99 Ind. 519 | Ind. | 1885
The complaint of the appellee contains, among others, the following allegations:
“ Plaintiff further says that the defendant Dwyer was at the day aforesaid, and for more than a year prior thereto had been, the agent and employee of said railroad company for the purpose of detecting, arresting and prosecuting all persons whp should, in any way, unlawfully obstruct the railroad aforesaid in said county. That on the — day of November, 1882, the railroad track aforesaid was obstructed by some person or persons unknown to this plaintiff, and without his knowledge, direction or consent, and thereupon said railroad company directed the defendant Dwyer to arrest the persons who had so obstructed said road and cause them to be criminally prosecuted for such obstructions in the courts of said county; that pursuant to said direction so received from said company, and in the discharge of his authority as the agent and employee of said railroad company as aforesaid, the defendant Dwyer thereupon proceeded to detect and arrest and prosecute criminally in the eoui’ts of said county the persoii ■or persons who had so obstructed the railroad aforesaid, and in so doing said Dwyer assaulted, arrested and falsely imprisoned plaintiff at said county on the — day of December,*520 1882, without any legal atithority so to do, upon the charge made by said Dwyer against him, said plaintiff, of unlawfully obstructing said railroad in said county at the day the same was obstructed, as aforesaid, to wit, on the — day of November, 1882; that thereupon said Dwyer placed, handcuffs upon his wrists, and in company with others, in said Dwyer’s employ, by threats of personal violence to him, said plaintiff, and by catching hold of the plaintiff’s person, compelled the plaintiff to go with him, said Dwyer, from his home in Knox county, Indiana, distant from Emison’s Station about three miles, to said station, in the night over a dark road, in the woods where it was cold and disagreeable, at which station said Dwyer compelled said plaintiff to get into a car on said railroad provided by said railroad company for that purpose, and said Dwyer thereupon, by means of said car, carried said plaintiff upon said railroad a distance of ten miles, at which point said Dwyer put said plaintiff off of said car in the woods, in the middle of the night, and in the darkest kind of a night, from which point said plaintiff was compelled to and did wander home, a distance of twelve miles, on foot as best he could.”
The appellant, in support of its assault upon the complaint, invokes the general rule, that a principal is not responsible for the torts of an agent unless committed while engaged in the performance of duties within the scope of his agency. This general rule is too well settled and too firmly grounded in principle to be the subject of debate, and if this case is within it there is no necessity for discussion. But whether the case is within the rule is the question, and not whether there is such a rule as that asserted.
The liability of the principal is not affected by the fact that the tort was wilfully committed, for it is now firmly settled that whether the wrong results from negligence or is the product of wilfulness, the principal is responsible if it was committed within the line of the agent’s duty. Indiana, etc., R. W. Co. v. Burdge, 94 Ind. 46; Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v.
A principal is responsible for the acts of the agent performed within the line of his duty, whether the particular act was or was not directly authorized. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Kelly, supra; Terre Haute, etc., R. R. Co. v. Jackson, supra; Am. Ex. Co. v. Patterson, supra; Noblesville, etc., G. R. Co. v. Gause, 76 Ind. 142; S. C., 40 Am. R. 224. In speaking of a question like the one before us, the Court of Appeals of New York said: “J.t matters not that he” (the agent) “exceeded the powers conferred upon-him by his principal, and that he did an act which the principal was not authorized to do, so long as he acted in the line of his duty, or being engaged in the service of the defendant, attempted to perform a duty pertaining, or which he believed to pertain to that service.” Lynch v. Metropolitan, etc., R. W. Co., 90 N. Y. 77 (43 Am. R. 141). It may be that the statement wo have quoted needs some qualification, for we suppose that the belief of the agent would not make the principal responsible if it was in fact not well founded, but in the main the statement correctly states the law.
The rules we have stated lead to the conclusion that the principal is liable for the tort of the agent, where the particular act, although wilful and not directly authorized, was within the line of the agent’s duty; but if the act was an independent one, and not within the scope of the agency, the person injured can not compel the principal to respond in damages. It results from these fundamental doctrines, that where
This principle applies here, for the question is not as to the name or station of the agent, but whether the particular act was within the line of his agency. Where the particular hct is within the scope of the agency, then it is, in legal contemplation, the act of the principal, no matter by what name the agent is designated. The material element is the authority of the agent, and not his mere name or position. Terre Haute, etc., R. R. Co. v. McMurray, 98 Ind. 358; Chicago, etc., R. W. Co. v. Ross, 31 Alb. L. J. 8. In Chicago City R. W. Co. v. McMahon, 103 Ill. 485, S. C., 42 Am. R. 29, a man was employed to gather up evidence for the company in a pending action, and while engaged in that ser
The case of Helfrich v. Williams, 84 Ind. 553, so much relied on by the appellant, does not antagonize our conclusion. In that case the point decided was that a complaint against the principal was not good unless it alleged that the' negligent act was committed by the agent within the line of his duty. So we hold here. We do not hold the appellant responsible for the tort of Dwyer, simply because he was its agent, but we hold it liable for the reason that he committed the tort while engaged in his principal’s service, and within the line of his duty.
Dwyer testified, among other things, that “ Mr. Hepburn, superintendent of defendant, directed me. to go and hunt up any person I found guiltyand there was other evidence tending to show the employment. The fact that the agent arrested a person not guilty does not relieve the principal from liability, for the delegation of authority to arrest persons deemed guilty by the agent committed to him a broad general power, and, if the agent, in attempting to exercise that power, did another injury, the principal must answer in damages. It was not necessary for the appellee to prove that the injury resulted from a rightful attempt to exercise the authority conferred, for whether the attempt was rightful or wrongful the injured person may compel the principal to respond in damages for an illegal injury inflicted in the exer
The evidence very satisfactorily shows that the arrest of the appellee was made while Dwyer was engaged in the general line of his duty, for it shows that he was at the time searching for persons who had illegally obstructed, the appellant’s track. There are facts from which it may well be inferred •that the arrest of McKee was not for an independent crime, but for an offence against the corporation. It is sufficient, if the facts proved supply reasonable grounds for the necessary inferences, and here the evidence, does supply such grounds.
It is not necessary to make out a case by positive evidence. Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Collingwood, 71 Ind. 476; Indianapolis, etc., R. W. Co. v. Thomas, 84 Ind. 194; Hedrick v. D. M. Osborne & Co., ante, p. 143.
Judgment affirmed.