Eutues White v. Fred Finkbeiner

had full and fair to SWYGERT, Judge, opportunity White a Senior Circuit Before WOOD, and Circuit proceedings.5 court litigate and SPRECHER in the state Judges. parties’ considering the statements After pursuant to to this court Circuit submitted SWYGERT, Judge. Circuit Senior below, given we reasons Rule Supreme an order Pursuant to of and judgment court’s reverse district Court,1 case is before us for the third to the writ with instructions issue remand time. The first time we considered re- release unless he is and order White’s we the district court’s denial case reversed of ninety days within of the issuance tried ap- White’s petitioner-appellant Eutues mandate.6 this court’s corpus a writ of habeas plication for hearing.2 On evidentiary remanded for an

remand, ha- again the district court denied I. relief, finding that had not re- beas White completely our Edwards undermines during counsel a quested present to have us to holding in II and behooves White interrogation. Consequently, the judgment. reverse the district court’s that district court held the confession warn- Miranda being given after interrogation White was during made he under- acknowledged that ings, which he Arizona, 384 admissible under Miranda v. stood, stated that he was the defendant 16 L.Ed.2d U.S. Having been told willing questioned. to be judgment, appeal In an from that him in suspect implicated another had rejected the we affirmed. we crime, any denied involvement Edwards that White district court’s determination alibi, to crime, an and tried gave in the Instead, we requested had counsel. interrogating officer negotiate deal. White made such a although held had statement that he wanted a told Edwards right his request, validly he had waived to make a authority that he had no to counsel afterward.3 Thereafter, an telephoned Edwards deal. order, In its remand a few moments. attorney hung up directed decision in us to reconsider our that he want- then told the officer Edwards Arizona, light White II Edwards a deal.7- “At attorney making an before ed Edwards point, questioning ceased and (1981). Additionally, although we found it county jail.” was taken to previously,4 now unnecessary to do so morning two at 1882. next Fink- respondent-appellee must consider county at the on Edwards detectives called beiner’s that we should extend contention want that he did not jail. Although he said Powell, the rationale of Stone detectives, was told talk to the Edwards to being given additional After that he must. obtaining bar White from listening part warnings relief on of a Miranda claim the basis 2254(b), Finkbeiner, required White § 28 U.S.C. 1. White v. state remedies. exhausted the available court Finkbeiner, (7th Cir. 2. White v. 570 F.2d case, posture it is un- of this In the current 1978) ("White I”). necessary recitation of include either fuller history procedural its or a its statement Finkbeiner, 3. White 611 F.2d facts, previous opinions being adequate re- our 1979) ("White II”). garding matters. these n.9; 4. 611 200-01. F.2d at 189 al- found Arizona 7. The arguable, though question Edwards’ opportunity to Not White have an did constituted, alia, request for inter statement litigate court Miranda claim in the state S.Ct. at 1882 451 U.S. at 480 counsel. fact, fully op- proceedings, utilized uncritically accepted this deter- n.6. The Court opinions. portunity, previous as set forth mination. 