145 F. Supp. 873 | D. Del. | 1956
This is a class suit brought pursuant to Rule 23(a) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.
The complaint alleges plaintiffs “ * * * by reason of their residence, except for their race, color and ancestry, would be acceptable by defendants for attendance at the public school in Clayton School District No. 119.”
The defendants urge the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because there is absent any allegation of the non-existence of administrative impediments to full faith compliance with the constitutional principles set forth by the Supreme Court in the two Brown decisions.
Defendants misapprehend the meaning of the two Brown decisions. The first Brown decision supplied an unqualified affirmative answer to the question of whether “segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other ‘tangible’ factors may be equal, deprive the children of a minority group of equal educational opportunities”.
“ * * * we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”9
In the second Brown decision, the Supreme Court referred to the first Brown case as a declaration of “the fundamental principle that racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional”.
The second objection of defendants goes to the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint. Jurisdiction is founded upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides:
Ҥ 1331. Federal question; amount in controversy
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 930.”
The pertinent portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1343 provides:
Ҥ 1343. Civil rights
“Thé district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
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“(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons, within the jurisdiction of the United States. June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 932.”
The jurisdiction of this court, invoked under the civil rights jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, is questioned by the defendants on the theory that when the Board of Trustees of Clayton School District No. 119 officially stated they had no plan for desegregation they were not acting “under color of any State law”. This conclusion is unsound and can only be reached by traveling a tortuous path of conceptualistic reasoning.
The local school boards are a legislative creation of the State of Delaware.
An order in accordance herewith may be submitted.
. “Buie 23. * * * (a) Bepresentation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is
* * * » *
“(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought.”
. Par. 3 of the Complaint.
. Par. 5 of the Complaint.
. Par. 6 of the Complaint.
. Par. 7 of the Complaint.
. Par. 8 of the Complaint.
. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 1954, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873, hereinafter referred to as the first Brown case; Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 1955, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083, hereinafter referred to as the second Brown decision.
. 1954, 347 U.S. 483, at page 493, 74 S.Ct. at page 691.
. Id., 347 U.S. at page 495, 74 S.Ct. at page 692.
. 1955, 349 U.S. 294, at page 298, 75 S.Ct. at page 755.
. Ibid.
. “* * * the [inferior] courts will require that the defendants make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance with our May 17, 1954, ruling. Once such a start has been made, the courts may find that additional time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective manner. The burden rests upon the defendants to establish that such time is necessary in the public interest and is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date. To that end, the courts may consider problems related to administration, arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the-public schools on a nonracial basis, andl revision of local laws and regulations, which may be necessary in solving the-foregoing problems.” (Emphasis added.) Brown v. Board of Education of
. 14 Del.C.
. Steiner v. Simmons, Del.1955, 111 A.2d 574, at page 582.
. Id., 111 A.2d at page 583.
. Cf. Ex parte Commonwealth of Virginia, 1879, 100 U.S. 339, at page 347, 25 L.Ed. 676: “Whoever, by virtue of public position under a State government, deprives another of property, life, or liberty, without due process of law, or denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with the State’s power, his act is that of the State.”
In Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett, 1931, 284 U.S. 239, at page 246, 52 S.Ct. 133, at page 136, 76 L.Ed. 265, it was said: “When a state official, acting under color of state authority, invades, in the course of his duties, a private right secured by the Federal Constitution, that right is violated, even if the state officer not only exceeded his authority but disregarded special- commands of the state law.”
Finally, it has been stated, “Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the