760 F.3d 892 | 8th Cir. | 2014
Lead Opinion
Appellants, the father and minor children of the deceased Samuel De Boise, brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Officers Bret Lively and Joseph Percich of the St. Louis County Police Department and a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against St. Louis County, Missouri.
I.
De Boise suffered from schizophrenia, which caused him to experience serious psychotic episodes. On the evening of July 7, 2008, De Boise became delusional and left his home naked. The next morning, neighbors reported seeing De Boise roaming the neighborhood, beating houses with a stick, and claiming to be God. That night, De Boise returned home still naked and delusional. He continued to claim he was God, demanded that his mother worship him, and held her head down to the floor. Eventually, De Boise headed to the back of the home, and his mother left the house and called 911 from a neighbor’s phone. The St. Louis Police department dispatched officers describing the call as a “violent OBS,” meaning that the subject was emotionally disturbed, acted violently, or used physical force against people or property.
Officer Arthur Williams arrived on the scene first, and De Boise’s mother immediately informed him of her son’s behavior and physical aggression toward her.
While De Boise was still in the home, five more officers arrived on the scene: Officers Joseph Percich, Bret Lively, Mike Kaemmerer, Jacob Maechling, and Chris Money. De Boise’s mother informed the officers that she had a firearm in the house and that De Boise was schizophrenic. Officer Percich heard extremely loud noises coming from the home, including screaming, glass breaking, and heavy furniture being thrown. De Boise then exited the house still naked and referring to himself as God. Officer Percich took command of the scene and aimed his taser gun at De Boise as he exited the home. Officer Maechling instructed De Boise to walk out on the grass and lie face down on the ground. De Boise complied. Officer Per-cich holstered his taser and began to approach De Boise to handcuff him. De Boise immediately jumped to his feet, clenching his fist, and glaring in Officer Percich’s direction. Officer Maechling continued to instruct De Boise to lie on the grass, but De Boise did not comply. Believing that De Boise posed a threat to the officers, Officer Percich instructed De Boise several times to lie down. When De Boise refused, Officer Percich yelled out “taser, taser, taser” and fired his Taser Model X-26 ECD in barb mode. The darts penetrated De Boise’s chest and the taser delivered a five-second electrical shock. De Boise immediately fell to the ground on his back with his arms and fists clenched to his chest.
When an X-26 Taser trigger is pulled, two darts with wires attached are deployed toward the target. Once the darts make contact, an electrical circuit is completed and the device automatically cycles five seconds of electrical current, immobilizing the subject. J.A. 440.
After the first taser discharge, De Boise continued to struggle and ignore the officers’ demands to remain on the ground, and Officer Percich followed with a second five-second cycle.
Officer Lively delivered another taser cycle, after which Officers Percich and Money attempted to handcuff De Boise. De Boise kicked at the officers, and Officer Lively took the cartridge out of his taser and applied the taser on De Boise’s leg twice, this time in drive stun mode.
Appellants filed suit, alleging excessive force against Officers Lively and Percich under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and violations of the ADA against St. Louis County. Officers Percich and Lively moved for summary judgment on the excessive-force claim based on qualified immunity. St. Louis County also moved for summary judgment on the ADA violation claim. The district court granted the officers’ motion, finding the use of force objectively, reasonable in light of the fact that De Boise repeatedly failed to comply with the officers’ commands to submit and continued to actively resist arrest. The court found it undisputed that De Boise continued to get up despite the officers’ instructions to lie down, walked toward the officers, and kicked and flailed his arms when the officers attempted to arrest him. The court further determined that even if the officers’ actions amounted to excessive force in violation De Boise’s Fourth Amendment rights, the law at the time of the incident would not have placed a reasonable officer on notice that multiple tas-ings under the circumstances violated a clearly established right.
The district court also granted St. Louis County’s motion for summary judgment, finding that no violation of the ADA occurred because the officers were faced with unexpected and exigent circumstances to which no reasonable accommodations could be made until after the scene was safely secured. This appeal followed.
II.
“Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability in a § 1983 action unless the official’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known.” Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 495 (8th Cir.2009). We review a district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and giving the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Carpenter v. Gage, 686 F.3d 644, 648 (8th Cir.2012), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 955, 184 L.Ed.2d 728 (2013).
To determine the question of qualified immunity, we engage in the following two-part inquiry: “(1) whether the facts shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Brown, 574 F.3d at 496. Courts have discretion to decide which part of the inquiry to address first. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). Here, we begin with second inquiry. Though the outcome of this encounter was tragic, and even if the reasonableness of the officers’ actions was questionable, Appellants cannot defeat the officers’ defense of qualified immunity unless they are able to show that a reasonable officer would have been on notice that the officers’ conduct violated a clearly established right.