196-99; 611 F.2d at 570 F.2d at 188. tape recording alleged accomplice’s 101 S.Ct. at 1884-1885 (footnote omitted). Under statement, this test Ed- Edwards confessed. Id. wards’ confession was deemed inadmissible The Supreme Court determined that Ed- because, after invoking his Miranda confession, during wards’ given second counsel, subjected Edwards was to addition- interrogation, custodial was inadmissible. initiate, al interrogation which he did not Specifically, stated: without having counsel been made available him. to 451 101 now hold that when an accused has [w]e 1885-1886. right counsel.present invoked his have to during interrogation, custodial a valid The facts of ease are this almost identical to those of In II waiver Edwards. White cannot be established we found although not clear and un by showing only responded that he to equivocal, White’s during statement an ini police-initiated further custodial interro- interrogation: tial see attor “I’d rather gation even if he been advised of his ney,” a request constituted for counsel un accused, rights. We further hold that an 611 der Miranda. F.2d at 189-90.8 Under Edwards, having expressed as requesting during after counsel desire to deal the police only interrogation, the initial White should not counsel, through subject is not further to subjected have been days two later to inter interrogation by the authorities until rogation did not initiate and be him, counsel has been made to available fore which counsel had not been made unless the accused himself initiates fur- available him.9 Consequently, to when communication, ther exchanges or con- White during confessed the second interro versations with police. gation he not validly had waived his Miran- 8. This determination was inconsistent Court had to desired formulate remand, finding rule, district court’s 611 F.2d such a it so could have indicated Ed- 189 but was consistent with the conclusion support wards Without itself. additional of the Illinois Court. See 611 F.2d at opinion, interpret Court’s we are reluctant to 188 n.8. “good incorporating excep- Edwards as faith” tion. prosecution In IIWhite we stated opinion, The Edwards where, still demonstrate a waiver even apparent counsel, S.Ct. at 1885 also cites with request after a for initiate approval decisions, Fifth two Circuit Nash v. further contact with an accused without coun- Estelle, Cir.) (en having (5th banc), sel been made available him. 611 597 F.2d 513 cert. to clearly denied, F.2d at 192. This conflicts with the 62 L.Ed.2d reproduced in Edwards text. In (1979), Thompson Wainwright, and v. previous opinion part our we also relied in (5th 1979), may impact F.2d upon Cir. upon the fact that the officers who conducted disposition According of this case. to interrogation the second did not know of Nash, Thompson, and F.2d previous request White’s at for counsel. 611 F.2d 772, where, as in both this case and Ed interroga- 192-93. Edwards the second wards, during interrogation sus tion was also conducted detectives other pect equivocal request makes an or unclear for than those who conducted Edwards’ initial in- counsel, questioning permitted further terrogation. the Court did not indi- clarify suspect’s (In request. United States opinion interrog- cate in its whether the second Nielson, 1968), v. F.2d previous request ators knew of Edwards’ for required inquiry court ed.) that such an be conduct counsel. 451 U.S. at clarifying inquiry Whether have would Thus, apparently it did not matter in Edwards permissible (or required) been White interrogators whether or not the second of the defendant’s knew counsel, equivocal request made his for previous request for counsel. interrogation additional case conducted Consequently, we believe it would be in- designed clarify request was not White’s consistent with to find con- Edwards White’s to elicit a in confession. additional interrog- fession admissible second terrogation impermissible even under request ators were informed of his for Thompson. Nash and We have no occasion to counsel. To so hold would be tantamount questioning merely consider additional whether “good exception creating a faith” to the Ed- clarify request per White’s would have been rule, interrogation wards which restricts after a missible Edwards. under counsel, suspect’s request permit might easy relatively rule. If circumvention Nor did his confession rights.

