Opinion by
This case involves several important questions: What is the proper construction of §4B(s) of the Municipality Authorities Act of May 2, 1945, * and does this Authority created thereunder violate Article III, §20 of the Pennsylvania Constitution?
We are informed that this is a test case which will affect many, if not all, of the Authorities which have been or are about to be incorporated under the above-mentioned Act in connection with the Pure Streams Program. The ■ Stream Pollution or so-called Pure
Plaintiff, a taxpayer, filed a bill in equity to enjoin defendant from imposing and collecting (sewer) charges assessed against her property, for the reason that §4B (s) of the Municipality Authorities Act, supra, was in contravention of Article III, §20 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania. The court below sustained defendant’s preliminary objection and dismissed the bill in equity.
The Board of Township Commissioners of West Norriton Township, by Ordinance dated June 6, 1947, created the West Norriton Township Municipal Authority, pursuant' to and in accordance with the Municipality Authorities Act. The township commissioners, by Ordinance dated May 5, 1950, approved the plan and report of the Authority’s engineers and also approved the Authority’s proposal to assess not exceeding $560,000.00 of the total cost of a sewer against the adjoining property owners according to the foot front rule.
Before we can decide whether §4B(s) of the Municipality Authorities Act violates Article III, §20 of the
Section 20 of Article III of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: “The General Assembly shall not delegate to any special commission, private corporation or association, any power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, money, property or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, or
to
The specific questions which arise are (1) is the Authority a special commission or private corporation; (2) is the imposition of a charge for the cost of construction of a lateral sewer against the property benefited a local assessment or a tax; (3) does the act delegate to the Authority the power to perform municipal functions and to levy taxes, or if such powers are vested in the elected local Commissioners, is the delegation of these powers in the mode prescribed by the Act constitutional? We shall discuss these three questions seriatim.
1. A Municipal Authority is defined by the Act as “a body politic and corporate”. Its members are appointed by elected public officials. It receives a charter from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania which grants it certain characteristic attributes of a corporation. It is authorized by law and by its charter to perform vast private as well as certain limited public functions. The line of demarcation between what was termed in earlier times a special commission or private corporation and the modern so-called public authority (or quasi-public governmental agency, instrumentality or body politic and corporate), has never been clearly drawn, or precisely defined.
None of the cases heretofore decided by this Court are directly in point or controlling, but it will be helpful to review a number of them.
The constitutionality of Authorities which have been chartered under this or a similar act have been sustained; and the courts have declared in a number of recent cases that such an authority is not a special commission or a private corporation, and that, notwithstanding its possession of broad powers usually associated with government, an Authority does not come within the prohibition of Article III, §20 of the Penn
2. Is the sewer assessment a tax? Whether a sewer charge or assessment or lien is a local assessment as distinguished from a tax is a matter on which the authorities are not as clear as they might be. Assessments by elected public officials of the cost of a sewer against the properties benefited was held to be constitutional although a “species of taxation”.
Oil City v. Oil City Boiler Works,
3. Does the Act delegate to an Authority the power to perform municipal functions and to levy taxes or are those powers vested only in the elected local Commissioners and in the latter event is the delegation of these powers in the mode prescribed by the Act constitutional?
It is well established that the State legislature has the right to delegate its power to tax, to municipal bodies such as counties, cities, boroughs, and townships, whose commissioners or taxing officers
are elected by the
people; and for the purposes and objects of carrying on local government, such elected public officials may perform municipal functions and may be validly and constitutionally authorized to impose and collect taxes:
Durach’s Appeal,
Furthermore, the analogous (so-called) “School Board cases” uphold the constitutionality of acts which authorize school boards, school districts or similar bodies to administer schools and the school systems, and to impose and collect a tax
if the legislature
(or the duly'elected public officials of a municipality)
fix the tax or fix a maximum ceiling or limit on the tax: Wilson v. Philadelphia School District,
Appellant contends that the second proviso of §4B(s) — notwithstanding the words “And provided further,” — modifies only the first proviso and not the prior language of this section, and consequently the section is invalid since it delegates to an Authority the power to assess costs and levy taxes
without limitation.
The language of this section of the Act is undoubtedly ambiguous.
**
It is not clear from the words of the Act (a) whether this section gives the Authority unlimited power to impose charges or assessments, with
“c. . .
we can declare an Act of Assembly void, only when it violates the Constitution clearly, palpably, plainly;
Tranter v. Allegheny County
Authority,
Is the (express or implied) delegation of this power to the elected commissioners in the mode prescribed by the act, constitutional?
The closest and most analogous case is
Wilson v. Philadelphia School
District,
Mr. Chief Justice Kepi-iakt, in a comprehensive opinion, reviewed, distinguished and, in effect, overruled many earlier decisions of this Court. Because taxation for local purposes is necessary under our constitutional theory or philosophy of government, and because local governmental units had historically levied taxes prior to the existence of our federal or state government, the Court held that the legislature’s delegation of the power to tax to local government bodies elected by the people of the locality (such as cities, counties, boroughs and townships) was constitutional; and it also approved the principle that the delegation merely of details of administration was not a violation of the Constitution or of the fundamental law.
While it may not be clear whether an Authority or school board or similar appointive instrumentality
with unlimited power of taxation
is a special commission or private corporation under Article III, §20 of the Constitution) it is clear from
Wilson v. Philadelphia School District
and other cases hereinbefore cited, that
neither the legislature nor a local elected munici
The Constitution, where it deals with principles in general language, should receive, in connection with remedial legislation, a broad construction unless such construction will violate its clear, plain language or will substantially curtail, impair or annul the unalienable rights of man which are declared and protected therein. Subject to these limitations, it should be construed in such manner as to give constitutional sanction and life to the constantly changing conditions and needs of the people, not only of the horse and buggy age and the automobile age, but also of the airplane age, and the atomic age. This does not mean that the language of the Constitution, when clear, can be ignored in favor of what the courts or the advocates of a new plan or a new policy or a new agency zealously or blindly believe is within its spirit. It does mean that subject to the aforesaid limitations, the Constitution should be given a broad construction in accordance with reason and common sense, taking into consideration the subject matter, the remedial objectives of the statute and the times in which we live.
Decree affirmed; each party to bear her or its respective costs.
Notes
P. L. 382, as amended, §4B(s), 53 P.S. 2900z-5.
Italics throughout, ours.
Act of June 24, 1931, P. L. 1206, Art. XXIV, §§2406, 2410, 53 P.S. 19092-2406, 2410; Act of May 1, 1933, P. L. 103, Art. XV, §§1507, 1511 (as amended), 53 P.S. 19093-1507, 1511.
It lias been clarified by Act No. 374, approved by the Governor on September 26, 1951, P. L. -.
P. L. 309.
P. L. 20.