“When determining whether an action was a clearly established constitutional violation, we look to the state of the law at the time of the incident,” Shekleton v. Eichenberger, 677 F.3d 361, 366 (8th Cir.2012); the relevant time here being July 8, 2008. The pertinent inquiry is “ ‘whether it would be clear to a reason
Although we have determined that non-violent, non-fleeing subjects have a clearly established right to be free from the use of tasers, see Brown, 574 F.3d at 499-500, we have yet to determine whether a violent subject, acting aggressively toward officers, has a clearly established right to be free from multiple tasings. See Clark v. Ware, 873 F.Supp.2d 1117, 1123 (E.D.Mo.2012) (holding that the court could not determine as a matter of law that the repeated use of a taser on a subject that was physically resisting the police violated a clearly established right as of November 2009). Indeed, in 2008, case law related to the use of tasers was still developing. See McKenney v. Harrison, 635 F.3d 354, 361-62 (8th Cir.2011) (Murphy, J. concurring). And, Appellants point to no previous case that could be said to have clearly established the unconstitutionally of the officers’ actions here. Accordingly, the state of the law would not have placed “an officer on notice that he must limit the use of his taser in certain circumstances, even though the subject continues to struggle and resist.” Clark, 873 F.Supp.2d at 1122.
Appellants are correct that the particular action in question need not have been previously held unlawful in order for a court to determine that a government official has indeed violated a clearly established right. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (“[A] general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though the very action in question has [not] previously been held unlawful.” (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In support of their claim, Appellants rely on Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898 (11th Cir.2009). In Oliver, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the multiple tasings of a mentally ill subject was excessive force and violated the subject’s clearly established right. 586 F.3d at 908. Although the court acknowledged that there was no prior decision in which a court had determined such acts violated a clearly established right, the court, nonetheless, reasoned the right was clearly established because the subject was tased multiple times without warning, he was not suspected of any crime, did not act belligerent or aggressively, and had complied with most of the officers’ commands. Id. at 907-08. The court determined, based on the facts alone, no reasonable officer would have believed that the repeated tasings were constitutionally permissible under the circumstances. Id. at 908.
Although Oliver and the case before us both involve the tasing of an emotionally disturbed individual, the facts of the two cases are not sufficiently aligned. Similar to Oliver, De Boise suffered from a mental illness of which the officers were aware. However, unlike in Oliver, the officers in this case observed De Boise aggressively approaching one of the officers, his continued noncompliance with the officers’ instructions to lie on the ground, and his violent and aggressive behavior, which included kicking and swinging his arms at the officers once they approached to subdue him. These important distinctions lead us to conclude that no reasonable officer, observing De Boise’s behavior, would have understood the actions taken to be so dis
Appellants also claim that the officers’ training placed them on notice that their actions violated a clearly established right. We disagree. Certainly, the officers training manual instructed that “[Emotionally disturbed persons] ... may not comply with verbal commands following the TA-SER cycle” and were informed that “[e]aeh cycle should be used as a ‘window of opportunity’ to attempt to establish control/cuff while the subject is affected by the TASER cycle.” However, the training manual further instructed officers to “[m]ove in and control the subject while TASER device is cycling and the subject is incapacitated when it is reasonably safe to do so.” Officer Percich testified that, due to the placement of De Boise’s hands and the placement of the taser wires, it was not safe to handcuff De Boise after the initial tasings. We are not persuaded that a reasonable officer, having the same training, would be on notice that using his discretion to forgo the “window of opportunity” due to the unsafe conditions violated the subject’s clearly established right. We, therefore, hold that even if Officers Percich’s and Lively’s repeated tasings of De Boise amounted to excessive force in violation of De Boise’s Fourth Amendment rights, such rights were not clearly established at the time of the incident.
III.
Next, the Appellants argue that because Officers Percich and Maechling had received Crisis Intervention Team training along with the Taser training, the
Important here, the officers received information that De Boise had assaulted his mother and observed De Boise’s aggressive and irrational behavior and his continued non-compliance with their demands. Due to the unexpected and rapidly evolving circumstances, the officers were not required “to hesitate to consider other possible actions in the course of making such split-second decisions.” Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801-02. Moreover, the “use of force” on De Boise was “not by reason of [De Boise’s] disability, but because of [his] objectively verifiable misconduct.” Bates ex rel. Johns v. Chesterfield Cnty., Va., 216 F.3d 367, 373 (4th Cir.2000). Accordingly, the facts before us do not contemplate any violation of the ADA.
IV.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the individual officers and St. Louis County.
. Appellants brought other claims against the Appellees that were dismissed voluntarily.
. The Honorable Terry I. Alderman, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
.While the parties dispute whether De Boise’s mother informed the officers that her son had tried to kill her, it is undisputed the officers were informed De Boise had terrified his mother and held his mother's head to the floor.
. Importantly, Appellants do not dispute the reasonableness of the initial two tasings.
. Deploying the taser in drive stun mode means that an officer removes the cartridge from the taser and applies the taser so as to make direct contact with the subject’s body. When the taser is in drive stun mode, it only causes discomfort and does not incapacitate the subject.