da itself constitute a valid waiver. White’s (Brennan, dissenting); United Rowe, confession was inadmissible. States ex rel. Sanders 1128 at 1141-42.11 II. looking insight may gained by Some above, previous ap As stated in two concurring opinion at the of Jus- backward decide, peals in this case we did not have to Powell, tice the author of do, urged us to respondent Finkbeiner Bustamonte, Schneckloth the rationale of whether to extend 2041, 2059-2072, L.Ed.2d Powell, (1973) (Powell, J., concurring), (1976), to bar habeas relief on Mitchell, examining Rose v. the basis of a Miranda claim. decided accompanying text. which, Stone, only in years three in its our conclusion that White is entitled to resolving argument an explicitly decision compels habeas relief under Edwards us to Fourth Amend- beyond extend Stone that question resolve now. For reasons dis ment,12 the Court held that Stone did not below, fully cussed more we decline to ex petitioner’s bar a claim of racial habeas tend Stone. discrimination in the selection of members holding deceptively of Stone is sim- grand jury by which he- was indict- ple: concurrence, ed.13 In his Schneckloth Jus- provided oppor- the state has [W]here history pur- tice examined the Powell tunity litigation for full and fair of a pose corpus. of the writ of habeas 412 U.S. claim, prison- Fourth Amendment a state at 2060-2062. Based on S.Ct. granted er not be federal habeas examination, severely criticized corpus ground relief on the that evidence permit “extension” of the writ to habeas obtained in an unconstitutional search or petitioners to raise constitutional claims at his seizure was introduced trial. having bearing guilt no on their or inno- (footnotes at 2062- at 3052 cence. 412 U.S. at However, Thus, omitted).10 the basis 2063. in Justice Powell perime- Schneckloth ter of remain ambiguous. seemingly Judge Stone obscure and embraced the thesis of holding applies Massey, on its face the in Stone Greene v. Ohio, only upon Mapp (1978). to claims based 57 L.Ed.2d 15 Predictably, garnered con Rose also underlying 11. The reasons the Court’s legal pursuing siderable attention scholars meaning as well as its are matters which have Dukes, meaning E.g. of Stone. Rose v. engendered plethora scholarly debate. Mitchell and Justice Lewis Powell: The Role of g., Halpern, Corpus E. Federal Habeas Habeas, 23 How. Federal Courts and Federal Powell, Mapp Exclusionary Rule After Stone v. Court, Note, Supreme L.J. 279 - (publication 1982 Colum.L.Rev. forthcom Term, Harv.L.Rev. ing); Development of Federal Habe Powell, Corpus Since Stone 1979 Wis.L. debate whether Part IIB of the There is some (hereinafter “Comment, Rose, Rev. 1145 cited as De opinion in which resolves ”); velopment Corpus of Federal Habeas See question be extend- whether Stone should Rowe, Also United States ex Sanders v. ed, holding. part constitutes of the Court’s Supp. (N.D.Ill.1978) (Bua, J.) F. 1142 n.37 Rose, n.3, at 582 at 3014 n.3 (collecting Stone). commentaries on (Powell, J., concurring judgment). dissenting also Justices White and Stevens 12. The Fifth Circuit declined to extend Stone to joined part opinion. of the Court’s Massey, jeopardy a double claim Greene v. including U.S. at 99 S.Ct. at 3017. 1977). In the Marshall, Justices Brennan and both of whom Court, Supreme again respondents contend- Court, majori- joined opinion of the the entire ed that Stone should be so extended. See Unit- ty agreed in Rose Rowe, ed States ex rel. Sanders v. should not be extended. See The reversing the Fifth Cir- Court, supra, at 199 n.8. cuit the did not even mention respondent’s argument based on Stone. Henry barred because Friendly his seminal article Is the asserted claim was unre- Innocence petitioner’s trial, Relevant? Collateral Attack on lated to the fairness of the Justice Powell relied more Judgments, Criminal 38 U.Chi.L.Rev. 142 on his concur- rence in than on (arguing opinion claims Schneckloth related to Rose, the Court in Stone. See guilt cognizable or innocence should be (Powell, 99 S.Ct. at 3012-3017 corpus) (cited in Schneck- concurring judgment). loth, n.12). By comparison, Stone seems of, perhaps despite, Because cryp- sweep broadly. less tic nature of virtually uniformly low- (Stone at 3052 n.37 to, er courts either have refused or have scope concerned with the of the federal not, stated in dicta that they would extend habeas statute litigating as a vehicle for beyond Fourth Amendment claims.14 generally). constitutional Rose rein- decisions, by any We are not bound of these reach, forces our view whatever its they strongly suggest the result we does not incorporate the broad-based should, do, reach in this case. jurisdiction curtailment of federal habeas A.

