Evans v. ChapmanEvans v. Chapman
The two basic issues presented are whether the “written notice” provision of
Prior to 1982, dental malpractice claims were governed by the two-year statute of limitations for general negligence contained in
“(A) An action for * * * malpractice, including an action for malpractice against a physician, podiatrist, hospital, or dentist * * * shall be brought within one year after the cause thereof accrued * * *.
“If a written notice, prior to the expiration of time contained in this division, is given to any person in a medical claim that an individual is presently considering bringing an action against that person relating to professional services provided to that individual, then an action by that individual against that person may be commenced at any time within one hundred eighty days after that notice is given.
“(D) As used in this section:
“(2) ‘Physician’ means all persons who are licensed to practice medicine and surgery or osteopathic medicine and surgery by the state medical board.
“(3) ‘Medical claim’ means any claim asserted in any civil action against a physician, podiatrist, or hospital arising out of the diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person.
“(5) ‘Dentist’ means all persons licensed to practice dentistry by the state dental board.
“(6) ‘Dental claim’ means any claim asserted in any civil action against a dentist arising out of a dental operation or the dental diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person.” (Emphasis added.)
Under these statutory definitions, appellant’s claim is a “[d]ental claim” as a matter of law and, by the plain words of this statute, the “written notice” provision of
Appellant also argues that this case involves not only differing treatment but also a fundamental right, i.e., “her day in court,” if the “written notice” provision is held inapplicable to her dental claim. However, all that is at stake here is a mechanism which, if used, would allow extension of the applicable statute of limitations; clearly, there is no fundamental right to an additional one hundred eighty days in which to bring suit. The statute, then, “ * * must be upheld if there exists any conceivable set of facts under which the classification rationally furthered a legitimate legislative objective.’ ” Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hospital (1983),
Although differing treatment between groups that are similarly situated may pose an equal protection problem, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia (1976),
In Denicola v. Providence Hospital, supra, we held that rational grounds exist for distinguishing between claims made against physicians and those against dentists as the Medical Malpractice Act was emergency legislation aimed at easing the growing burdens of medical malpractice. The General Assembly stated its specific concerns in this “malpractice crisis” as being claims against physicians, podiatrists, or hospitals.
These rational bases, stated above, must be presumed to exist because “* * * [s]tate legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory determination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.” McGowan v. Maryland (1961),
Appellant raises one final issue, i.e., the propriety of the trial court’s granting appellee’s motion to file his answer brief instanter (over thirty days late).
“When * * * an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion * * * (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure of the act was the result of excusable neglect * * *.”
Although it would be preferable to have an affidavit supporting appellee’s allegation that “clerical errors” had prevented the complaint from being transmitted to counsel, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion under
Judgment affirmed.