2 Ind. App. 237 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1891
This was an action to recover damages for the destruction of the appellee’s threshing machine by the locomotive and train of the appellant.
The complaint was in three paragraphs, the first and third • being for wilful injury, the second for negligent injury.
A special verdict was returned, and the appellant’s motion for a venire de novo and its motion for a new trial having been overruled, judgment for three hundred dollars was rendered for the appellee.
In .the special verdict it was found that on the 19th of August, 1889, the appellee was the owner of a threshing machine of the value of $300, which on that day was struck by a locomotive engine and train of cars on appellant’s track, and was entirely destroyed, which locomotive and train of
“ John Higbee, Foreman.
*242 “ If, upon the foregoing facts, the law is with the defendant, we find for the defendant.
“John Higbee, Foreman.”
One ground assigned in the motion for a venire de novo is, “ that the verdict is imperfect, in this, that after finding the facts upon which it calls for the application of the law for the plaintiff, it makes the further finding of fact before asking for the conclusion of law for the defendant, to wit,” etc.
We do not regard this as a fatal defect in the verdict. It is an irregularity in form which the court, looking to the facts found, should disregard in the rendition of judgment. The result of a trial can not be overthrown because of such an inadvertence or technical error. A special verdict is not vitiated by the want of the usual formal conclusion. Louisville, etc., R. W. Co. v. Lucas, 119 Ind. 583.
Another objection presented by the motion is, that there is no finding upon certain matters of fact alleged in the complaint and denied by the answer.
If a special verdict contains no finding upon particular matters of fact in issue, this is not sufficient ground for a venire de novo. Wilson v. Hamilton, 75 Ind. 71; Louisville, etc., R. W. Co. v. Buck, 116 Ind. 566 ; Louisville, etc.,
The other grounds assigned in the motion for a venire de novo are, that certain designated parts of the verdict are not findings of facts, but are conclusions of law; that certain designated findings are not within the issues, and that the findings contain the evidence, and not the facts established by the evidence.
To require a venire de novo the verdict must be so defective that a judgment can not be rendered on it. Henderson v. Dickey, 76 Ind. 264.
The question in this court in reviewing the action of the trial court in overruling’ a motion fora venire de novo, is not whether the verdict authorized the particular judgment ren
In examining the verdict under a motion for a venire de novo, mere conclusions of law, mere evidence and findings outside of the issues will be disregarded; and if, when stripped of such improper matters, the verdict is sufficient to sustain a judgment for either party, a venire de novo will not be granted. Indianapolis, etc., R. W. Co. v. Bush, 101 Ind. 582; Conner v. Citizens Street R. W. Co., 105 Ind. 62; Pittsburgh, etc., R. W. Co. v. Adams, 105 Ind. 151; Louisville, etc., R. W. Co. v. Frawley, 110 Ind. 18; Indiana, etc., R. W. Co. v. Finnell, 116 Ind. 414; Louisville, etc., R. W. Co. v. Green, 120 Ind. 367 ; Lake Shore, etc., R. W. Co. v. Stupak, 123 Ind. 210 ; Louisville, etc., R. W. Co. v. Graham, 124 Ind. 89.
The appellant has not indicated any particular statement in the verdict as constituting mere evidence, and not matters of fact.
It is insisted on behalf of the appellant that the following findings are not within the issues:
“1. Which headlight was dirty to an extent that interfered with its use.
“ 2. That there were two brakemen on said train, composing a part of the crew.”
The second paragraph of the complaint contained an allegation that the appellant, by its agents, servants and employees, so carelessly and negligently managed, run and operated said locomotive and train of ears that the same ran into, etc.
It is well established, and has been so often decided as not to need the citation of authorities, that negligence may be pleaded in general terms, without stating the particular facts constituting it. In a special verdict, however, the particular facts proved under such a pleading should be set out. The two findings thus objected to, taken in connection with
The verdict contained conclusions of law, but when stripped of all such conclusions, still the verdict was not so defective that no judgment could be rendered upon it.
It is contended by the appellant that the verdict was not sustained by sufficient evidence.
We have examined the evidence, and we are unable to decide that it does not support the special verdict.
The judgment is affirmed.