contemplated by Justice Powell’s concur- Indeed, rence in arguing Schneckloth. First, jurisprudential there is a reason habeas of the racial discrimi- underlying our refusal to extend Stone to nation claim at issue in Rose should be We Miranda claims.15 doubt whether we Rose, court, dicta, 3103, (1978) (claim Prior to one district in prose did 57 L.Ed.2d 1142 applied state that Stone should be claims. Richardson v. to Miranda cutor commented on defendant’s silence vio F.Supp. 421 577 Doyle Ohio, 610, lation of v. 426 U.S. 96 S.Ct. (N.D.Cal.1976). However, after Rose both the 2240, (1976)); Cowan, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 Moore v. Ninth Circuit and another district court in Cali 1298, (6th 1977), 560 F.2d 1301 Cir. cert. de independently rejected fornia the Richardson 929, nied, 1500, 435 U.S. 98 S.Ct. 55 L.Ed.2d Warden, court’s conclusion. Patterson v. San (1978) (“comment 525 on silence” claim con Obispo, (9th 1980) (per Louis 624 F.2d 69 Cir. despite sidered failure to raise trial and in Morris, curiam); Berg 179, F.Supp. v. 483 error); district court found to be harmless (E.D.Cal.1980). I, n.3 In White we stated 12, Massey, supra (double jeop Greene v. note argument” dicta that a “forceful can be made ardy claim); United States ex rel. Burton v. extending for Stone to Miranda claims. 570 1173, Cuyler, F.Supp. (E.D.Pa. 1182 n.14 prior F.2d at 200 n.2. 1977), mem., (3d 1978) aff’d 582 F.2d 1278 Cir. court also had indicated dicta that it would (dicta) (denial line-up); to counsel at not so extend Stone. United ex States (7th Perini, 8, (N.D.Ohio F.Supp. Szaraz v. Fike, 809, 1977) Henne v. 563 F.2d Cir. 1976) (suggestive claim). identification curiam), denied, 1072, (per cert. 434 U.S. Alabama, 1322, Swicegood Also v. 577 F.2d 1257, (1978). Many 55 L.Ed.2d 776 other (5th 1978) (Stone applicable Cir. where courts, dicta, holdings either in are in accord illegal line-up fruit of arrest is identification but Henne, while no other court inis accord challenge line-up procedures does not bar Harryman Estelle, with Richardson. See v. themselves) (discussed Develop 870, (5th Cir.) (en banc), F.2d denied, cert. 11, Corpus, supra, 860, ment of Federal Habeas 161, note 449 U.S. 101 S.Ct. 66 L.Ed.2d 1174). (1980) (extension argument made for first Henderson, appeal); time on Wilson v. Concurring in Brewer v. 430 U.S. 1185, (2d 1978) (dicta), F.2d Cir. cert. 387, 414, 97 S.Ct. 51 L.Ed.2d 424 denied, 945, 2892, 442 U.S. 61 L.Ed.2d (1977), “ap- Justice Powell remarked that (1979) (“The express 316 ly grounded in Stone was plicability of Stone in Fifth upon and Sixth Fourth Amendment search exclusionary rule.”); Amendment contexts raises a number of unre- and seizure issues and the 1149, wright, solved issues.” He Smith v. Wain noted that Fifth Amend- 581 F.2d 1978) (dicta); Smith, challenges ment claims often involve to the Cannistraci v. 586, (S.D.N.Y.1979) (dicta) (Stone integrity fairness of the trial or the of the fact- only applicable finding process question rationale to search and seizure and cautioned that the issues); Rowe, United States ex rel. Sanders v. whether Stone should be so extended should be 11, supra. only exploration resolved implications after S' full ruling. Supreme Lower of such a courts also have declined to extend yet implications explored Stone to claims other than Court has not extending Miranda claims. Hall, Morgan v. Stone to Miranda claims. As stated (1st denied, Cir.), text, cert. 437 U.S. believe that the Court itself inclined, so, authority implicitly so we have no believing that to do such power

