142 Ind. 264 | Ind. | 1895
A demurrer for want of facts was sustained to appellant’s complaint.
The pertinent allegations of the complaint are, “That the defendant, by its servants and employes, ran a locomotive and train of freight cars into the town of Ashland, and there stopped and disconnected the locomotive from the train of cars standing upon its railroad track opposite the platform of its depot, and ran said locomotive on ahead, a distance of twenty rods, for the purpose, as the plaintiff supposed, of passing a switch and hacking the said locomotive from thence on to a side track for the purpose of gathering some cars and connecting them with its train by bringing them on to the main track and backing them to the said train of cars so left standing upon said main track; that the caboose of said train of cars was the last car in the rear of said train, and that there was in front of said caboose, and connected therewith, what is known asa “ scale tester,” which was a small heavy iron structure placed upon four wheels, no wider than the track of the railroad, with a round iron covering over the top, which said scale tester was made and used for the purpose of running onto scale platforms, and testing the accuracy of the scales; that whilst said defendant’s cars were so standing upon said track, the plaintiff had occasion to pass by the caboose, and being attracted by the • sight of the scale
It is admitted that the facts alleged show contributory negligence on the part of appellant in placing his foot upon the rail, and near the wheel of the scale tester. It is also admitted that he was a trespasser.
It remains, therefore, to determine whether the appellee wantonly and wilfully caused the injury complained of. The question is not free from difficulty. There are general statements made in the complaint from which such wanton and wilful conduct might be inferred. We must, however, look to the particular facts and circumstances alleged, rather than to the conclusions drawn therefrom by the pleader.
If appellee’s employes in charge of the train knew of appellant’s peril, and could have stopped the cars before they crushed his foot, the appellee must he held liable. If they did not know of such peril, or, knowing it, could not stop the train in time to avoid the result, the appellee should not he charged with the injury.
Certainly the employes were not to blame when they “ran said locomotive hack against the train of cars, so
It was not until after the locomotive had' been thus butted against the cars, that those in control of the train were signaled to stop it. This signaling was done by a brakeman who ‘ saw the plaintiff in said perilous position, and immediately signaled the engineer to stop the train, and took off his hat and swung it, and hallooed at him. ” This, we think, comes far from showing that the engineer knew that any one was in peril. The fact that the brakeman swung his hat and hallooed at the engineer, rather indicates that the brakeman could not, and therefore did not, give the engineer any definite information of what the trouble was, or why the train should be stopped. The allegations as to these “warnings, hallooings, and violent motions, ” at least fail to show that the enginéer, with knowledge of what he was doing, was wantonly and wilfully engaged in endangering the life or limb of the appellant.
But is there anything alleged to show that the engineer could have stopped the train in time to have saved appellant from injury? The engineer, as we have seen, was not to blame for bumping the locomotive against the cars. But this bumping pushed the cars back a hundred feet. The wheel of the scale tester, however, as we learn from the complaint, when it struck the foot of appellant, ‘ ‘ slid upon the iron rail, holding his foot fast to said rail, and slid him in that condition fifty or sixty feet. ” It was this pushing and sliding the plaintiff’s foot upon the iron rail ” which crushed the foot, as is further stated in the complaint.
If then the butting of the locomotive upon the cars sent the latter back a hundred feet, and if appellant’s
"We think that the allegations in the complaint fail to show that the engineer in charge of the train had knowledge of appellant’s peril; and we are of opinion, moreover, that the allegations do show that, even if he had such knowledge, he could not have stopped the train in time to avoid the injury. See Parker, Admr., v. Pennsylvania Co., 134 Ind. 673 (23 L. R. A. 552).
No willful or wanton wrong to appellant is, therefore, shown, and there bging no question of negligence, the judgment is affirmed.