69 N.C. App. 644 | N.C. Ct. App. | 1984
Lead Opinion
The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the words, “any provision of the motor vehicle laws,” as used in the context of G.S. 20-28.1(c) include G.S. 20-343 within their meaning. The defendant argues in effect that the legislature intended the inclusion and that, had it intended otherwise, it would have said so. We disagree.
G.S. 20-28.1(c) provides in pertinent part as follows:
[A]ny person whose license has been suspended or revoked under this section permanently may apply for a license after three years. Upon the filing of such application, the Division may, with or without a hearing, issue a new license upon satisfactory proof that the former licensee has not been convicted within the suspension or revocation period of a violation of any provision of the motor vehicle laws, alcoholic beverages laws, or drug laws of North Carolina or any other state. . . .
G.S. 20-343 provides in pertinent part as follows:
Unlawful change of mileage. — It is unlawful for any person or his agent to disconnect, reset, or alter the odometer of any motor vehicle with the intent to change the number of miles indicated thereon. . . .
The purpose of G.S. 20-28.1(c) is not to punish affected drivers, that being the purpose of other provisions of the motor vehicle laws. See Ennis v. Garrett, 279 N.C. 612, 184 S.E. 2d 246 (1971) (statute applies only where license has been revoked). Rather, the clear purpose of G.S. 20-28.1(c) is to promote safety on
As this Court, speaking through Judge Arnold, recently said, “[licensed drivers are aware that driving while intoxicated threatens the safety of others.” Huff v. Chrismon, 68 N.C. App. 525, 315 S.E. 2d 711, rev. den. 311 N.C. 756, 321 S.E. 2d 134 (1984). In that case, Judge Arnold also observed,
There appears to be a growing trend in this State to maximize the punishment and deterrence which impaired drivers are subjected to. This trend is seen in the recent enactment of the “Safe Roads Act” with its stiff penalties for impaired drivers. . . . This State’s growing concern and outrage stemming from injuries and deaths caused by impaired drivers is further seen in our court’s recognition of a common law dram shop liability.
Id. See also Hutchens v. Hankins, 63 N.C. App. 1, 303 S.E. 2d 584, rev. denied, 309 N.C. 191, 305 S.E. 2d 734 (1983) (recognizing common law dram shop liability). See generally, Comment, Punitive Damages and the Drunken Driver, 8 Pepperdine L. Rev. 117 (1980).
We note that where the law directs suspension, revocation, or non-issuance of a driver’s license, the grounds are convictions for “moving violations,” or other statutory violations relating to highway safety, or situations where an individual’s capacity to operate a motor vehicle safely are manifestly questionable. E.g., G.S. 20-9, 20-13, 20-16, 20-16.1, 20-16.4, 20-17, 20-17.1, 20-23.2. We note with interest that G.S. 20-17(3) subjects a person to license revocation if convicted of “[a]ny felony in the commission of which
In its argument, defendant concedes that the policy behind G.S. 20-28.1(c) is the promotion of highway safety. Defendant contends that G.S. 20-343 is a safety-related statute in that it is designed to protect consumers from a false sense of safety induced by an odometer reading that is less than the actual mileage of the car. This argument is premised on defendant’s unsupported assertion that safety-related mechanical failures are more likely to occur in cars with greater mileage. To the limited extent that this may be true, we note that our statutes require periodic safety inspections of all motor vehicles. G.S. 20-183.2 et seq. The retail sale of an automobile by a dealer without the dealer first having the required inspection performed has been held to be negligence per se. Anderson v. Robinson, 8 N.C. App. 224, 174 S.E. 2d 45 (1970).
Our research discloses that G.S. 20-28.1 was enacted in 1965 as an additional single provision of the Uniform Driver’s License Act of 1935 (G.S. 20-5 et seq.). N.C. Session Laws 1965, c. 286. The Vehicle Mileage Act, G.S. 20-340 et seq., containing the predecessor to the current G.S. 20-343, was enacted as a separate Article under Chapter 20 in 1973. N.C. Session Laws 1973, c. 676. G.S. 20-343 was amended to its present form in 1979. N.C. Session Laws 1979, c. 696. While nothing may be conclusively inferred from this information, we think that the 1965 Legislature did not anticipate the enactment eight years later of the Vehicle Mileage Act and that the apparent inclusion of G.S. 20-343 within the compass of G.S. 20-28.1 was not intended to have the result urged by appellant.
We agree with the trial court that the purpose of G.S. 20-343 is to address a form of commercial fraud which is only indirectly related to highway safety. The promotion of highway safety is clearly the purpose of G.S. 20-28.1. Based on our reading of relevant statutory and case law, we believe that the legislative intent and policy of 20-28.1 excludes G.S. 20-343 from that class of motor vehicle laws the violation of which justifies the non-issuance of a driver’s license. We therefore conclude that a violation of G.S. 20-343 is not “a violation of any provision of the motor vehicle
Affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
G.S. 20-28.1(c) provides that a new license to drive may be issued to a person whose driving privilege has been suspended or revoked only “upon satisfactory proof that the former licensee has not been convicted within the suspension or revocation period of a violation of any provision of the motor vehicle laws.” That G.S. 20-343 is a provision of the motor vehicle laws is beyond dispute, and that defendant was convicted of seven violations of G.S. 20-343 while his license to drive was permanently revoked is uncontroverted. The express language of G.S. 20-28.1(c) thus precludes issuance to defendant of a new license to drive.
The trial court and the majority here may be correct in their conclusion that it was not the legislative purpose and intent to proscribe issuance of a license to persons convicted of the variety of commercial fraud in question. If such was the purpose and intent, however, the General Assembly could not have said so more clearly.
The judgment below and the majority opinion here effectively repeal G.S. 20-28.1(c) pro tanto. Such should be the prerogative of the General Assembly, not the courts. Even in the face of considerable legitimate doubt, I would assume that the legislature meant what it plainly stated, and would leave to that branch of the government the correction of its own error, if such it is. “[I]t is quite wrong to alter the language of a statute for the purpose of getting at its meaning.” Nance v. R.R., 149 N.C. 366, 373, 63 S.E. 116, 119 (1908) (quoting Lord Coleridge in Coe v. Lawrence, 72 E.C.L. (1 Ellis & B.) 516).
I thus vote to reverse and remand to the Superior Court for issuance of an order directing the Division of Motor Vehicles to