have the a matter for or limit these may be to overrule Court an extension of Stone Wainwright that an v. decisions. to the extent ex- Court. tension of Stone would inconsistent Sykes, 433 U.S. (1977), Brown, Wainwright beyond it would be 53 L.Ed.2d whether question power to extend acknowledged Stone. claims. applies to Miranda also dictates that we leave an Prudence that the rule determined Wainwright Court to Miranda claims to the extension Henderson, 425 U.S. Francis Mincey noted in As Justice Marshall Court. (1976), should Arizona, 385, 402-05, 98 of a Miranda claim

govern cognizability proceeding. in a federal habeas (Marshall, J., concurring), places an habeas review of a held that federal responsibility upon additional unavailable where there Miranda claim is raising review of cases Fourth direct waiver, procedural absent has been a state by making direct review Amendment claims “prejudice.” 433 showing of “cause” and virtually vehicle examination of such claims. federal court course, many Sykes necessarily permits the Court cannot review as Wainwright Of claim, subject such were to federal court litigation habeas of a such claims as here, litigated scrutiny which was when federal habeas review was the one at issue time, court, 5, supra, them. At the same be- state available for clearly permissible under Amendment decisions litigation cause their Fourth Allen, subject in the likely Brown v. are less to be to review courts, 97 L.Ed. 469 which was cited in federal state courts be less like- viability ly without its continued to follow the Fourth Amendment deci- Wainwright circuits, causing being questioned. respective sions of their permitted increasing develop habeas inconsistencies to 2506. Brown n which were raised in state court. Amendment law.” The “Fourth the eventually forecloses habeas Court must harmonize incon- Stone by granting were not do arise certio- only litigated not of claims sistencies which which therefore, (and, procedurally raising rari in more cases Fourth Amend- in state court cases), invariably almost ment claims on direct review. Alternative- waived most but increasingly live with litigated ly, simply bars claims which were so as well. must law.” Wheth- Development of Federal Ha diverse “Fourth Amendment place pressure at 1153-67. such on the Corpus, supra beas er to additional by accept diversity to Miranda claims or to extend Stone Court Wainwright and law” are matters which implication would overrule “Fifth Amendment Clearly, even itself should resolve.17 Brown v. Allen.16 if we were the Court respect initially whether to so extend L.Ed. 969 should decide claims, we note that the Miranda Stone. Amendment but that Rose v. to Fourth merely unwillingness claim not involve at issue here does the Mitchell indicates Court’s Miranda, “technical” violation of such as the In this resurrect the Frank rule for all claims. complete warnings give at issue in failure to view, effectively much of Stone Rose overrules Tucker, Michigan v. Note, Scope Brown. See and reaffirms Rather, (1974). the Mi- Corpus Review: Rose v. Mitch- Federal Habeas which occurred this case randa violation 948, 958, ell, B.C.L.Rev. protection recog- denied White the most crucial right in Miranda —the to have counsel nized interesting illuminating discus- 17. For an interrogation. present during a custodial interplay state and federal the between sion of 469-71, Miranda, at 1625- 384 U.S. at corpus federal habeas and the role of courts 1626. Aleinikoff, jurisdiction, & Dialectical see Cover Court, Corpus Habeas Federalism: Indeed, argued Stone itself it has been that Yale L.J. 1035 and reinstated retreated from Brown v. Allen regime Mangum, the of Frank v. exclusionary applied B. rule need not be proceedings. at assuming Even that we extend 489-94, 3050-3052; claims, generally S.Ct. at Stone to Miranda are addition- there Comment, Development al refusing reasons for to so extend Stone of Federal Habeas here. primarily employed Corpus, supra note at 1150-53.18 analysis a utilitarian to determine that analysis The utilitarian the utilized Fourth claims should not Amendment logically may be limited to cognizable corpus proceed- in federal habeas Mapp exclusionary rule. United States ings. at It Sanders, F.Supp. ex rel. at 1142. In- applying balanced the costs of the Fourth deed, in other contexts the Court has uti- such proceedings against Amendment