187 Ga. 30 | Ga. | 1938
1. “ Declarations by any person in the article of death, who is conscious of his condition, as to the cause of his death and the person who killed him, shall be admissible in evidence in a prosecution for the homicide.” Code, § 38-307. “A prima facie case is all that is necessary to carry dying declarations to the jury. When this has been made out, the declarations are admitted, and the ultimate determination as to whether or not the person making them was in articulo mortis and realized that death was impending is for the jury.?’ Findley v. State, 125 Ga. 579 (54 S. E. 106). “That the declarant was in articulo mortis may be shown by the nature of the wound, and the declarant’s consciousness of impending death may be established by other evidence. It need not appear from the declaration itself, and may be determined from all of the circumstances.” Simmons v. State, 181 Ga. 761, 763 (184 S. E. 291); Johnson v. State, 169 Ga. 814, 823 (152 S. E. 76), and cit.; Sisk v. State, 182 Ga. 448 (4), 453 (185 S. E. 777); Rounds v. State, 174 Ga. 308, 310 (162 S. E. 696); Jones v. State, 150 Ga. 775 (105 S. E. 495). The testimony as to the nature of the stab-wounds of the deceased and the circumstances attending his statements, made two or three hours before his death, that these wounds had been inflicted by the defendant with an icepick, was sufficient to authorize the admission of such statements as dying declarations, and a charge of the law thereon, without regard to their admissibility on the additional theory that the defendant was present when they were made. Such testimony and the circumstantial evidence for the State authorized the verdict of guilt of murder.
2. After a preliminary examination of a witness as to the alleged dying declarations, and after the return of the jury from their retirement during the examination, the court said to them: “This evidence is being admitted to you by the court for your final determination under the rules of lav/ which I will give you in charge. In other words, this evidence is being admitted for such probative value that you believe it is entitled to receive; that is, the statement when made was made by the deceased, being conscious of the fact that he was in what is known as the article of
3. The following charge was not subject to the exception that it expressed an opinion that the alleged statements of the deceased were actually made, that the deceased was in a dying condition, that his alleged statements were dying declarations, or that the deceased knew he was dying, and that the charge was erroneous in law, misstated the issues, and was confusing: “Testimony has been admitted by the court for the consideration of the jury as dying declarations which is admissible and can be considered by the jury only when it is proven that when the declarations were made the deceased was in extremis, or in the article of death, and was conscious of his condition that death was impending. The jury may determine for themselves from the evidence and facts and circumstances of the case whether or not this consciousness, if such was true at the time the alleged declaration was made by the deceased, was such a consciousness by the deceased that he was in a dying condition or in the article of death, and in arriving at the answer to this question as to whether or not he was in the article of 'death, the jury may take into consideration the nature of his wounds and the jury may infer that the deceased was conscious of being in a dying condition because of the nature of his wounds or from other circumstances as introduced before the jury. Now, gentlemen of the jury, dying declarations should always be received with great care and caution. When such evidence is admitted for the consideration of the jury, it is submitted to them as to its probative value, that is, the jury will also pass upon the question as to whether or not. such declarations were made in the article of death by the deceased, as well as the credibility of the witnesses tes
4. The doctor who attended the deceased testified; “The defendant, Buck Etheridge, was right around the bed at the time I had the conversation with the deceased. He helped put him to bed and put hot irons to him. I was not looking right at the defendant, but he was in the room.” Other witnesses testified, without dispute by evidence or by the statement of the defendant, that he was standing at the foot of the bed of the deceased at the time of the alleged statements, admitted as dying declarations, and that the defendant made no reply or statement with reference thereto. Immediately after the testimony quoted, the court said, in the presence of the jury: '“It would not necessarily require a consciousness of death upon the part of. the deceased in order to receive that testimony, but it should not be confused, and I will attempt to prevent the jury from combining it with a dying declaration.” The court did not charge as to the admission of this evidence and similar alleged statements by the deceased, except on the theory of dying declarations as stated. The quoted statement
5. The judge charged as follows: '“If you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed the deceased, and if you find from the evidence establishing the homicide that there were no facts of justification, alleviation, or mitigation, you would have the right to imply that the killing 'was' felonious and constituted murder, and the burden then would be shifted to the defendant to rebut such presumption of a felonious killing by proof or his statement that the killing was not done with malice aforethought either express or implied, but under facts establishing justification, alleviation, or mitigation; and if he fails to rebut such presumption, you would be authorized to find him guilty of the offense of murder.” The undisputed evidence showed that the deceased was killed by being repeatedly and fatally. stabbed with an ice-pick, and that he and his home had been set on fire. The defendant in his statement merely denied generally that he had anything to do with the killing, or that he was at the house of the deceased until after the deceased was found in such condition. The charge complained of was not erroneous, in the absence of any proved fact or circumstance indicating justification, or alleviation, excuse, or accident. See Fitzpatrick v. State, 149 Ga. 75 (3), 80 (99 S. E. 128); Gaillard v. State, 149 Ga. 190 (99 S. E. 629); Hudgins v. State, 2 Ga. 188; Mann v. State, 124 Ga. 760, 762 (53 S. E. 324, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 934), and cit.; Benton v. State, 185 Ga. 254, 255 (2) (194 S. E. 166); Brown v. State, 184 Ga. 305 (191 S. E. 108), and cit. In Patterson v. State, 181 Ga. 698, 702 (184 S. E. 309), where only the use of words assuming that there
6. The court did not err in charging that “Moral and reasonable certainty is all the law requires in a legal investigation,” without giving the rest of Code, § 38-105, that “in all civil cases the preponderance of 'evidence is considered sufficient to produce mental conviction,'” and that “in criminal cases a greater strength of mental conviction is held necessary to justify a verdict of guilty,” where, immediately after tire language complained of, the court charged the correct rule in criminal cases, substantially as codified in § 38-110, “but, whether dependent upon positive or circumstantial evidence, the true question in every criminal case is not whether it be possible that the conclusion to which the evidence points may be false, but whether or not there is sufficient evidence to satisfy the minds and 'consciences of the jury of the defendant’s guilt under the indictment as therein alleged beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Howell v. State, 160 Ga. 899 (4, 5) (129 S. E. 436); Williams v. State, 125 Ga. 302 (3), 306 (54 S. E. 108).
7. The first count of the indictment charged the defendant with murdering the deceased by stabbing and cutting with an ice-pick; and the second count, with murdering him by stabbing and cutting with an ice-pick and setting fire to his body and house. The undisputed evidence showed that while the deceased was found in a dying condition, stabbed with an ice-pick and afire, the stab wounds rather than burns caused death. The judge read the first count to the jury, and then charged: "“That is count number one, gentlemen, of the indictment, and the other count, which is count number two of the •indictment, 'is withdrawn by the State, and it is not necessary that I should read that count to you, but only to instruct you that you would not be authorized to find him guilty under the second count of the indictment.” Later he charged: “ If jmu believe that the State has not carried the burden which is imposed upon the State and the defendant is not guilty of the crime of murder as alleged in count one of the indictment, it would be your duty to find the defendant not guilty, and in that event the form of your verdict would be, ‘We the jury find the defendant not
8. There was no expression of opinion or misstatement of the contentions of the defendant, such as reasonably might have confused the jury, in the charge that “The defendant, as I have already stated to you, . . denies his guilt of the crime of murn dler, and says that he is guilty of no offense under this indictment for the reason that he did not slay the deceased as is alleged in count one of the indictment;” or in the charge that “He contends . . that he was not at the scene of the crime and he did not inflict any of the wounds which resulted in the death of the deceased which are alleged in count one of the indictment.”
Judgment affirmed.