This appeal involves a dispute between family members over family-owned farm land located in Brooks County. Clara Evans, Loretta Phelps, and Rosa Diann Ojikutu (three of the six surviving children of Charles and Fannie Phelps, both deceased) filed an action in the Brooks County Superior Court in April 2008 asserting an interest in the subject land acquired under the will of Charles Phelps and from the estate of Fannie Phelps. Named as defendants in the action were other family members with interests in the land: Cora Dunkley, Marilyn Williams, and Fanniella Lewis (the three remaining children of Charles and Fannie Phelps); Josiah Phelps (the brother of Charles Phelps and former executor of his will); Robert Simmons, Jr.; Nathaniel H. Abrams, Jr.; and Albert J. Abrams. In addition to seeking partition of the land along with an accounting and division of funds generated from management of the land, the action sought cancellation of allegedly fraudulent deeds — three executor’s deeds and a deed from Charles Phelps to Robert Simmons, Jr.
This appeal by the Plaintiffs in the action is from the grant of the Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, and from the denial of the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. In granting the Defendants’ motion and denying the Plaintiffs’ motion, the trial
The record contains deeds and other allegations purporting to establish that the farm land at issue, comprised of 131 acres more or less, had been owned since the 1950s by Charles W. Phelps, who died in January 1997, and his wife, Fannie W. Phelps, who died in November 1994. At the time of their deaths, Charles and Fannie Phelps were survived by six daughters: Clara Evans, Cora Dunkley, Loretta Phelps, Rosa Ojikutu, Marilyn Williams, and Fanniella Lewis. In January 1993, Charles Phelps deeded a 26-acre tract and a 17-acre tract to his six daughters. In March 1994, Charles Phelps deeded Fannie Phelps a 50% undivided interest in a tract of land containing about 131 acres. Fannie Phelps subsequently died intestate survived by her husband and six daughters, and her estate was never administered. Under the law of descent in effect at the time of Fannie Phelps’s death, she left various undivided interests in the 131 acres to her surviving husband and six daughters. Charles Phelps subsequently died testate owning an interest in the subject land that he acquired by deed or otherwise
The same Plaintiffs (Cora Evans, Loretta Phelps, and Rosa Diann Ojikutu) who filed the present Brooks County Superior Court action in April 2008, filed an action in November 2004 in the Peach County Superior Court against Josiah Phelps, individually and as executor of the estate of Charles Phelps. In the Peach County action, the Plaintiffs alleged that Josiah Phelps had been discharged in 1999 as executor of the estate of Charles Phelps, and sought an accounting: (1) for money he received and expended as executor of the estate of Charles Phelps with respect to the estate’s real and personal property, and (2) for money he subsequently received and expended as an individual (after being discharged as executor) with respect to real and personal property he managed in which the Plaintiffs held an interest. In November 2006, the Peach County Superior Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the defense ruling that the Plaintiffs’ claims for an accounting for Josiah Phelps’s actions as executor of the estate were barred by his discharge as executor on March 2,1999. As to the claim for an accounting for his actions taken as an individual who managed the property after his discharge, the trial court conducted a bench trial and entered a judgment in September 2007 concluding that, after being discharged as executor, Josiah Phelps contacted the Plaintiffs and all interested heirs about management of the property; that he continued to manage the property at issue on behalf of the Plaintiffs and other interested heirs;
1. The Plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred by granting the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and by denying their motion for summary judgment on the basis that the statute of limitation for fraud had expired.
The trial court erred by applying the four-year statute of limitation for fraud in this case. See OCGA §§ 9-3-30; 9-3-31; Serchion v. Capstone Partners,
The doctrine of res judicata provides that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive between the same parties and their privies “as to all matters put in issue or which under the rules of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered. . . .” OCGA § 9-12-40. “The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent the re-litigation of claims which have already been adjudicated, or which could have been adjudicated, between identical parties or their privies in identical causes of action.” Crowe v. Elder,
The Plaintiffs’ present complaint asserted claims for cancellation of three deeds fraudulently conveyed by Josiah Phelps while acting as executor of the estate of Charles Phelps, and one deed conveyed by Charles Phelps. Although the Plaintiffs’ prior Peach County Superior Court action against Josiah Phelps for an accounting of funds received and expended while managing the property at issue is factually linked to the present action for cancellation of deeds, these are different causes of action within the meaning of the res judicata doctrine set forth in OCGA § 9-12-40. As to the claims for cancellation of deeds, the trial court erred by granting the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denying the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of res judicata.
The Plaintiffs’ present complaint also asserted a claim for an accounting against the Defendants for actions taken while managing property in which the Plaintiffs hold an interest. In their motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiffs concede that, “the question of an accounting was previously litigated in the Superior Court of Peach
3. The Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred by denying their motion for summary judgment to the extent it sought a ruling that the Defendants had no legal basis to assert the defense of adverse possession as to the three separate ten-acre tracts which Plaintiffs claim were fraudulently deeded by the executor of the estate of Charles Phelps. The trial court’s summary judgment orders show that the court found it unnecessary to reach this issue because of its rulings barring Plaintiffs’ claims on the basis of the statute of limitation for fraud and the doctrine of res judicata. An issue not ruled on by the trial court presents no issue on appeal. Kirkland v. Earth Fare, Inc.,
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Notes
The record contains allegations that Charles Phelps died with an interest in real property at issue that he inherited from the estate of Levi Hall.
On appeal, the Plaintiffs argue only that res judicata did not bar their claims based on fraud.