. The dissent cites Hickey v. Reeder, 12 F.3d 754 (8th Cir.1993) to support its contention that it was unreasonable for the officers, in July 2008, to have believed their actions were unlawful. We find this case and the dissent’s application of it unpersuasive for three reasons. First, the question before us is whether the application of multiple tasings on a subject actively resisting arrest in the circumstances faced by the officers amounts to a clear violation of his constitutional rights, not whether the initial use of a taser/stun gun on a nonviolent inmate to enforce a housekeeping order is unconstitutional. See Hickey, 12 F.3d at 758-59 (determining whether the type of force used was an unnecessaiy and wanton infliction of pain in violation of the Eighth Amendment). Here, the Appellants do not dispute the initial taser application but take issue with the subsequent taser shocks administered to De Boise. Appellants' Br. 21-22. Second, in Hickey, we gave significant weight to the fact that the inmate was nonviolent and tased due to his failure to comply with a housekeeping order to sweep his cell. Hickey, 12 F.3d at 758-59. Here, officers observed De Boise’s irrational behavior and repeated acts of aggression towards the officers, actions absent from the circumstances in Hickey. Finally, in Hickey, the fact that the officers failed to "take advantage of [the inmate's] incapacitation to neutralize any perceived theat to their safety” was relevant to the officer's subjective state of mind in using the stun gun. Id. at 757. That is, we noted that the lack of any attempt to "remove, isolate, or restrain” the inmate demonstrated that the motive in using the stun gun was not based on any fear for the safety of the officers. Id. at 757-58. Here, the motive for using the taser is not at issue. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397-98, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (acknowledging the absence of a subjective state of mind inquiry under Fourth Amendment claims). Moreover the officers, after having made a few attempts, did successfully subdue De Boise when it was safe to do so, though we recognize that officers may not always have the opportunity to subdue a subject hands-on, particularly when such action poses a risk to the safety of the officers on the scene and when split-second decisions must be made. See McKenney v. Harrison, 635 F.3d 354, 360 (8th Cir.2011); see also Johnson v. Carroll, 658 F.3d 819, 826 (8th Cir.2011) ("[P]olice officers are often forced to make split-second judgments about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”).
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I disagree the officers are entitled to qualified immunity for the tasing death of De Boise. Instead, I believe a jury should determine whether the officers violated De Boise’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force by continuing to tase De Boise without attempting to handcuff him. I therefore respectfully dissent from Part II of the decision affirming the district court.
The court analyzes only the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis. See Fourte v. Faulkner Cnty., Ark., 746 F.3d 384, 387 (8th Cir.2014) (noting two-part test for qualified immunity). The court concludes the state of the law in 2008 would not have placed an officer on notice he must limit the use of his taser. I believe the law placed an officer on notice he could not continuously tase a suspect when safer alternatives were reasonably available to constrain De Boise in order to effectuate an arrest.
First, construing the facts in the light most favorable to De Boise, I would find a
Second, I would find the officers were put on notice in 2008 that continuously tasing a suspect until his death was unlawful. To determine whether an action was a clearly established constitutional violation, we look to the state of the law at the time of the incident, and the correct inquiry is whether it is clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful. Shekleton v. Eichenberger, 677 F.3d 361, 366-67 (8th Cir.2012). The test does not require “there be a case with materially or fundamentally similar facts,” Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 499 (8th Cir.2009), but rather merely whether “ ‘it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.’ ” Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)).
“The right to be free from excessive force in the context of an arrest is clearly established under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Brown, 574 F.3d at 499. A reasonable officer would know only reasonable force can be used to effect an arrest. Although tasing a suspect can be reasonable force in certain circumstances, tasing rises to a “significant level of force.” McKenney v. Harrison, 635 F.3d 354, 364 (8th Cir.2011) (Murphy, J., concurring). Even without a ease decided on materially or fundamentally similar facts, a reasonable officer in 2008 would have known “the use of tasers requires sufficient justification for their use to be reasonable.” Id. There are, and long have been, limits on officers tasing suspects. In Hickey v. Reeder, 12 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir.1993), we found an Eighth Amendment violation where a jailor applied a stun gun, and there were six or seven officers present, but the officers failed to “take advantage of [the inmate’s] incapacitation to neutralize any perceived threat to their safety.” We also noted, as relevant to the Eighth Amendment analysis, the officers failed to “remove, isolate, or restrain” the inmate. Id. In this case, the officers were on notice they should have attempted to handcuff De Boise as a safer alternative to tasing De Boise with fifty seconds of electrical shock in just over two minutes of time. It would be clear to a reasonable officer that failing to seize De Boise with reasonable force was unlawful.
Because the officers’ actions are not protected by qualified immunity, I would remand this case for trial where a jury can determine whether it was reasonable the officers continued to tase De Boise until his death and seemingly without taking the available opportunities to handcuff and restrain De Boise.