analysis lized such an ap- determine the benefits an application of such and found plicability of E.g., Michigan Miranda. the former outweighed latter. Tucker, Having already stated Fourth (1974) (prosecution L.Ed.2d 182 use of testi- exclusionary per- Amendment rule is not a mony of whose identity witness was made sonal constitutional “judicially police pre-Miranda known to in defendant’s created of effectuating rights means Amendment,” interrogation trial to which Mi- Stone, secured the Fourth 3046-3048, applied).19 randa partially because of Court held the Fourth Amendment the limited deterrence which would result intuitively 18. We applying believe that resulted from criteria intrinsic Fourth to the primarily majority Amendments, dissatisfaction of a and Fifth resolves Mapp of the Court with the rule. See succeeding simply by declaring cases that so 496-502, 428 U.S. at 3053-3056 enough much exclusion is to deter mis- J., (Burger, concurring); C. id. hardly conduct. That conforms to disci- J., (White, dissenting). S.Ct. at 3072 3074 plined analytical ‘legal method described application Foreclosing the rule on ha reasoning’ through judges endeavor to corpus way beas was one it to limit without principles formulate or derive of decision itself, overruling Mapp ap votes applied consistently predict- that can be parently forthcoming. been have not See Unit ably. Sanders, ed States ex rel. [B]y treating . .. Fourth and Fifth Amend- justices Of the on the Court who have com schemes, privileges ment as mere incentive however, upon question, mented denigrates unique their status as expressly urged extending Chief Justice protections. constitutional Stone to Miranda claims. Brewer v. Havens, 620, 633-34, United States v. 430 U.S. at 1912, 1919-1920, (Burger, J., dissenting). C. As discussed (Brennan, dissenting) (citations omit 15, supra, recognized Justice Powell has ted) (emphasis original); see also that such an extension raises unresolved issues (Brennan, U.S. at 96 S.Ct. at 3060-3062 require the Court’s close examination. J., dissenting). Legal joined scholars the have 414, Brewer v. 430 97 S.Ct. at Compare Monaghan, debate. The J., (Powell, Moreover, concurring). 1247 the Court, 1974 Term — Foreword: Constitutional simply has not been as hostile to Miran Law, (1975), Common 89 Harv.L.Rev. 1 Mapp. E.g., da as it has been to Welsh, Reconsidering Schrock & the Constitu (unanimous decision defendant’s confes Law, tional Common Harv.L.Rev. Miranda). sion was obtained violation of (1978). ques We will not resolve the difficult fact, recently the Court extended Miranda. See by application tions raised the of a utilitarian Smith, 454, 1866, Estelle v. 451 U.S. 101 S.Ct. analysis availability to determine the of the (1981) J.) (Burger, (applying C. exclusionary rule. in-custody, psychiat Miranda to court-ordered examination). ric Michigan 19. In Tucker the Court found others, Among ques- Justice has Brennan reliability was not at issue both suspect had not incriminated the legal applica- tioned the basis for the Court’s and be- himself analysis tion of a utilitarian to determine the suspect’s cause the whom witness to the state- availability exclusionary the rule: subject police ments lead the was to cross-ex- Court has undertaken to strike a ‘bal- [T]he 449, amination at trial. 417 U.S. at at 94 S.Ct. ‘policies’ the ance’ between it finds in the Bill case, present 2366. Unlike the the statement Rights ‘competing interes[t]’ suppressed of the er, was in Tuck- accused himself accurate trial determinations. This balanc- ing 437, 417 U.S. at at completely freewheeling. effort is Far rule, primary justification cause the Mapp contrary permit of a ted the defendant who “the impeachment police rule is deterrence conduct own behalf with statements testifies in his rights,” Fourth Amendment violates Miranda. otherwise inadmissible under 3048, 486, at it 428 U.S. has been Hass, 714, E.g., Oregon v. U.S. provides criticized no recom- because “[i]t 1215, Harris v. New L.Ed.2d pense the innocent and it frees York, Schneckloth, guilty.” background, we Against may (Powell, concurring) 93 S.Ct. 2068 n.26 assume that a decision whether to extend (iquoting Oaks, Studying Exclusionary to be Stone Miranda should informed Seizure, Rule in and 37 U.Chi.L.Rev. Search by analysis. Applying utilitarian an (1970)). however, analysis, appreci find that the By