20 Ind. App. 5 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1898
The complaint of the appellee, May D. Wilson, after its introductory matter, showed, in substance, that on the 6th day of August, 1895, the appellant, by its ticket agent at Vincennes, notified all persons desiring to purchase tickets over its railroad for the purpose of attending a picnic being held in the vicinity of Purcells, that its passenger train going north through that place at about 8:45 or 9 o’clock
It was found that in addition to the contract contained in the ticket, the appellant contracted to carry appellee to Purcells and back to Vincennes, the additional contract being made with C. N. Cheever, ticket agent of the appellant; that he had authority from the appellant to make such contract other than that he possessed by reason of his being such ticket agent; that F. P. Jeffries, general passenger agent of the appellant, made a special contract by which the appellee was to be returned from Purcells to Vincennes on the train passing Purcells going north at 8:45 or 9 p. m.; that said train going north, by the rules and regulations of the railroad, did not stop at Purcells at, and for more than one year before said date; that it did not on said evening stop at Purcells for the appellee to take passage to Vincennes; that the appellant had a passenger train at Purcells about 11 o’clock p. m. at said date, and stopped it there for the appellee to ride thereon to Vincennes; that she left Purcells and returned to Vincennes before the train sent by the
The appellant’s motion for judgment upon the jury’s answers to interrogatories, and its motion to tax the costs against the appellee were overruled. These rulings are assigned as errors, and the question as to the sufficiency of the cqmplaint is for the first time pre
In a complaint by a ticket holder for failure to stop the train on which he is traveling at the station named in his ticket, it is necessary to show that the regulations of the railroad company provided that the train should stop at such place; and so, also, in order to put the railroad company in the wrong, in a complaint for failure to stop a train to receive the ticket holder, it should be made to appear that it was the duty of the company toward the ticket holder to so stop the train. But the company may make a special arrangement for the stopping of a particular train at a certain station at which under the general rules and regulations it is not required to stop. Such a
It is sufficiently, alleged in the complaint that the special regulation for stopping the train, by way of notice to her and agreement with her, was made by the appellant, and the special findings of the jury are not inconsistent with the general verdict. Whatever may be the proper view as to whether or not the passenger’s ticket or provisions therein should be treated as a contract, we are of the opinion that it may be supplemented by such special matter in parol as the arrangements here shown for the stopping of the train. And while it is doubtless true that it is not within the implied authority of agents for the sale of tickets at its stations to change the duly established regulations of the company for the stopping of its passenger trains, yet where a ticket has been purchased and in part used under the circumstances disclosed in this case, the company is liable for the damages resulting to the passenger for failure to stop the train. The case is not one requiring us to go further and to decide as to the responsibility of the company for the injurious consequences of the giving of merely false information by a ticket agent to a passenger concerning the running or stopping of trains. There ap
The appellant moved to tax costs against the appellee, because the verdict was for a sum less than fifty dollars, it being assumed that the action was upon contract. Under the relation created by the facts in the case, the appellant owed the appellee a duty, the violation of which was a tort. The contract of carriage was an incident in the creation of the relation from which the duty arose. The action was based upon the violation of the duty, and was in tort. The judgment is affirmed.