15 Utah 67 | Utah | 1897
This case was commenced before a justice of the peace, and the defendant, after having been convicted of a violation of an ordinance of Eureka City which forbids the
The record presents several questions, raised on behalf of the appellant, respecting the rulings of the district court as to the sufficiency of the complaint before the justice of the peace, and the allowance of amendments thereto. These questions simply relate to the interpretation which the district court put upon various provisions of statute, and do not affect the validity or constitutionality of a statute. We have no power to consider such questions in this class of cases, because, under section 9 of article 8 of the constitution, the decision of a district court on all questions except those affecting the validity or constitutionality of a statute is final and conclusive. We so held in the case of City of Eureka v. Wilson (decided at the present term), 15 Utah 53, to which we refer for our opinion on this point. In that case we also discussed the question whether an appeal would lie in a case like one where the validity of a city ordinance, and not of a statute, is involved; and on the authority of that case, and in conformity with it, we hold that the appeal herein was properly taken, and that we have jurisdiction to determine the validity of the ordinance under which the appellant was convicted, but have no jurisdiction to determine any other question presented.
The principal question to be determined in this case, therefore, is whether the ordinance under which the appellant was convicted and fined is constitutional and valid. Counsel on behalf of the appellant insists that it conflicts with section 1 of article 14 of the amendments to the constitution of the United States, and that it delegates legislative power to a committee of the city council, and is therefore void. The provisions of the ordinance
Section 1 of the ordinance in question in this case defines the fire limits of Eureka City. Section 2, above quoted, in conformity with the statutes, prescribes the kind of material to be used in the construction of build
The fact that the proviso is void, however, affords no sufficient reason to declare the whole ordinance invalid. The ordinance is capable of enforcement independent of the proviso. The provision defining the fire limits and , the prohibition against the erection therein of buildings of inflammable material, except certain described classes of buildings, are complete, distinct, absolute, and apparently in no essential manner dependent upon the void provision. It is apparent from the valid portion of the ordinance that the council intend to prohibit the construction of buildings of the objectionable material, so as to promote the security and protection of persons and property, and the good order of the city; and the council itself doubtless has authority, under the statute, to exercise the power, in a proper manner, which it attempted to delegate to the committee. There is nothing apparent which would justify this court in holding that the city council would not have enacted the ordinance except in connection with the proviso. The provisions contained in, and those referring to, the proviso, must be stricken out as invalid and inoperative; and the remaining provisions of section 2 may stand in connection with the other sections of the ordinance. It is a well-settled rule that where the portion of a statute or ordinance which is
It follow's that the erection, within the fire limits of Eureka City, of buildings of combustible material other than such as are provided for in the ordinance, was unlawful, and that the appellant, having erected and maintained a building of the class prohibited, was guilty of an
There appears to be no reversible error in the record. The judgment is affirmed.