those who do not so far participate as to be principals are not guilty; and Peter Haulenbeek does not appear, on all the evidence, to have so far had a part in what John W. and Mitchell did as to be liable for it. The bill must therefore be dismissed as to him, but, in consideration of his attitude, without costs.
The question remaining as to the other defendants, as made by their answer, is solely as to the validity of the patent. That the cooking, or partial cooking, of various grains, and crushing, com-minuting, desiccating, or otherwise breaking or dividing them, while in a soft state, were old and well-known processes, many of them patented, and all of them in use at the time of this invention, is amply shown by the evidence. None of these methods merely flattened the kernels, but all included some form of breaking them. The patent distinguishes this invention from all of those things by providing for. flattening and preserving individuality without any breaking. The two-years prior use rests substantially upon the same things. The want of patentable novelty, as illustrated in Glue Co. v. Upton, 97 U. S. 3, is strongly urged in behalf of these defendants. The substance of a pea is said to be, and is, the same, whether left round or made flat. The change is of form, merely,
“It thus appears that the invention claimed is not any new combination of ingredients, creating a different product, or any new mechanical means by which a desirable change in the form oí a common article of commerce is obtained. but it consists only of the ordinary flake glue reduced to small particles by mechanical division.”
This invention is not applicable to, not useful for, single peas, but to masses of peas, of varying diameters, reducing them to uniform thickness for evenness in drying or roasting. The patent covers such a desirable and useful change of form, which is more than a mere reduction in size. If any part of the invention is in the process of cooking the peas first, so that they can be flattened to uniform thickness without breaking, and then flattening them, the process so inheres in the product, like that in Smith v. Vulcanite Co., 93 U. S. 486, as to make the product of the process patentable. Upon these considerations the patent seems to be valid, and the plaintiff to be entitled to a decree against those infringing it. Let a decree be entered for the plaintiff against John W. llaulenbeek and Mitchell for an injunction and an account, with costs; and dismissing the bill as to Peter Haulenbeek, without costs.