comparison, pro- Miranda includes two able the Miranda differences between and safeguard, phylactic procedural rules: a Mapp support rules our conclusion warnings, form of to effectu- required extension to Miranda claims would of Stone privilege against ate the Fifth Amendment Compare be unwarranted. United States self-incrimination; exclusionary and an Sanders, Halpern, supra; ex rel. note remedy warning require- enforce (suggesting that Stone supra 444, 479, Miranda, ment. 384 U.S. at claims), should not be extended Miranda necessary predi- Comment, Development of Federal cate of Miranda is the Court’s determina- 1174.20 Corpus, Habeas against privilege tion that the self-incrimi- First, rights by the Fourth secured applies during police in- nation protection against Amendment unreason- terrogation. 384 U.S. able seizures searches and are not inextrica- privi- 1620-1621. Fifth Amendment bly accuracy linked to the fairness and lege, against like the use of prohibition the criminal as is Amend- process, the Fifth confessions, involuntary “un- reinforces the against ment privilege self-incrimination. derlying in the of our principle enforcement Sanders, United States ex criminal that ours an accusatorial law: As viewed system inquisitorial system and not an —-a intended Fourth Amendment “was guilt by must in which the state establish protect of a home ‘sanctity man’s freely secured independently evidence life,’ privacies Boyd States, v. United prove charge may coercion its 616, 630, 524, 532, 29 L.Ed. against the out of his own mouth.” accused from searches under unchecked Richmond, 534, 541, Rogers general authority.” Stone, (cid:127) Conse- (footnote omitted). 96 S.Ct. at 3046 Al- which, rule, quently, Mapp ac- unlike though frequently implicated in they are designed cording to de- process, criminal Fourth Amendment values just ter conduct in order to foster privacy may frequently values be not, implicated may, may implicated proceedings where criminal are contemplated. process, rights neither nor be- likely criminal secures Mitchell, 20. Rose in Rose Fourth Amendment and ed between claims, broad, for the at 561- L.Ed.2d 739 stand racial discrimination 64, unremarkable, proposition present but are claims at materially respect which different from Fourth claims. we do are Miranda narrowly require the claims are not barred not read Rose so as to Amendment Stone. application all which do not The Rose noted that in Stone the Court Stone to claims Court of stressed narrowness of its decision. differ from Fourth Amendment claims the “Mindful ...” claims. of limited reach of Stone same manner as racial discrimination [the] 560, Court, supra at S.Ct. the But see The note at at proceeded (suggesting claims the differences between Rose to consider impugning of trial or correc- the racial there at the fairness state discrimination claim issue cognizable procedures presented federal Fourth Amendment claim tive should course, many corpus). Stone. Of of the differences not- habeas inextricably which are linked to the federal judiciary by Ameri precluding litigation of sense, law, can theory of criminal in a a ubiquitous claim on federal habeas corpus. rule, are its heart. unlike Mapp Schneckloth, Also 412 U.S. at 263- solely 65, Miranda rules were not intended (Pow- 93 S.Ct. at 2066-2067 behavior, egregious police ell, to deter J., but concurring).21 protect suspect’s a criminal exercise of the objectives Neither of these would be ac- privilege which is one of the distinctive complished by extending to Miranda components of our criminal law. Cf. Es likely, stripped claims. Most of ability Smith, 454, 466-67, telle v. U.S. claim, raise petition- habeas L.Ed.2d er challenge having would his confession as C., 707, 719-20, Fare v. Michael involuntarily. been made This would com- 2560, 2568-2569, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 pel federal courts habeas to return to the (1979); United ex Riley States v. Fran case-by-case “totality-of-the-circumstances” zen, (7th Cir.), 1158-61 cert. which, extent, test great Miranda re- - denied, -, U.S. placed. application (primary purpose of Mi uncertain, “old” test is more friction result- randa protect suspect’s is to exercise of ing differing decisions state and Fifth Amendment privilege against self-in courts, federal at times between a state crimination). supreme court, court federal trial sense,

