Appellants, Euclid Terrace Corporation and James Simkin, appeal from an adverse judgment of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis denying their petition to redeem from foreclosure certain real estate of which thе corporate appellant had been the record owner. No reason is assigned why the individual appellant joined in the petition to redeem; presumably it may have been thought that since, as he testified, he оwned all of the stock in the corporate appellant, it was merely his alter ego.
The property involved is situated in Block 3885 of the City of St. Louis, and fronts approximately 98 feet on the west line of Euclid Avenue. The prеdecessor in title of appellant Euclid Terrace Corporation was one Opal J. Emde, who on March 25, 1955, executed and delivered to Gloria Zewiski a negotiable promissory note for $170,000 due six months after date, with intеrest from date at the rate of 5%, which note was secured by a deed of trust on the real estate here involved. Subsequently, on February 1, 1956, Opal J. Emde executed and delivered to Gloria Zewiski another negotiable promissоry note for $20,000 due March 31, 1956, with interest from date at the rate of 8%, secured by a second deed of trust on the same property. Appellants’ evidence was that Opal J. Emde was, in fact, the straw party for James Simkin and that on April 12, 1956, Simkin had Emde convey the title to Euclid Terrace Corporation, which Simkin had caused to be organized.
Both notes and deeds of trust being in default, on December 26, 1956, a written agreement was entered into by the Euclid Terrace Cоrporation and James Simkin on the one hand, and Gloria Zewiski on the other, by which it was agreed that the maturity of each of the two notes was extended to June 30, 1957 and that interest on both from January 1, 1957, to the new maturity date was to be at the rate of 6% per annum, and 8% thereafter. This agreement was not signed by Gloria Zewiski but was signed by Edward L. Weise as her attorney.
Default was again made on both notes and deeds of trust. Thereupon, at the request of the respondent, the trustee foreclosed under the second note and deed of trust on September 24, 1957 and the property was bought in at the sale by the respondent. On the same day, hut prior to the sale, appellants served upоn the trustee a notice of their intention to re *544 deem, and on October 12, 1957, appellants served upon Edward L. Weise, as attorney for respondent, a notice that it would, on October 14, 1957, file in the Circuit Court its petition to redеem. A copy of the petition and redemption bond accompanied the notice served on Weise. The transcript discloses that the petition and bond were filed on the latter date, presented to the court below, and that the hearing on the petition and bond was continued to October 23, 1957. The record further reveals that the hearing was commenced on that day but because of the press of other matters on its docket was continued by the court until October 31, 1957, on which day the hearing was concluded.
Respondent stipulated at the hearing that Gloria Zewiski, the payee named in both promissory notes, was its nominee, and that it was, in fact, the ownеr and holder of both notes and deeds of trust. Appellants offered its redemption bond, in the amount of $12,000 executed by both appellants as principals and by one Harvey E. Morris as surety. On behalf of appellants, Simkin testified аs to his method of computing the amount of the bond, and the authority given him by the corporate appellant to redeem the property. Morris, also called by appellants, testified as to the nature and extent оf his property and the state of his financial condition. At the . conclusion of the hearing on October 31, 1957, the court below entered a judgment finding “ * * * that the petitioners are not entitled to the relief prayed for in their petition” and adjudging “ * * * that the petition herein be and the same is hereby denied * *
Neither appellants nor respondents requested the court below to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, for which reason the record dоes not disclose the basis of the trial court’s decision. In its brief, respondent urges a number of grounds to sustain the action of the trial court: (1) because the redemption bond presented by appellants was in an insufficient amоunt; (2) because appellants’ service on respondent’s attorney, rather than on respondent, of the notice of their intention to file their petition to redeem and their redemption bond was a nullity, so that the cоurt lacked jurisdiction of the matter; (3) because appellants failed to present and obtain approval of the redemption bond within the statutory 20 day period following the foreclosure sale and thereby lost thеir right to redeem; and (4) because the evidence presented a conflict as to the authority of James Simkin to institute the redemption proceedings and to execute the redemption bond on behalf of the cоrporate appellant. Appellants contend, on the other hand, that they strictly followed the requirements of the statutory redemption proceedings as provided for in Section 443.410 et seq. RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.; that the redemption bond was in the proper amount, and was executed by a good and sufficient surety; and that the court therefore erred in denying their petition to redeem.
In addition to the foregoing points, respondent also contends that this appeal has become moot because appellants failed to redeem, or to offer to redeem, the property foreclosed within the year following the foreclosure sale. We believe this contention is well taken.
A cause is moot when the question presented for decision seeks a judgment upon some matter which, if the judgment was rendered, could not have any practical effect upon any then еxisting controversy. Preisler v. Doherty,
The method of effecting a statutory redemption, as distinguished from an equitable redemption, is provided for by Sections 443.410 to 443.450, inclusive, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. The owner of an equity of redemption can effect such a redemptiоn only in the manner and on the conditions prescribed in the statutes and compliance with the statutes is essential. State ex rel. Hopkins v. Stemmons, Mo.App.,
As stated, the foreclosure sale of the prоperty here involved occurred on September 24, 1957. Hence, the statutory re-demption period of one year expired while this appeal was pending. At the hearing of this case on June 3, 1959, counsel for apрellants admitted that appellants had neither paid nor offered to pay, within the year following the foreclosure sale, the amount necessary to effect the redemption. It is clear that the statutory requirement that payment "'shall" be made within one year is mandatory rather than merely directory. Compare White v. Huffman, Mo.App.,
Lest it be thought that appellants’ rights have been lost through any delay attributable to the judicial process, it should be noted the transcript and our records show that the abnormal lapse of time between the taking of their appeal and the hearing of this case was due entirely to procrastination on the part of appellants; the time for the filing of their transcript was twice extended by the trial cоurt, and once by the Supreme Court, at appellants’ request, and the transcript was not, in fact, filed in that court until long after the one year period for redemption had expired. Fur *546 thermore, appellants erroneously appealed to the Supreme Court, which transferred the case to this court, where it was heard as promptly as the state of our docket permitted. In justice to appellant’s counsel of record in this court, it should be made clear that he did not enter his appearance in this case until more than a year had elapsed after the appeal was taken, the appellant having twice changed counsеl between the time the appeal was taken and the day we heard the case.
For the reasons stated, the Commissioner recommends that the appeal be dismissed.
PER CURIAM.
The foregoing opinion by DOERNER, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.