12 Wend. 399 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1834
By the Court,
The objection to the plea principally relied upon is, that it professes to answer, and does-in fact answer only a.part of the declaration.
The declaration and bill of particulars show the plaintiff’s-claim to be for two years rent of the premises, commencing on the first of April, 1829, and ending on the first of April, 1831. The plea sets up a bar to the recovery of any rent which accrued on or before the first of April, 1830, but neither admits nor denies the claim for the rent of 1831. This is a fatal defect, according to the cases of Sterling v. Sherwood, 20 Johns. R. 204, Hecock v. Coates. 2 Wendell, 419, and Slocum v. Despard, 8 id. 615, where all the'authorities are referred to. In England, according to Mr. Chitty and Sergeant Saunders, 1 Chitty’s Pl. 509, 1 Saunders, 28, n. 1, 2, 3, if a
If it were an open question, this would appear to me to be the sound rule upon the subject; but since the case in 20 Johnson, the rule in this court has been considered different, and perhaps ought not now to be disturbed, especially as it is rather a matter of form than of substance. It may also be said, in support of the decision and principle alluded to, that as a general rule, each plea must stand or fall by itself, and cannot therefore be supported by any other plea; and that therefore, in testing the sufficiency of a special plea, no regard can be paid to the general issue.
The principle of the plea is sound. So far as the subject matter in controversy has been once adjudicated upon the parties are concluded by it. Outram v. Morewood, 3 East, 346. 3 Cowen, 120. 3 Wendell, 32. 6 id. 288. Duchess of Kingston’s case, 11 State Trials, 261. 1 Phil. Ev. 223.
Judgment for plaintiff on demurrer, with leave to defendant to amend, on payment of costs.