In this the racial discrimination not be significantly would reduced by ex- Mitchell, claim at issue in Rose v. tending Stone to Miranda claims. More- supra, to which over, refused to extend application “totality” likely of test Stone, is more like a Miranda claim than it require expenditure would of more fed- is like a Fourth Amendment claim. As the judicial application eral resources than of Rose recognized, on the comparatively perspicuous Miranda “[discrimination of especially pernicious basis race ... is rules. justice.” of administration The Rose Finally, another consideration in Stone Court also that the of noted exclusion indi- was the Court’s belief evidence seized viduals from a grand jury on basis of of violation the Fourth Amendment uni race “strikes at the fundamental values of view, formly According is reliable. to this ” judicial Rose, system . ... atU.S. application yields of Mapp typically only a 555-56, 99 S.Ct. at 2999-3000. guilty. windfall for the U.S. Second, n.31; almost en- see 490 - tirely litigation eliminated n.2, Fourth also Brewer v. at 413 J., Amendment pro- (Powell, 97 S.Ct. at 1247 n.2 concurring); ceedings. The Schneckloth, (Powell, J., Stone Court believed that elimination was beneficial in at concurring); Develop least two respects. 428 S.Ct. ment Corpus, of Federal Habeas potential 3051 n.31. It avoided one (discussing applicability at 1171 n.174 source of friction between state federal Stone where fruit unlawful arrest identification).22 courts. It also reduced the workload of if line-up Even this con- Ohio, Mapp prohibition general against Unlike unreasonable Miranda had sev- searches and seizures. provided police eral It beneficial effects. guidelines, Rose, promoting self-regulation light permitted concrete habeas reasonably ensuring admissibility claim, non-guilt-related of a it would every confessions when appear its dictates are followed. Mi- that Stone does not bar claim gave easily applicable randa non-guilt, also lower courts be characterized as many Rose, non-reliability-related. rules and obviated in instances the case- But see by-case analysis previously (Powell, utilized to resolve challenges Court, concurring judgment); to confessions. No such benefits accompanied Mapp, putative which contained a at 203-05. component nothing clarify may longer require remedial and did basis Stone no of con- mandate, the issuance of this court’s unless viable, 22, supra, still see is sideration period. within that retried fairly be characteriz- White is cannot Miranda claims In John- entirely non-guilt-related. ed as and Remanded. Reversed 719, 86 S.Ct. Jersey, 384 U.S. son v. New apply not to Miran- deciding in WOOD, Jr., Circuit HARLINGTON although acknowledg- retroactively and da concurring. Judge, overinclusive, ing that it was II, Judge District agreed I In White against guards] observed: “[Miranda construing the defendant’s brief Morgan in every statements of unreliable possibility official to be with a conversation interrogation .... in-custody instance counsel, although it was for request safeguards important new provide[s] [I]t Supreme Court close determination. statements against the use of unreliable however, Illinois, found otherwise.1 had trial.” reminded Sum- then I have been Since Whitson, F.2d Also United States See Mata, ner v. 1978). regard, Judge Morgan and (1981), that L.Ed.2d 722 creating per se may be viewed as Miranda that factual disregard free to I are not that of confes- the voluntariness regarding rule is, I court. That of the state conclusion requirements unless the sions: be. agree, as it should cannot be satisfied a confession have been compelled I am Now, view of “totality-of- voluntary said under to be to issue as I directing the writ to concur in Miranda, 384 test. the-circumstances” nothing suggest in the record to Although the 86 S.Ct. at 1619. with the offi- White “initiated” the contact voluntary requirement that a confession confession, although led to his cers which solely not rest in order to be admissible does circumstances examined there were other neither is the reliability, for concern that there opinion suggested our first wholly divorced reliability of confession to counsel if a waiver of had been Rogers v. Rich- from its voluntariness. requested. had been in fact counsel 739-740; mond, Tucker, Michigan see also v. Powell to extend ready am I Stone Nor Therefore, Judge at 2366 n.23. join I in this case. in its new analysis of this case Swygert’s reasons, conclude that For these configuration. the rationale of was not barred White since the passed have years ha- obtaining from federal About v. Powell murder guilty found that his confession ground on the defendant beas relief that our regrettable It trial. under Miranda. the state was inadmissible this conclusion bring us to judicial processes practical late date at such a III. remote. surely a retrial are chances of that White’s confession Having concluded and that the rationale was inadmissible preclude granting v. Powell does not case, we reverse the

habeas relief in this remand the district court and

judgment of the writ and or- grant

with instructions ninety days of release within

der White’s Soloff, Litigation Also, Powell U.Rich.L.Rev. itself Justice sideration. of Federal Relitigation: Status The Uncertain guilt/innocence emphasis ra- shifted Prisoners, Corpus 6 Hofstra for State Habeas expounded in Schneckloth to a utili- tionale necessary analysis. L.Rev. 297 have been tarian This Boyte, majority the Court. to attract a White, Corpus N.E.2d 457 People After Stone v. Powell: Federal Habeas 61 Ill.2d Only Arguably Remedy Innocent? A the.

Case Details

Case Name: Eutues White v. Fred Finkbeiner

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Date Published: Mar 26, 1982

Citation: 687 F.2d 885

Docket Number: 79-1563

Court Abbreviation: 7th Cir.