190 A. 523 | Md. | 1937
On May 20th, 1924, the appellants confessed a judgment in the Circuit Court for Cecil County in favor of George P. Zouck, in an action on a replevin bond. The amount of the judgment was originally $926.41, but as the result of a proceeding brought by the appellants to have it marked "satisfied," the court allowed credits which reduced the amount (in 1934) to $428.75. Later, in July, 1936, the plaintiff ordered an attachment issued on the judgment, returnable to the Superior Court of Baltimore City. On August 10th, 1936, the appellants, the judgment debtors, filed in the Circuit Court for Cecil County, in equity, their bill of complaint against Zouck, praying that, because of certain equitable considerations, he be enjoined from prosecuting that attachment, "or proceeding in any manner, looking to the execution" of the judgment. It appeared on the face of the bill that Zouck resided in Baltimore City.
Zouck appeared specially in proper person and in a paper called a "Demurrer to Jurisdiction," but which was in fact a motion to dismiss or an answer, alleged that he did not reside in Cecil County, that he did not carry on any regular business, or habitually engage in any avocation or employment, in that county, but that he did reside in Baltimore City. The case was heard on the bill *14 and that pleading, which was supported by affidavit, as though it was a demurrer, and thereafter the court sustained the so-called "demurrer" and dismissed the bill. The appeal is from that decree.
The territorial jurisdiction of a court of chancery, unless enlarged by statute, is limited to the area within which its process is effective (21 C.J. 149), so that "no jurisdiction whatever exists unless the parties to be affected are by service of process or voluntary appearance within the jurisdiction and subject to the control of the court, or the res is within the jurisdiction." Id., McGaw v. Gortner,
The principle thus announced was recognized in Mexican Cent.Ry. Co. v. Pinkney,
It may therefore be accepted as settled law, in this state, that except where it is otherwise provided by statute, a defendant in an equity suit has the same right to be sued only in the county of his residence, or in the City of Baltimore if he resides there, that the defendant in a law suit would have, and that, unless he is within the territorial jurisdiction of the equity court in which the suit is pending or voluntarily submits to its jurisdiction, such court cannot acquire jurisdiction to bind him by a decree in personam. Pennoyer v. Neff,
If, therefore, this could be considered an original proceeding, wholly independent of and distinct from the proceeding in which the judgment was entered in the Circuit Court for Cecil County, it would necessarily follow that the Circuit Court for Cecil County, in equity, was without jurisdiction to entertain this suit. But this proceeding is not independent of the action in the Circuit Court for Cecil County, but is ancilliary thereto.Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450, 16 L.Ed. 749, 752; Markham v.Huff,
Assuming that the allegations of the bill made out a case within the general jurisdiction of the court, it follows that there was error in dismissing the bill. The defendant having himself invoked the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court for Cecil County to secure a judgment in an action at law against the plaintiffs named in the bill in this case, should not be permitted to deny the power of the same court, acting in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, to adjust any differences between the parties as to the enforcement or satisfaction of that judgment. It is true that, since he does not reside in Cecil County, he would not be within the reach of the process of the Circuit Court for Cecil County in an original proceeding, except in cases where such jurisdiction is conferred by statute, but where his appearance in such court is required in aid of some proceeding pending there, the court is not without power to command it. Code, art. 87, secs. 18-21; Id. art. 16, secs. 213, 89, 204; Baltimore City v. Sackett,
Because of the form in which the case comes to this court, we are not authorized to consider or to decide whether the allegations of the bill state a case for equitable relief; there was no demurrer to the bill, nor did the trial court pass upon that question. The decree must therefore be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
Decree reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings inaccordance with the views expressed in this opinion, with coststo the appellants. *18