176 Ga. 388 | Ga. | 1933
This was a habeas-corpus case, in which R. G. Etheridge sought to he discharged from the custody of M. C. Poston, warden of the chain-gang of Seminole County. The judge of the superior court, after hearing evidence, passed an order remanding the applicant to the custody of the warden; and the applicant excepted. It appeared from the allegations of the petition that the authority- claimed by the warden for holding the applicant in custody was a sentence of the Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of Seminole County wherein the applicant was adjudged to be a road-tax defaulter. The sentence as introduced in evidence at the hearing was as follows: “Gordon Etheridge having been tried and found guilty and adjudged to be a road-tax defaulter, the* said Gordon Etheridge was sentenced by the board to serve a term-of 25 days in the chain-gang of said countjr, from which he may be relieved upon the payment of the sum of $9.50 to include the costs; however, said sentence is suspended and the operation thereof is not to take effect until January 1, 1932; and if in the meantime the de
The other contentions are stated in the bill of exceptions as follows: (2) “That said sentence being dated November 3, 1931, and [the applicant] having been arrested on March 14, 1932; that since no certiorari had been issued, no motion for new trial pending, no attempt to enforce said sentence by arrest or otherwise until March 14, 1932; that he had not absconded, but had remained in Seminole County at all times; that he had been accessible and within reach of the authorities at all times; that he had not been notified in any manner or form of the passing of said sentence and did not know thereof; that for these reasons said sentence had expired.” (3) “That said sentence providing that the same be suspended until January 1, 1932, thereby sentencing applicant to „work 25 days in the year 1932 for the payment of 1931 road taxes, was void under the law.” (4) “That in waiting until March 14, 1932, to notify applicant or to attempt to enforce said sentence which applicant knew not of, although said sentence was alleged to have been passed in November, 1931, that applicant’s right to the writ of certiorari had expired, leaving applicant no other remedy except the writ of habeas corpus; applicant further contended at
Judgment affirmed,.